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This study explores the political, social and economic transformation of Islamic 
entrepreneurs in Turkey, their emergence and their progress into a large, politically and 
socially influential business elite. The focus of this historical analysis of Turkish 
political economy is on the relations between the state, business and the interdependent 
relations of the new entrepreneurship. Also, the way of the interaction of this new 
Islamic entrepreneurship with Turkish modernization, which is dominated by the 
Turkish state, is one of the important steps in the line of the theoretical analysis. The 
economic, social and political trajectory of Islamic business people in the last two 
decades is examined in terms of the commonalities and differences in the perspectives 
of members and executives of two Islamic business people associations: the Association 
of Independent Businessmen and Industrialists (MÜSİAD) and the Confederation of 
Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON), with a focus on politics, religion, 
culture and business relations. 
This research consists of a comparative analysis of the views, perceptions, and 
life-stories of the members of MÜSİAD and TUSKON, which were gathered through a 
field research based on the interviews conducted in the years between 2013-2014. The 
interviews sought pathways to extract the data on the emergence of a new, Islamic 
approach to business life, cultural change, political views, and governmental relations in 
both political and economic levels in a country that is constitutionally secular. The 
empirical and theoretical analysis of this study demonstrates that the over-generalizing 
reductions of Euro-centric and orientalist perspectives on Islamic business people are 
incorrect to a significant extent. The case of Turkish modernization was examined in 
this context by employing the multiple modernities approach to understand this 
phenomenon within the Turkish modernization process. It is concluded that the Islamic 
business is both a significant case for understanding the interaction of Islam with 
Turkish modernity and also it constitutes a social and economic background for the 
transoformation of new conservative polity in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER -1- INTRODUCTION 
In this study, I shall attempt to explore the political, social and economic 
development and transformation of a new phenomenon, Islamic entrepreneurs in 
Turkey, since their emergence as small merchants and manufacturers, and their progress 
into a large, influential business class, social elite and political actor. Islamic 
entrepreneurship in Turkey has increasingly become the centre of attention of the media 
as these entrepreneurs have grown in economic and political power. However, as 
represented in the media they have been exposed to several political and cultural 
stereotypes and generalizations, irrespective of a number of academic studies more 
accurately capturing elements of this phenomenon’s reality. This research aims to 
further elucidate parts of this relatively new phenomenon and offers an analysis of 
Islamic entrepreneurship in its various aspects. 
The study will be based on a combination of historical and empirical analysis of 
this new economic and social movement. I will start with an historical and theoretical 
analysis of this phenomenon and will continue with the analysis of data extracted from 
qualitative research on Islamic entrepreneurship. My focus in the historical analysis will 
be on the relations between the state and business; the influence of, and reactions to 
Turkish modernization in terms of the political, cultural and religious perspectives of 
this group; and the interdependent relations of new entrepreneurs with conservative 
politics. I will also explore the changes in right-wing politics over the last two decades 
by examining the commonalities and differences in the perspectives of members and 
executives of two Islamic business people’s associations: the Association of 
Independent Businessmen and Industrialists (MÜSİAD) and the Confederation of 
Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON), focusing on their increasing 
influence on Turkish conservative politics. 
The unique combination of Islamic values and principles with secular, modern 
business and politics will open a discussion on the possibility of the co-existence of 
modernization and Islamic conservatism, especially in the frame of modern capitalist 
development. The changes in their political and ideological standpoints, and the 
changing role and structure of their political identities through time will be considered. 
The function of the religious, core role in business life, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the labels ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’ for business people that emerged 
and developed in the period of secularist oppression of the 1990s will be evaluated, and 
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the similarities and differences between the progress of MÜSİAD and of TUSKON in 
the 2000s and onwards will be explored. Since Islamic entrepreneurship is an on-going 
process, this study will also cover the on-going changes in the associations, their 
memberships and their political positions. 
This research will consist of a comparative analysis of the views, perceptions 
and pasts of the members of MÜSİAD and TUSKON, and analysis of the emergence of 
a religious approach to business life, political views and governmental relations in terms 
of both politics and economics. 
First I will examine the organization of work, business networks, partnerships, 
and labour relations on the economic level. The functioning and importance of moral 
economy of kin in these business relations are highlighted. Capital accumulation and 
borrowed money for investments will be analysed from the perspective of the role of 
religion and kinship in Islamic business in Turkey. This religious perspective is very 
important to consider due to Islamic restrictions over interest (riba) in the context of 
Islamic finance. The central role of religion and its application and relevance to bank 
interest and trade with secularist parts of Turkish society and non-Muslim societies such 
as Western/ Israeli firms will provide a key for discussion of the relationship between 
Islam and capitalism in the frame of these new entrepreneurs. How does Islam function 
for them in their business and political networks? Is there a kind of commodification of 
religious symbols or materials? What is the role of ‘Muslim’ identity’s emphasis in a 
constitutionally secular country? 
Second, the dynamics of the socio-cultural transformation of Islamic business 
people is revealed. The changing lifestyles of Islamic entrepreneurs in the making of a 
new social elite where Islamic religious principles of social life, Turkish traditions and 
values confronting the social heritage of the Westernization polices of the Kemalist 
Republic, military interventions and the effects of globalization will all be investigated 
and discussed in the socio-cultural aspect of Islamic entrepreneurship. 
Third, changing political standpoints and related ideological positioning are also 
very important. Specifically, their relationship with the conservative AK Party (Justice 
and Development Party) government, which has been ruling the country since 2002, 
will be a pivotal point in this analysis. Their political pasts and the reasons for these 
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entrepreneurs evolving into proponents of new conservatism (politically represented by 
the Justice and Development Party, hereafter, AK Party
1
), and how this new 
conservatism underlies democracy, pluralism and a liberal economy in combination with 
Islamic and national references in political discourse will be explored. The influence of 
the Gulen Movement
2
 on TUSKON will be discussed in context of the TUSKON-
member business people. This analysis will be based upon a historical analysis to 
provide a theoretical framework upon which to interpret the field study, which is 
composed of in-depth interviews with both MÜSİAD and TUSKON members, and 
observations in their workplaces and associations. 
1.1. Conceptual Framework 
The assumption that the only way towards modernization should necessarily be 
acceptance of the Western cultural programme of modernity is open to debate, 
considering the modernization processes in non-Western countries like Japan, China, 
India, and Singapore. This assumption was widespread among classical theories of 
modernity until 1950, as seen in Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and others. “They all 
assumed, even if only implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity as it developed 
in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would 
ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of 
modernity, they would prevail throughout the world” (Eisenstadt, 2000, p.1). 
Is Westernization the only way to become modernized? This question is central 
in the ‘multiple modernities’ approach that is articulated by discussing and comparing 
the basic parameters of Western modernity and ‘non-Western modernization projects’. 
The ‘multiple modernities’ approach (adopted by scholars like S.N. Eisenstadt, G. 
Preyer, and M. Rosati) presents a challenge to the mono-civilizational narratives of 
Western modernity. “It attempts to re-introduce some of the pluralistic features of 
Western modernity that were repressed, marginalized, or simply forgotten on the side 
1
The “Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi” is generally translated into English as the “Justice and 
Development Party”. Though the party officially uses the “AK Parti” shorthand, “AK Party” in English, 
some scholars prefer “AKP” rather than “AK Party”, due to the controversial usage of the term of “ak”, 
which means pure, white, and clean. However, as the party chose to use “AK Party” as the official 
shorthand, the “Justice and Development Party” has been abbreviated as such throughout this study free 
from any political bias. 
2
Gulen movement is officially recognized as a terrorist group (named as FETO – Fetullahist 
Terrorist Organization) by the Turkish State in 2014. In this study the economic and social activities 
affiliated by TUSKON is analyzed rather than the criminal activities of the Gulenist terrorist organization 
(FETO).
 
Page | 14 
paths of modernity’s historical and intellectual trajectory. It also attempts to open up 
readings of the modernization of other civilizations and cultures” (Gole, 2000, p.91). 
Instead of binary oppositions, exclusions or ‘clashes of civilizations’, this approach 
brings synthesis, cross-fertilization and cultural relativities into the discussion. 
The cultural, traditional and religious foundations of Islam are often excluded in 
Euro-centric analyses of modernities in different parts of the world. Orthodox secular 
methodologies presume the idea that religion cannot exist within the political arena. 
Religion is often seen as a reason for being reactionary, deviant and backward. 
According to this view, religion cannot survive in the modern era. However, this strict 
secularist assumption of the 19th century is falsified today by the fact that religion still 
plays a very important role in every sphere of social life. Religion may have lost some 
of its institutions and leading figures in the Middle Ages, but has not lost its power or 
commonality (Bayraktar & Durgun, 2011, p.19) Weber’s theory of The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism demonstrates the continuing influence of religion in social 
and economic progress. What about the compatibility of modernity and Islam as a 
religion and civilization? (Weber, 2002) 
It has been argued that Islam is incompatible with the development of modernity 
and modern capitalism. Even though he thinks that the Protestant Ethic played an 
important role in the development of modern capitalism, Weber thinks that Islam’s 
concepts of predetermined fate caused a war-like, fatalistic culture, which is not suitable 
for the emergence of capitalism (Weber, 1968, pp.574-575). To develop modern 
capitalism, Lerner invited Muslims to choose between mechanization and Mecca 
(Lerner, 1958, p.405). These concepts influenced Muslim intellectuals in their views of 
modernization. 
Maxime Rodinson, in his book Islam and Capitalism (1974) targeted the 
refutation of Max Weber’s reputable arguments about the relationship of Islam to 
Capitalism. Rodinson cites verses from the Quran that give relevant principles: The 
Quran says nothing against private property, wage-labour or commerce – “One must not 
forget one’s portion of this world” (Quran, 28:77) – and it also suggests that trade is 
important and should be continued even during the pilgrimages (Rodinson, 1974, p.14). 
Also, the life and words of the Prophet Muhammad contain no single obstacle to the 
principles and progress of capitalism. Rodinson adds that the society where Islam was 
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born and developed was already a centre of capitalistic trade (Rodinson, 1974, p.28). He 
later states that: 
We have seen that there was always a capitalistic sector in the countries of Islam, and this was 
even very extensive in certain periods. One cannot, however, speak of a capitalist socio-
economic formation existing in the middle ages. Such a formation presupposes a capitalist 
economic system as its basis – that is, a system in which the capitalist sector plays a 
predominant role, influencing the other sectors without being influenced by them to any 
important extent. This was far from being the Muslim Middle Ages (Rodinson, 1974, p.118). 
Rodinson concludes that there is no correlation between Islam and any particular 
economic system, nor any evidence that Islam did not create any commercial activity or 
opposed it. The leaders of the Islamic expansion were traders, and the spread of Islam 
into three continents happened mostly via trade. Also, in the last 200 years, no strong 
opposition or hesitation to trade occurred in any Muslim country (Rodinson, 1974, 
p.186).
Rodinson not only considers the material aspect of capitalism, but also opposes 
Weber’s opinion that Islam is an obstacle to rationality. It is worth quoting Rodinson at 
length to have an insight into his claims that rationality dominates Islam and Islamic 
texts. 
The Quran is a holy book in which rationality plays a big part. In it Allah is continually arguing 
and reasoning… It is said again and again that the prophets have brought ‘the evidences’… The 
Quran continually expounds the rational proofs of Allah’s omnipotence: the wonders of 
creation, such as the gestation of animals, the movements of the heavenly bodies, atmospheric 
phenomena, the variety of animal and vegetable life so marvelously well adapted to men’s 
needs (Quran, 3: 187/190)…. Repeated about fifty times in the Quran is the verb ‘aqala’ which 
means ‘connect ideas together, reason, understand an intellectual argument’. Thirteen times we 
come upon the refrain, after a piece of reasoning: ‘a-fa-la ta’quling, ‘have ye then no sense?’ 
(2:41/44). The infidels, those who remain insensible to Muhammad’s preaching, are 
stigmatized as ‘a people of no intelligence’, persons incapable of the intellectual effort needed 
to cast off routine thinking (5:63/58, 102/103; 43:42; 22:45/ 59:14). In this respect they are like 
cattle (2:166/171; 25:46/44)… Allah particularly detests those who are unwilling to subject 
their fundamental ideas to re-examination: such people are the worst of all in his eyes 
(8:23)…All that Allah can do, given the existence of human free will, is to set down these 
signs, which are conclusive pointers to the truth, if only men will set to work their senses and 
their faculty of reasoning (24:61; 57: 16/17) (Rodinson, 1974, pp.79-80). 
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In debates on the relationship between Islam and modernity and modern 
institutions like progress, rationality and capitalism, basically, three approaches 
emerged. The first approach suggested that the only way to become modernized is being 
culturally Westernized, because Islam and the traditional values of Islamic countries are 
obstacles to progress, as Weber and Lerner argued above. The second approach 
suggested that Islam should be reformed and made compatible with modernity. The 
third view is an Islamist reactionary view and is in total opposition to the first two 
approaches. This third, Islamist reactionary view holds that Muslim countries should be 
against anything coming from the West – even capitalism itself – and should seek the 
welfare of the Muslims in the roots of the Islamic Golden Age of the Prophet 
Mohammad’s time. 
Historically, the Islamic world started to interact with modernity through 
experience of Western colonialism, which included economic, technological and 
military expansion. All the Muslim countries (except Turkey and Iran) witnessed 
“modernization projects” externally enforced by Western colonialist occupations. The 
appropriation of modern themes and institutions led these non-European societies to 
actively participate in the new modernity, but a modernity initially based upon the 
Western tradition, which took the hegemony of the Western formulations of the cultural 
programme of modernity for granted (Eisenstadt, 2000, p.14). In many of these 
countries, groups of political, economic and social elites accepted Western cultural 
programmes of modernity and formed local agencies of the cultural, political and 
economic colonialism of the West. However, in most Islamic countries, which had 
colonial pasts, there have materialized strong reactionary Islamist movements that 
oppose and reject whatever ‘others’ bring. Struggles with the issues and the trauma of 
colonial heritage often lead to strict fundamentalism. Islam affects all spheres of life 
from faith to gender relations, private and public boundaries, scientific knowledge and 
governance principles. The Islamic history of civilizational antagonism is manifested in 
attempts to make a past-oriented change (returning to the Islamic golden age of the 
Prophet), a ‘top-down Islamization’ of society, submission of the individual to religious 
precepts, and a rejection of the dominant features of modernity (Göle, 1997, p.93). In 
this sense, Islamists equate modernity with Western culture just as orthodox modernist 
theorists do, by considering the acceptance of Western cultural programs as a 
prerequisite for modernization. As a result, these two opposite poles share similar 
perspectives on modernity. 
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However, this was not the only response to Western Imperialism: There is a 
‘third way’ among Muslim intellectuals who approach the issues of colonialism, 
modernity and colonialist dominance. This third group of scholars and politicians 
suggests the idea of a reformism in the cultural, political and economic institutions by 
aiming to improve the Muslim society and to reach the development level of Europe 
without accepting the precepts of Cultural Westernization. Such figures include Saiyid 
Ahmad Khan, who tried to found a new educational reform process for the Muslim 
community in pre-partition India by founding a modern university called Aligarh 
College, and Muhammad Abduh, in Egypt, who advocated the compatibility of rational, 
capitalist entrepreneurship with the Islamic religion, and offered the establishment of 
modern educational institutions in Egypt to make this possible (Malik, 1963, p.221; 
Tripp, 2006, p.41; Hourani, 1962, p.131). On the other hand, the intellectual and 
political figure Muhammad Iqbal suggested the reformation of Islamic law by saying 
that Islamic law is capable of evolution, and tried to prove that Islamic principles were 
not obstacles to the development of the Muslim community in pre-partition India and 
that this reformation is not against the essence of Islam (Malik, 1963, p.253). This third 
way of reformist thinking was criticized from advocates of both the first two 
approaches: by the Westernists, who thought that the religion of Islam or the culture 
itself are obstacles to development, and by the Orthodox Islamists, who viewed this 
reformism as heretic and accused them of trying to harm Islam. 
1.2. The State, Modernization and Religion in the Turkish Republic 
Turkey provides an ideal case study for a discussion of the duality of Western 
modernity and Islam. Historically, as the centre of one of the largest Islamic 
civilizations, Turkey is a primary figure in the Islamic world. Turkey is also unique 
because it has never been colonialized, and the Turkish modernization process began 
without colonial influence. Even so, Turkish modernization shares much in common 
with Islamic countries that faced forced Western modernization experiences, and 
Turkey even went beyond these Islamic countries in this culturally Westernizing and 
secularist modernization. 
From the time Ataturk founded the Republic of Turkey, the official 
ideology of the state was called ‘Kemalism’ after his death. Kemalist  modernization 
had some basic premises: 1) accepting cultural Westernization as the only way of 
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modernization; 2) viewing religion as an obstacle to modernity and progress, and 
limiting religion to the private sphere rather than the public, using the state as the only 
agent of political, cultural and economic development and rejecting the possibility of a 
multiplicity of modernities as seen in the cultural plurality of modernization projects in 
different parts of the world. Denying its historical, traditional, cultural and religious 
heritage, from its foundation in 1923 the Turkish state has maintained a revolutionary 
process by trying to change the overtly religious nature of Turkish culture. 
The establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and its strictly implemented 
secularist policies and Western cultural values changed all spheres of society as part of 
modernization. Cultural revolutions during the 1920s and 1930s were examples of the 
authoritarian secularization and Westernization of the country. Notable changes include 
the replacement of the traditional Ottoman script with Latin script, the legislative 
enforcement of wearing Western clothes, the forbidding of Turkish classical and folk 
music and encouragement of classical Western music, the banning of religious orders 
and brotherhoods, and the creation of a constitutional basis for state power and control 
over religious institutions in this process. This Westernized secular modernity caused a 
duality between the secularist centre (the state) and the religious periphery consisting of 
rural Anatolia and urban peripheries. However, the secularist Euro-centric approach to 
discussing the alleged antagonism between modernism and religion in Turkey ignores 
the fact that the cultural aspect of Western modernity was established in a European 
Christian context which has significant differences from the social and historical 
conditions and development of Turkish society (Bayraktar & Durgun, 2011, p.19). The 
false assumption that the emergence of modernity will necessarily be the same for both 
Christian and Islamic societies led to an over-generalized and Euro-centric outlook. 
Not only religion, but also all the traditional values and ideas were assumed to 
disappear in the modern era. This assumption led some ‘modernists’ to apply 
Westernization policies besides anti-religionism. 
“While Western modernization came out as a result of its historical-social 
conditions and within its own tradition, Turkish modernization was shaped as a kind of 
imitation, perceiving another history as if its own and being irrespective of its own 
historical accumulation” (Bayraktar & Durgun, 2011, p.23). Rather than a change in 
socio-economic structure, changes in cultural and political systems were considered to 
be the path to modernization in the Republican period of Turkey. 
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In this study, both the state-centred Western and secularist modernization project 
of Kemalism and the fundamentalist religious approach of Islamism that rejects modern 
progress and universal values are criticized and will be explored and discussed. 
‘Islamic’ is a generic name employed by the media, some academics, and 
entrepreneurs to describe the new type of entrepreneurial class in Turkey. One of the 
crucial questions that can be raised about Islamic entrepreneurship is the choice of the 
labels ‘Islamic’ and ‘Muslim’, disadvantageous terms in a period of strict secularist 
authoritarianism in which legal and juridical obstacles were placed against Islamic 
political and religious backgrounds. As a concept, Turkish Islamic business people’s 
principles prioritize Islamic work ethics in the labour process, in capital accumulation 
and in financial policies, but do not address certain specific areas, such as consumption. 
Their daily routine, in which Islam is embedded, is not visibly the opposite of others’. 
Secularist capitalism has depicted the function of religious communities in networking 
and partnerships in the process of the growth of Islamic business as being part of a 
secret agenda since the financial and social growth of these entrepreneurs. This growth 
has been connected with the strengthening of the Welfare Party in the 1990s, which was 
labeled as Islamist, and, since 2002, with the government party of the AK Party, which 
identifies itself as conservative democrat. 
The labels ‘Islamic’, ‘Islamist’ and ‘Conservative’ have been used to define a 
group of people in different time periods interchangeably as if they have the same or 
similar meanings in the literature of politics and sociology, especially in the case of 
Turkey. This study will examine these labels and explore how these entrepreneurs 
define themselves and how they function in the economic, social and political spheres 
of their lives. In a preliminary discussion before analysing the data from my fieldwork, 
the term ‘Islamic’ will be used to identify this group of people, to indicate religious and 
cultural background rather than political or ideological connotations. 
The concept of ‘conservative’ as used in this study is a composition of attitudes, 
mostly related to being religious, traditional, and protective of the pre-secular cultural 
values prior to cultural Westernization. Since the Republican state ideology defined 
itself as ‘revolutionary’ in terms of Westernizing the society, those who wish to protect 
their traditional and religious values, lifestyles and principles position themselves as 
‘conservative’ in terms of resistance to this cultural revolution. So the conservatism in 
Turkish political discussions refers to a cultural conservatism rather than a political one. 
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The nuances between the terms of ‘Islamic’, ‘Islamist’, ‘Muslim’ and 
‘Conservative’ in this work are functional in understanding and describing the 
contemporary social and political developments in Turkey, especially within the Islamic 
business class. ‘Muslim’ is a concept to identify people believing in Islam without 
claiming any social or political goals, whereas Islamism indicates a radical top-down 
Islamization of the society in a revolutionary way. ‘Islamic’ refers to a social and 
cultural viewpoint in which public space is determined by symbols, by lifestyles, 
and a way of doing business and presenting religiosity without necessarily 
promoting radical change and while benefiting from the opportunities of the liberal-
democratic system (Yankaya, 2014, pp.24-26). ‘Conservative’ and ‘Islamic’ are 
sometimes used interchangeably in this work, however ‘conservative’ mostly refers to 
the political reflection of this Islamic social realization in terms of culture and 
lifestyle. Conservatism arises from the desire to protect Islamic national and 
traditional values of the society from cultural Westernization and secular authoritarian 
anti-religionism. In order to ascertain whether modernity, including capitalism as 
a modern institution, is compatible with Islam, I will focus on the ways in which the 
conservative/Islamic part of Turkish society interacts with modernity. 
The new entrepreneurs may be defined as ‘new’ and ‘challenging’ in terms of 
undermining the economic power structure through religious motives. These reformist 
features do not contradict their conservative features since these entrepreneurs can be 
reformist in terms of business and political economy, but conservative in the cultural-
political arena. In contemporary Turkish political debates, the term ‘Islamism’ in this 
sense symbolizes being radical, revolutionary, and categorically anti-Western and anti-
secularist whereas the term ‘conservative’ is characterized by moderation, tolerance, 
and open-ness to democracy and to a global market economy. This combination of 
attitudes manifests both in the private sphere of religious practices, lifestyles and 
fashion, and in the public sphere of participation in religious movements or 
communities, in their supporting the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) which 
defines itself as “Conservative Democrat” in its party programme in terms of business 
life, and in their way of making business networks or partnerships with people with 
similar traditional and religious values and attitudes. 
Yalcin Akdogan – who was the chief advisor of Erdogan when he founded the 
AK Party in 2001, became Vice-Deputy in 2013 and is known as the ideologue of the 
party – defines conservative democracy thus: 
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Conservative democracy does not propose revolutionary but evolutionary change while 
protecting traditional values and achievements. The political establishment should have been 
saved from extremism, radicalism and social engineering. Conservative democracy is based on 
the culture of dialogue and agreement of social differences (Akdogan, 2004, pp.15-17). 
According to the AK Party, Turkey should replace its less-developed democracy 
with a democracy relying on pluralism, multiplicities of ideas and voices and mutual 
tolerances. The ideal democracy is an organic democracy that spreads to all 
administrative, social and political spaces; not only reduced to the election (Akdogan, 
2004, pp.15-18). 
“We are cultural conservatives. We refer to conservatism by emphasizing the 
traditional and cultural heritage of Turkey” (Akdogan, 2004, p.111). The strengthening 
of freedoms and human rights, democratization of the state, removal of obstacles to the 
operation of the free market economy, full membership of the European Union, and 
opposing religious extremism and militarist hegemony are the main headlines that 
Akdogan emphasizes. He adds that, in a country like Turkey where different religions 
and sects exist, if a party defines itself as ‘Muslim’ that will cause polarizations and 
exclusions (Akdogan, 2004, p.111). By saying “we are cultural conservatives” Akdogan 
attempted to separate them from ‘political reformism’ by adding that they defend 
reformism in Turkey. In a country where deep cultural revolutions have occurred, the 
reactions to these cultural revolutions becomes identified as ‘culturally conservative’, 
and Turkey is a unique example both where this kind of strong cultural revolution 
happens, and where reactions to these revolutions have gained a political identity, 
cultural conservatism. 
In the literature it is argued that ‘the centre’ and ‘the periphery’ can be used as 
key concepts in explaining Turkish politics. It has been suggested that the duality is 
between the authoritarian secularist, Republican, Westernized elite, with its bonds to the 
large Turkish capitalists as ‘centre’, and the broad Islamic masses conserving traditions 
as the ‘periphery’ (Göle, 1997; Gellner, 1981; Heper, 1985 Mardin, 1973, 1995; Öniş, 
1997, p. 744; Toprak, 2006) This Islamic ‘periphery’ is deemed to be the primary social 
base of Islamic resurgence in Turkey (Cemrek, 2004 p.90). Heper analyses the state-
religion relations in Republican Turkey by referring to the impacts of ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ in the 1920s and 1930s and concluding that the Islamic resurgence has 
much to do with the psychological and cultural consequences of the secularization 
process pioneered by the Kemalist regime (Heper, 1985). 
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The core of Islamic entrepreneurship has been in Anatolia. Anatolia provides a 
stark contrast to the cosmopolitan outlook of Istanbul, which can be defined as 
representing the centre in terms of economy and society. The vast Turkish interior is 
seen as impoverished and ‘non-European’ in its values, and Anatolia, with its rural 
economy and Islamic culture, is seen as the heartland of this ‘peripheral’ Turkey (ESI, 
2005). On the other hand, the traditional centres for commerce and industry in Turkey 
are located in the Western part of the country, primarily in the cities of Istanbul, 
Ankara, Bursa and Izmir. These cities are the heartland of economic activity as well as 
the secularized, Westernized social life and culture in Turkey, which suits the principles 
of the founder of the Republic, Kemal Ataturk. 
The change towards liberal, moderate conservatism in the periphery has a socio-
economic context. With the help of the shift from the East, and an import-substituting 
economic policy that supports and protects the large capitalist group that were created 
by the state and designed to control business on the axis of Kemalist Westernization 
towards a neo-liberal, exporting based economic policy that started to support small or 
middle scale entrepreneurs, a new group of entrepreneurs emerged in Turkey. This new 
group is different not only in terms of the scales of their businesses, but they also 
represent the cultural majority of the country who are religious, conservative and 
traditional. Because of its religious and cultural background this business is named 
Islamic Business. 
Anatolia has witnessed a huge transformation starting from the 1980s, and 
especially from the 1990s onwards, which turned the fortune of the region from being 
an economic and political periphery to having a more centralized role. With its rural, 
patriarchal and Islamic social settings, Anatolia was the core of backwardness, with 
limited industrial and commercial activity and extreme support of political parties who 
defined themselves as conservative. After the 1990s, Anatolia witnessed an economic 
miracle that has turned a number of former trading towns into prosperous 
manufacturing centres (ESI, 2005). Both the number and capacity of these new 
entrepreneurs rose dramatically after the middle of the 1990s. 
The change was not limited to the Anatolian rural periphery; much of Turkey 
went through a massive urbanization process that changed all the sociological and 
economic conditions of the country. In 2011, about three persons out of four lived in 
urban areas in Turkey, up from around 20% of the population in 1950. This change in 
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numbers means a change in society as well. Besides this social change, the new 
entrepreneurship has driven the emergence of a new middle class which is different to 
the previous one in that it relies upon civic identities, which have much less to do with 
state intervention in conserving the national, religious and traditional values. 
This social and economic transformation did not only occur in the Anatolian 
periphery. It also happened in the urban areas. The demographic and cultural structure 
of big cities like Istanbul and Ankara changed because of the internal migration from 
rural areas. The expansion was seen not only in population and geography, but also in 
the lives of the people affected, and this transformed the secularist, Westernized cultural 
and political structure. This can be observed in election results in municipalities that 
since 1994 have had a strong Islamic discourse and conservative opposition to the 
Kemalist-Westernist governments in both Istanbul and Ankara.
The studies on Islamic entrepreneurship mostly focus on its emergence and 
influence on the Anatolian periphery (mainly Central Anatolia), and underline their 
changing nature: “we are no longer faced with a space and living, which is identified 
with ‘underdevelopment’, ‘traditionality’ or ‘periphery’ (Keyman & Lorosdagi, 2010). 
According to the 2005 ESI report, “a number of Anatolian trading centres that once 
ranged along the old silk routes have undergone an industrial revolution which has 
turned them into major manufacturing centres and players in the global economy” (ESI, 
2005). They were “loyal to religious values, but open to change” and had a high degree 
of economic rationality (ESI, 2005). 
However, if we look at the whole picture, Islamic entrepreneurship cannot be 
limited to the Anatolian periphery; it should include the Islamic business at its core, i.e., 
in the big cities of the country like Istanbul, Ankara and Bursa. Even the Islamic 
business in this region should be the primary focus, since in terms of numbers and scale, 
the Islamic entrepreneurs in this region are larger and more influential than the Islamic 
business enterprises on the periphery. 
Especially after the governments of the Welfare Party (RP, 1995-1997) and the 
Justice and Development Party (2002-present), this newly emerged entrepreneur group 
transformed into an important economic and political power in the country. The owners 
of large media groups, being members of the top-100 largest Turkish businessmen list, 
gained political power by becoming MPs or sponsors in the government party, and 
transforming into a large capitalist group that is able to compete with and challenge the 
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secularist, Westernized capitalists’ hegemony in the Turkish economy. These are the 
features of these new Islamic entrepreneurs who grew to a large-scale. These features 
signal a recent change in Turkey that also has political dimensions, which can be seen 
with the huge electoral power of the AK Party that is supported by the majority of new 
Islamic entrepreneurs in terms of finance, media promotion and campaigning. 
1.3. The Factions of Islamic Business 
The social, economic and political representatives of the Islamic entrepreneurs 
are the business associations: MÜSİAD and TUSKON. These two associations aim to 
represent Islamic entrepreneurs by forming both networks of mutual trust and solidarity 
in the situations of economic or political uncertainties or crises, and a new 
entrepreneurial ideology as well, but they also differ among themselves. Business 
associations like MÜSİAD and TUSKON are very important in terms of making 
business networking and collective identity possible. TUSKON has about 50,000 
individual members and MÜSİAD has almost individual 11,000 members in total. 
These associations help their members to share information about the opportunities and 
difficulties in several spheres of business. These associations also give opportunities to 
business people to meet new people in business, bureaucracy and cultural networks that 
help them to access higher status people and to build connections and partnerships. 
Moreover these associations help business people to gain status and consciousness of 
identity by emphasizing political standpoints and religious–political identities. 
Furthermore, the spread of ideology as a bridge between the political party of the 
government and the business community is very influential. These are not simply 
solidarity organizations of business people; these organizations also have an important 
political role in spreading and supporting conservative politics in Turkey. 
MÜSİAD members are individuals; kinship networks or business partners who 
prioritize religious and traditional values and who mostly openly support the 
conservative AK Party government. This group of entrepreneurs refers to Islam as an 
identity and a label firstly by connotation to the word ‘Muslim’ in the name of the 
association, its abbreviation beginning with the letters ‘MÜS’. This abbreviation forms 
a kind of duality with the largest, oldest business association, TÜSİAD, whose name is 
the abbreviation of “The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen”. Also, 
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the name of the association includes the Turkish word ‘müstakil’ (meaning 
independent), which emphasizes being independent from state support and ideology. 
On the other hand, TUSKON is a formation of business people who are claimed 
to have some ties with Gulenist movement. This movement is known to describe 
itself as a so-called moderate religious movement. Members of the Gülen movement 
are known by their business solidarity and intense global network in terms of 
exporting and investing in education and private schools, and being part of 
missionary efforts to spread the so-called principles of the Gülen community. By the 
way, Gulen movement is officially recognized as a terrorist group (as FETO – 
Fetullahist Terrorist Organization) by the Turkish State in 2014. In this study the 
economic and social activities of TUSKON is analyzed rather than the criminal 
activities of the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization. 
1.4. The Content of the Study 
In this study, the emergence, development and transformation of Islamic 
business people on the path of their interaction with modern Turkish business life will 
be analysed by comparing the attitudes, self-interpretations, and life-stories of the 
members of the two largest factions of Islamic business: MÜSİAD and TUSKON. The 
analysis includes the following three dimensions of the development of Turkish Islamic 
business and its way of interacting with modern capitalism in Turkey: 
First, the economic emergence and development of Islamic business people from 
small-scale business into middle and large-scale business by interacting with the 
disadvantages of constitutionally secular and economically monopolistic structure 
before the rule of the AK Party in 2002 will be the starting point. While tracking this 
interaction, the approaches of the MÜSİAD and TUSKON members to adapt their  their 
business activities will be evaluated. There will be discussion of: ways in which these 
entrepreneurs deal with disadvantages – like the authoritarian secularist limitations on 
Islamic business people and the monopolistic structure of business life before 2002; the 
effects on economic and political uncertainties in their business life by benefiting from 
the religious and kinship networks based on trust and business relationships; and how 
they merge their Islamic moral 
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principles regarding such parts of modern capitalism as bank interest, labour relations 
and foreign trade, with the necessities of the cost and benefit paradigm of business life. 
In short, the economic trajectory of business people coming from the economic 
periphery towards the centre as an entrepreneurial power will be the focus of analysis. 
Second, the socio-cultural dynamics behind the emergence of Islamic business 
people as new urban elites by synthesizing their religious and traditional values with the 
high-class urban lifestyle – in terms of education, changing consumption culture, 
participation in religious networks, repositioning of women in Islamic business and 
inter-generational differences between the Islamic business people and their children – 
will be analysed. Traces and interactions of the confrontation of Western lifestyle and 
Western cultural influences with the cultural baggage of new Turkish Islamic elites will 
also be taken into account at this point. 
Third, understanding will be sought of the political attitudes and political 
relations of Islamic business people, from exclusion towards interdependency with the 
government, especially while a ruling government party that defines itself as 
conservative might reveal the political identifications of Islamic business people. What 
are the commonalities and similarities in their approaches to government influence on 
their political and economic aspirations? Their way of thinking regarding the place of 
Islam in political life in a secular country – towards religious extremism and towards 
people from different religions, sects or irreligious people – will help to demonstrate the 
level of Islamic entrepreneurs’ tolerance and perceptions of social and political 
pluralities. During the research, the interaction with the past and present of Turkish 
modernization and modern Turkish business life is going to be focused upon not only in 
terms of their economic life but also for their political behaviours. 
This three-dimensional analysis – economic, socio-cultural and political – 
will form three sections of each analytical chapter. 
After the introductory chapter, Chapter Two will introduce the methodological 
concerns and background of the research. In this section, these questions will be 
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answered: How was the research planned and applied, what were the research 
techniques used, and why did we follow that methodological pathway? The timing, 
place, strengths, weaknesses and limitations of the research will be discussed. 
In Chapter Three, the historical background of Turkish modernization that led 
Islamic business to emerge and to develop into a powerful economic, social and 
political power will be discussed by analyzing the trajectories of state-society relations, 
the development of Turkish capitalism and its interdependent relations with the state, 
the past and present of conservative and Islamist political movements, and the 
associational histories of the Islamic business associations of MÜSİAD and TUSKON. 
The data from the field study will be analysed in the fourth and fifth chapters of 
this study. In Chapter Four, the data collected on MÜSİAD will be analysed and 
discussed. In Chapter Five, the data collected on TUSKON will be analysed. 
In the sixth chapter, Islamic entrepreneurship in general, and MÜSİAD and 
TUSKON in particular, will be discussed in a comparative way. In this comparative 
analysis, the similarities and differences between the two associations will be examined. 
Also, the differences and similarities between Islamic business and secularist business 
(as represented by TÜSİAD) will be explored in a wider context as a part of the 
comparative analysis. Finally, the seventh and final chapter will offer some conclusions 
as well as some future projections. 
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CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY 
2.1. The Focus of the Research 
In this study, the emergence, development and transformation of Islamic 
business people and their interaction with capitalism and Turkish modernization will be 
analysed by comparing the attitudes, self-reflection and real-life accounts of some of the 
members of the two largest Turkish Islamic business associations: MÜSİAD and 
TUSKON. 
This research focuses on rise of new Islamic entrepreneurship by making a 
comparative analysis of the transformation of the social, political and economic 
background of Islamic business people and by examining the perspectives of the 
members of MÜSİAD and TUSKON. The role of Islam in business, the reason for, and 
function of the Muslim identity in business networks and in work ethics, the growth of 
these businesses, the ways in which their political relations and affiliations are 
changing, and the influence of their upper social mobility on their new socio-political 
positions will all be explored. 
For both groups of entrepreneurs, religion has an important role in providing 
capital resources, and in labour and partnership relations, as well as in influencing and 
changing political and economic behaviour and moderateness from religious and 
political perspectives. This research follows the relationship between Islam and modern 
economic, social and political relations in Turkey. The role of religious values and 
networks in the rise of Islamic businesses in a constitutionally secular country has three 
perspectives that should be examined and evaluated: economic, socio-cultural, and 
political. 
The economic perspective analyses the emergence and development of Islamic 
business and examines the relative benefits of religious and kinship networks, the 
importance of Islamic values in business, and the integration of Islam with modern 
capitalist business relations. 
The socio-cultural perspective on Islamic entrepreneurship explores the 
dynamics of the transformation of a rural, peripheral, illiterate and traditional people 
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into a new elite whose transformation is visible in their new lifestyles, consumption 
habits, education, and participation in the public space. 
The political perspective of this analysis explores the inter-dependent 
relationship of this new ‘economic elite’ and the ‘political elite’, which is the AK Party, 
the conservative democrat government party. 
2.2. Research Question(s) 
There are both major and minor research questions posed by this research. The 
main research question concerns the ways in which religious and political connections 
and values have contributed to the process of transformation from small scale, 
peripheral economic and social actors into a significant economic-social elite with the 
power to influence Turkish politics. Also, how did this transformation occur differently 
for MÜSİAD and TUSKON? 
In order to understand the larger political and social transformations of these 
new entrepreneurs, other questions must be asked and answered: 1) What factors of the 
Turkish periphery lead to the emergence and development of the Islamic Entrepreneurs 
in Turkey? 
2) How were the capital resources for beginning their businesses obtained? Did
the business owners and/or their partners borrow from a bank, from an Islamic financial 
institution or from a kinship or religious network? Are any partnership relations 
involved in these transactions? How do family, religious and/or political networks affect 
business? What are their employment policies, and what are their positions on labour 
relations and unions? 
3) What does the label Islam mean in economic terms such as bank interest and
partnerships? How do they define themselves politically: as conservative, as Islamist, or 
as something else? How do social factors such as kinship and networking function? 
Why did they form MÜSİAD/TUSKON? 
Numerous questions shall be posed concerning their business people 
associations as well: What does their association represent and mean for them? Do they 
support the political views of the association that employs them? 
Also of interest are religious and political organizational issues. Why and how 
do both of these associations support the ‘democratic-conservative’ AK Party? How do 
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these associations approach Gulen movement’s illegitimate political activities and 
also the question of doing business with non-Muslims and secular Muslims? 
How do they approach the European Union and political relations with the West? 
How does the label ‘Islamic’ affect their business relations? Do they believe that 
Turkish secularism is against Islam? What are the main issues of secularism in Turkey 
for them? How was business affected during the governance of the Islamist Welfare 
Party from 1995 through to 1997, and how did the secularist military intervention 
influence them economically and socially? Were they blacklisted by the military after 
1997? What were their political affiliations before the foundation of the AK Party, and 
what are their opinions of the AK Party’s governance? 
What are the differences in the approaches to the role of religion in business and 
politics between MÜSİAD and the centrally led and systematically organized 
TUSKON? 
How has their consumption culture changed through time? Are changes in 
consumption related to intellectual and/or artistic life? How do the members of these 
two associations (MÜSİAD and TUSKON) interact with secularists and non-Muslims 
in social life and in business interactions? What is the role of women in the workplace 
and within the associations? How does secularism affect conservative women according 
to them? 
Comparing their past and present political, cultural and social standpoints, how 
do association members see themselves? What has changed for them and how do they 
define themselves politically? What are their attitudes to the concept ‘Islamist’? What 
does secularism mean for them? What about the concepts of democracy and pluralism 
in social and political life and their attitudes towards these in the 1980s and 1990s? 
Which political parties did they support before these changes occurred? 
All these questions will be investigated through reviewing the literature and by 
examining the executives’ and members’ perceptions and insights. 
2.3. The  Pathways  of  the  Research:  Epistemological,  Ontological  and 
Methodological Considerations and Research Design 
One of the primary concerns of social research is to explore cause-effect, or 
interdependent relations of political and social changes by examining several factors. 
Socio-economic backgrounds often support change, especially in democratic political 
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regimes. Business elites and associations of entrepreneurs are important for political 
parties and movements for support. Thus it is reasonable to expect the influence of 
entrepreneurs on political and ideological changes. Close relationships with political 
elites have obvious advantages in the business sector. 
While most studies about new Islamic business elites in Turkey connect the rise 
of Islamic business with the influence of the conservative AK Party government, this 
study proposes that the surge in both Islamic businesses and in conservative politics 
(AK Party) is based on an interdependent relationship that supports and aids in each 
other’s growth. In most of the studies, the research is based on the Marxian assumption 
that Islamic business people benefit from their religious identities and exploit labour by 
using the ‘opium of religion’ to impose cheap wages (Tugal, 2009). There is an 
important gap in research based on interviews and life-story analysis of Islamic 
entrepreneurs. There are a few studies that have combined theoretical approaches with 
field study to analyse Islamic business people (Ozdemir, 2006; Durak, 2011; Yankaya, 
2014). However, these pieces of research focus only on the faction of MÜSİAD. As 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON are the two largest factions of Islamic entrepreneurship in 
Turkey, any analysis that does not cover both factions is misleading. And also, 
especially after the political polarization between the Gulen movement and the Turkish 
Government, revealing the diversity among business associations is more crucial, and is 
attempted by this study. 
In order to understand the ideological and political empowerment and change of 
today’s AK Party, it is important to uncover the roots of this change among the Islamic 
entrepreneurs within a sociological framework. How have the new Islamic 
entrepreneurs organized, developed and evolved in terms of their business goals and 
their political viewpoints? What is the function of religion in the workplace? Why and 
how have the political and ideological priorities of the entrepreneurs changed? Answers 
to these questions are sought and evaluated by comparing the two associations of 
Islamic entrepreneurs: the Independent Businessmen and Industrialists (MÜSİAD) and 
the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON). 
From an epistemological standpoint, in order to understand the emergence of the 
new entrepreneurial group, we must examine the entrepreneurs’ own perceptions and 
insights. This research is based on interviews to ascertain the self-perceptions of Islamic 
business people. The data extracted from interviews will help us to discern elements of 
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the reality. However, as is the case for all social research, it is impossible to reach a 
universal reality by any particular study. Thus the data gained through the interviews 
will enlighten on some parts of social fact concerning Islamic entrepreneurship in many 
aspects. Thanks to the positions of the interviewees, the sample of interviewees might 
be considered as representative because it includes high level Islamic business 
associations’ executives and members who have witnessed different stages of this 
phenomenon. The sample also includes representatives of the youth branches of both 
associations. This research is based on Istanbul and Ankara, which are the economic 
and political centres, and attempts to include business people from different sectors, 
such as construction, medical equipment manufacturing, retailers, small scale 
merchants, the middle level outsourcing firms of large chains, medical hospital owners, 
large scale owners of several companies in various fields. Also, those represented are 
from higher education graduates to lower; from people born in cities to the villages; 
from managing the family company founded by older generations of the family to 
business people who founded an enterprise and started in business life recently. 
The interviews present the fact that members of both MÜSİAD and TUSKON 
helped, supported and participated in the foundation and the political campaigns of the 
AK Party, and at the same time the AK Party Government removed barriers to the 
business opportunities of Islamic business people, especially in public bids, and helped 
ameliorate the secondary social position of Islamic people in general and business 
people in particular with the help of its political power. This is a good example of how 
the interdependent relationship of Islamic business people and the AK Party 
Government works. Focusing on the interviews and analysing the business lives of 
business people with the help of life-story analysis reveals this interdependency. The 
growth of their economic and social power goes in hand with the increasing power of 
the AK Party, and there are many arguments that might be seen in the interviews. This 
analysis will finish with the influence of conservative politics on Islamic business 
people. 
The nature of social research is that it is mostly based on the analysis of the self-
interpretations and discourse of people without trying to investigate whether they are 
true words or not, which is often impossible to find out. There are ways to find out 
controversies or inconsistencies by asking similar questions in different ways to 
crosscheck ideas or attitudes, and such questions were used during the interviews in this 
research. In some parts, such inconsistencies are highlighted in this study. Relying on 
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the opinions, attitudes and feelings of the interviewees is the main pathway for many 
studies in the social sciences. For example, on Islamic Business people, Dilek 
Yankaya’s PhD research at the Sorbonne on MÜSİAD members benefitted from the 
same technique, and many other similar studies’ main sources are the words of the 
Islamic business people (Yankaya, 2014). As in most of the social studies, this 
research’s main axis of analysis is based on the analysis of thoughts, attitudes, self-
definitions and life-stories. 
How do the entrepreneurs themselves approach the concept of conservatism? 
How did they do so in the past? Have they changed their perceptions of the Islamic 
banning of interest? How does Islam function for them in the world of business? 
All of these questions are best answered through examining the subjective 
perceptions and insights of the entrepreneurs themselves, rather than relying on 
objective data alone. Political self-identification is important to understand the changes 
in the political landscape. It is important to understand how these people themselves 
view the present in terms of the past, which is needed for the construction of a coherent 
political identity. 
A theoretical context will be formed by critically discussing the literature. In 
order to form a cohesive analysis composed of a combination of theory and practical 
findings, data collection and analysis will be conducted in the next stage of this study. I 
will analyse the literature on new Islamic entrepreneurship by conducting the research 
and analysing the data. Because this study is about the social and political change, the 
use of qualitative methods will also be appropriate and important. 
The most important problem, as declared by the interviewees in the study, of 
Islamic Enterprises in Turkey is the low level of institutionalization. This reflects on the 
low quality or non-transparency of archives or official data. The only sources for the 
official data for MÜSİAD and TUSKON are the periodicals of the associations or 
public declarations of the Presidents of the associations; nevertheless, these periodicals 
or speeches mostly do not consist of statistical data, information about the scales of the 
firms or any other beneficial data for this research. These documents are ideological 
material, the goal of which is to both motivate and unite association members and also 
to establish the association itself as an important political and economic actor in 
country. The manner in which they interpret their data and the determination of which 
concepts have been emphasized in their interpretations will provide background for this 
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research. The terminology that association members themselves use to discuss religion, 
business, politics and the economy will serve to form the conceptual framework of this 
discourse analysis. The discourse analysis will help us to understand the motives, 
attitudes, and cultural and religious backgrounds of the business lives. The problems 
concerning institutional archives and the sharing of data with researchers caused a lack 
of benefit from official data gained from associations. The most important official data 
used in this research is the data obtained from The Union of Turkish Chambers’ annual 
Top-500 lists. This gives an opportunity to crosscheck the success stories told by the 
interviewees and the declarations of MÜSİAD and TUSKON. And as a result, these 
lists show the validity of the arguments presented by MÜSİAD and TUSKON: First, 
Islamic business is growing every year as reflected by presence on the 500-Company 
list in increasing numbers every year. Second, Islamic business existed on this list 
before the AK Party government, and this shows that Islamic business was not born 
with AK Party rule; instead they had a certain role previously, even if at lower levels. 
Also, we may see that TUSKON members are almost as numerous as MÜSİAD 
members on the list, and this leads us to the importance of TUSKON in Islamic 
business, which has not been investigated in any study before. 
Interviews with the presidents, the vice-presidents and other members of the 
boards of MÜSİAD and TUSKON will be quite beneficial for comparisons of these two 
associations in terms of accurate representation of their approaches to politics, religion 
and work organization. 
In addition to structured interviews and the secondary data sources mentioned 
above, a thorough analysis of the evolution of Islamic business is the key: formative 
concepts in the public discourse of MÜSİAD and TUSKON will shed further light in 
this analysis, especially if there have been any changes in their political standpoints. 
According to Potter (1997; 146), “Discourse analysis emphasized the way versions of 
the world, of society, events and inner psychological worlds are produced in discourse”. 
From this perspective, language constitutes and creates the social world so language is 
an important agent of social change and I shall benefit from the analysis of the language 
in interviews in the research. 
2.4. Interviews 
The primary aim of this research is to examine the perceptions of the 
entrepreneurs themselves about their emergence and about their approaches to political 
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institutions and to ideological, cultural and religious values. In selecting my sample, I 
sought out interviewees who became involved in Islamic business life at different stages 
of the development of Islamic business, from different generations and sectors that can 
show the trajectory of their changes and differentiation in time. 
The associations of MÜSİAD and TUSKON are political entities as well as 
economic and social, and therefore the views of their members are important to track 
the changing trajectories of their political outlooks. Thus, I conducted interviews with 
members in the leadership roles in the associations. Among my interviewees there are 
former presidents, members of executive boards and presidents or vice-presidents of the 
Ankara branches of both associations. Simultaneously, and to see the full picture, I also 
interviewed more ‘ordinary’ members who do not have much to do with the executives 
of association. Among ordinary members that have no official title in the association, 
there are pioneering figures with great power within their association and inner circles. 
Participation in the daily, informal conversations and observations of the employees in 
the workplaces were planned to have an important place in this study in the beginning; 
however, there were busy working hours, ethical concerns stated by the employees who 
feel extremely grateful to be employed and paid, and a common unwillingness of the 
employees towards being involved in this type of research. This absence in this research 
should be recovered in further studies to reach a more general picture of Islamic 
business in Turkey. 
In this research, snowball sampling has been implemented. Snowball sampling is 
the preferred sampling methodology when connections are limited into closed 
communities. While investigating the Islamic business groups where religious and 
kinship connections are strong, the access for a researcher definitely requires a primary 
link. Business people have busy schedules, and often tend to have arrogant 
personalities, so arranging interviews with them for an academic researcher can be quite 
a challenge. This challenge also requires strong and reliable primary contacts that are 
good references for multiple possible interviewees. 
Through snowball sampling methodology, I made initial contacts with a group 
of people, first by using personal connections with the chair of the association and by 
reaching people who are relevant to the research topic, and then by establishing contacts 
with others. “This is referred to metaphorically as snowball sampling because as more 
relationships are built through mutual association, more connections can be made 
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through those new relationships and a plethora of information can be shared and 
collected, much like a snowball that rolls and increases in size as it collects more snow” 
(Bryman, 2012, p.204). Contacts with influential and important people increase the 
credibility of the researcher. 
Since I had prior experience researching some of the entrepreneurs during my 
Master’s study, I felt capable of making initial contacts, which enables further access to 
additional contacts. Moreover, my personal connection with the head of the associations 
has been useful in enabling me to reach different segments of the associations and to 
grasp the internal diversity among member entrepreneurs. 
I am aware that there are some potential risks in using the snowball sampling 
methodology. Since this method is practiced through personal connections, there is a 
possibility of not reaching a broader variety in the sample because of the limited nature 
of personal connections. However, having previous fieldwork experience in that circle 
as well as having connections in different associations and different cities seemed to 
mitigate this risk in the research. 
To clarify the terms of my selection criteria, I did not have access to a large 
number of potential interviewees. In order to grasp a more complete picture, I included 
different levels, groups, networks, sectors and regions of the entrepreneurs in my study. 
In the end, ten MÜSİAD members and five TUSKON members were interviewed. 
Among these interviewees, there were high-level association members including 
presidents and branch presidents, as well as other association members. Therefore, this 
methodology provided a satisfactory sample of data. 
The ways in which the entrepreneurs interpreted their own pasts, their changes in 
time, and their approaches and attitudes towards different concepts or institutions is 
very important to the success of an interview, even if there is a risk of losing objectivity. 
However, subjective interpretations can also be read as parts of the developing of a new 
ideology. As an interviewer I avoided being critical and taking positions during the 
interviews. Instead, I asked open-ended questions in my interviews in order to explore 
the political, ideological and cultural positions of my subjects. 
In the approach of interviewer to interviewee, it is important to make the 
interviewee feel secure enough to be willing to share personal thoughts and perceptions. 
Being a researcher working abroad can create both advantages and disadvantages. 
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Living abroad for a researcher can be an advantage because, as an outsider, the 
researcher may be considered as being somehow removed from domestic issues, 
conflicts, prejudices and suspicions. A disadvantage for this researcher can occur when 
an interviewee believes that a stranger could not possibly know about certain specific 
and internal phenomena. However, as a researcher living abroad but speaking the native 
language and sharing the Turkish culture, I tried to combine the advantages of being 
insider and outsider of the region and to avoid the potential disadvantages. 
During the interviews, as a researcher, I avoided expressing any critical 
statements and opinions. My goal is to understand the political views, thoughts and 
attitudes of entrepreneurs, their manner of conducting economic interactions, business 
networking and labour relations, as well as their approach to the role of religion in 
business life. At the same time, I am fully aware of the possible influence of my own 
prejudices or opinions on the responses of my interviewees. I minimized this possibility 
by asking mostly open-ended questions. 
The language of interviews is very important. As a researcher and interviewer 
my mother tongue is Turkish, so it was most advantageous to conduct my research in 
Turkey. However, since this study is written in English, there are always issues 
associated with translation. In this study I attempt to objectively present main ideas, 
keywords, local phrases, idioms and attitudes, even while recognizing that these are all 
influenced by my own perceptions. 
2.5. Research Location 
The research was conducted in the two biggest cities of Turkey: Istanbul and 
Ankara. The interviews were made at the headquarters of the associations, at Ankara 
branches or at workplaces of certain members of these associations in Ankara and 
Istanbul. Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, these two cities had been 
known as the core of secularism in Turkey. As the centre of culture, arts, industry and 
commerce under secularist/Westernist hegemony, Istanbul has long been the window 
through which Turkey views the West. And Ankara – as a capital city that was selected 
and created as a political centre of the secularist republic and Kemalist political 
ideology – has been a major centre of secularist culture and politics. 
However, these two cities faced social and political transformations in recent 
decades. The intense migration from the Anatolian periphery to urban centres affected 
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the cultural life in these cities and that caused a diversity of secularist/Western lifestyles 
and traditional conservative Islamic Turkish-Anatolian lifestyles. This cultural change 
and contradiction reflect inherent political contradictions as well. Conservative parties 
that have won all local municipality elections since 1994 now govern Istanbul and 
Ankara. 
Islamic business people are the new social, economic and political elites of the 
conservative part of the society. Most research about Islamic business people in Turkey 
was conducted in Anatolian cities where conservative Islamic culture and politics are 
dominant and where the Islamic business people are locally stronger in the business 
lives of these cities. Conversely, I conducted my research in Istanbul and Ankara, where 
the interaction of Islamic businesses with a secular, Westernized cultural and political 
environment is both active and apparent. This interaction is important to fully grasp the 
polarization and confrontation of these two social and economic segments on Islamic 
business people in the same urban space. In addition, most of the largest Islamic 
business enterprises are located in these two cities, a fact which allows us to both trace 
the trajectory of the development of these large enterprises and also to focus on the 
small, middle, as well as large-scale enterprises that are mostly concentrated in the 
industrial zones of these cities. 
Among the member-entrepreneurs, there are representatives of many different 
business-sizes and different sectors in the country. The reason for choosing these two 
associations for research (instead of choosing only one) is due to the important 
differences in the organizations in terms of business. TUSKON has about forty-five 
thousand members and MÜSİAD has almost sixty-five hundred members in total in the 
country. 
2.6. Timing of the Research 
The timing of this research was remarkable. The interviews were made from 
June 2013 to December 2013, when Turkey faced some significant social and political
incidents. In June 2013, Turkey witnessed the widespread ‘Gezi Park Protests’ against 
the conservative AK Party Government, which lasted weeks and gained the support of 
significant part of the opposition. These protests sharpened the social and political 
conflicts between the secularists and conservatives. Second, on 17
th
 December 2013, 
Gulenist policemen and prosecutors initiated an alleged corruption investigation against 
the AK Party Government. Then, starting from 25
th
 December 2013, tape
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recordings of key ministers were leaked to social media by Gulenists in order to cause 
the collapse of the AK Party Government. This was a juridical coup attempt by 
Gulenists against the legitimate Turkish Government. This was a turning point in the 
relationship between the Gulen community and the AK Party politically, and 
between the Gulen community and other conservative Islamic groups socially. The 
formerly  alliance between the Gulenists and the conservatives was broken and war 
ensued. 
These remarkable incidents expectedly affected their economic elites: MÜSİAD 
and TUSKON. First, the Gezi protests increased the polarization in the country and 
affected Islamic business people in terms of their position towards secularists. This 
reaction will be seen in the interviews. Second and even more importantly, the conflict 
between the Gulenists and the AK Party caused a war between TUSKON and the AK 
Party and its economic base, MÜSİAD, in the economic sphere. This incident influenced 
almost all of the TUSKON members’ perspectives. Also, as an outsider and non-
Gulenist person, it became harder for me as a researcher to access TUSKON
members because of the fear of being stigmatized. Due to these complications, the 
research was limited to only five interviewees from TUSKON and ten from MÜSİAD. 
2.7. Limitations of the Research 
This study combines the theoretical and historical background of 
Islamic business in Turkey with data extracted from the interviews with members of the 
Turkish Islamic business community. This means that the data of this research is only 
about the Islamic business people interviewed. Thus, no matter how representative the 
sample is, over-generalizations about thousands of people by looking at a small 
sample are likely to be misleading. However, the comparative analysis of other 
studies and data, combined with theoretical discussion, will provide general 
background for analysis of the data of this field study. 
One of the main limitations of snowball sampling is finding the interviewees. 
There is always a risk of finding similar interviewees with this technique because of 
inadequate connections. However, having influential connections within the business 
associations MÜSİAD and TUSKON enabled me to reach different sections of business 
people. In terms of the selection criteria, I have to admit that I conducted interviews with 
every businessperson that I could find who would talk to me. Unfortunately, it is not 
easy to find and convince business people to take part in a research study because of 
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the potential risks and the time involved. It is for this reason that the number of elite 
interviewees may be lower, comparatively speaking. 
Second, the timing of the research is crucial in terms of the findings. Recent 
political developments and popular debates can be very influential on the interviewee’s 
views, which can lead to inconsistencies even within the same sample, whose opinions 
and views can differ from one moment to the next depending on context and current 
events. 
Third, as a PhD candidate interviewing business people, it can be challenging 
for the academic to get business people to open up about their business networks, their 
political connections and their religious affiliations. Business people prefer to talk to the 
mass media to make their success stories and thoughts known to the people. Business 
people can be unwilling to give their opinions and perceptions to a dissertation-writing 
PhD candidate, even one with influential connections and well-organized introductory 
questions. As a researcher, I tried to utilize all of the connections and networks that I 
had at my disposal. 
Fourth, as a researcher coming from Ankara and carrying a secular impression, 
the interviewees may tend to label me as ‘the other’ and might be reluctant to answer 
my questions honestly and openly. To overcome this obstacle, I would often rephrase 
my questions in order to achieve greater candour. 
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CHAPTER 3- HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND OF STATE – 
BUSINESS RELATIONS ON THE AXIS 
OF TURKISH MODERNIZATION 
3.1. The Roots and Emergence of Turkish Modernization 
3.1.1. Reformist Movements in the Islamic World and Ottoman Modernization 
In the 19
th
 Century, when modernity had been becoming widespread in
significant parts of the world, the Islamic world was made up of the Ottoman Empire 
which encompassed South Eastern Europe, Anatolia, the Middle East and North Africa; 
the Qajar Empire which is now Iranian land, Central Asia from the Caspian Sea to the 
Great Wall of China that witnessed the struggle of Turkic Khanates with the Russian 
Invasions; the Mughal Empire that ruled India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and South Eastern 
Asia; and also some African colonies in Central and Eastern Africa. This huge sum of 
lands and nations started to face the concept of modernity brought by Western 
colonialism and expansionism. This military expansion caused three main reactions in 
the Islamic world: 
First, strong, fundamentalist, anti-Western reactionary movements and opinions 
gained strength. These movements opposed the idea of modernity totally, including 
political reforms like democratization; the development of capitalism; progress in 
human rights like the rights of religious minorities and the participation of women in the 
public sphere; and any type of cultural influence carried by the Western political and 
economic dominance. 
The second reaction in the Islamic world to the modernity brought by Western 
colonialism is the adopting of Western political and economic institutions in addition to 
the adoption of Western culture as a superior background for economic and political 
power, thus suggesting transformation of native cultures. This trend became widespread 
in the new political, economic and intellectual elites of the dominated Islamic countries, 
elites that gained power both in countries like Turkey and Iran that had no colonial pasts 
and in some former colonies after they gained independence. 
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Third, a number of intellectuals and politicians sought a ‘third way’ for 
overcoming the problems of the first two approaches and the backwardness of the 
Islamic world. These intellectuals could be called reformists and modernists for 
defending the idea of economic, social development and political reforms without any 
radical, holistic opposition or acceptance. This group of thinkers and practitioners could 





In this section, first modernist approaches in the Islamic world will be presented 
by starting from pre-partition India and Egypt, and then the focus of the chapter will 
shift to Turkish modernization approaches starting from the late Ottoman period 
towards the recent past Republican period. 
 
Pre-partition India is an interesting case in which Muslim and non-Muslims 
lived together in a country ruled by Muslim Emperors for centuries and faced British 
invasion. As a part of British colonialism, Pre-Partition India faced economic, 
militaristic and political expansionism that also included cultural dominance and 
influence over the native population. Muslim intellectual and political figures like 
Saiyid Ahmad Khan and Mohammad Iqbal offered new means of improvement of 
Muslims to end the backwardness, weakness, poverty and defeats of Muslims. The 
people of India especially noticed these after going through colonialism and the 
political, economic control of the foreigners. They offered several reforms in political 
institutions, educational activities and cultural reasons for the backwardness (Issawi, 
2004, p.178). 
 
Saiyid Ahmad Khan is one of the first intellectuals who realized the importance 
of the need for achieving technological changes but also cultural and conceptual 
reforms like progress in science and education; and the important role and compatibility 
of rationality with Islam and its influence in the development of Muslims, particularly 
Indian Muslims. He opposed the Orthodox Islamist views as well as the British colonial 
enforcements on the Muslim population in India, and tried to found educational 
institutions like colleges and universities for Muslim students so as to afford intellectual 
and scientific improvements as well as adoption of the national language, Urdu (Malik, 
1963, p.219). He founded a college named Aligarh College, which was to become 
entitled to work as a university after some time. This university offered both scientific 
and Islamic sciences both in English and Urdu (Malik, 1963, p.221). 
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There are people who hold the opinion that our national cause will be promoted by discussing 
political affairs. I do not agree with that, but regard the spread of education to be the only means 
for the promotion of the national cause. In these days our nation should not strive for anything 
other than the spread of education. When in our country, education will be sufficiently 
propagated, then we shall have sufficient means to arise from our backward condition (Malik, 
1963, p.222). 
 
Saiyid Ahmad Khan thinks that commentaries on the Quran should be reformed 
and that false and fabricated tales should be excluded. He thinks that Muslims should 
adopt a new legal and social code, which states that the traditional Islamic code is not 
compatible with the requirements of the present time (Malik, 1963, p.220). Ahmad 
Khan defended the idea that usury (riba) prohibition should be applied only to poor 
people, not to all people, and that this reform would contribute to the public good so 
cannot be against religion (Baljon, 1970, pp.255-260). He was criticized by the clergy 
and the Islamist majority of the elites among Indian Muslims and branded ‘an infidel’. 
However, his ideas and contributions made an impact on Indian Muslims towards the 
foundation of Pakistan. 
 
Mohammad Iqbal, also, was an important reformist intellectual and political 
figure in the Pre-Partition Muslim community. His ideal was the unity of the Muslim 
community but adapting it into a contemporary, modern international community. Iqbal 
accepted the idea that Islam, as a religion, cannot be separated from social order 
because it brings legal codes. He was against secularism and nationalism; Iqbal stresses 
that Islamic Law is capable of evolution in terms of adapting to changing needs and 
conditions (Malik, 1963, p.242). Iqbal’s priority was the modernization of Muslim 
society and Islamic laws, both in the cultural and economic spheres (Malik, 1963, 
p.253). 
 
Iqbal’s priority was to reach the level of the Western Colonialist countries 
without sacrificing Islamic values and principles but adapting them to the requirements 
of institutional, technologic and philosophical development. He offered the idea of the 
unity and independence of Muslims in India, and established the idea of the foundation 
of Pakistan; however his idea was of neither a theocratic nor a secular system. 
 
While talking about Muslim reformism, other than in pre-partition India, 
Ottoman modernization composes an important segment. In the 19
th
 Century, the 
Ottoman Empire ruled large and important parts of the Islamic World, both through a 
ruling Sultan and a government, as well as through The Caliphate. Not only Turks but 
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also most Middle Eastern and North African Arabic speaking people, Bosnians, 
Albanians and other Muslim groups were under Ottoman control. Before talking about 
the Ottoman heritage of Turkish modernization, the reformist and modernist movements 
within the borders of the Empire should be revisited. 
Even though Tunisia and Egypt were ruled by the Turkish Ottoman Empire as 
Ottoman lands, and even though they were ruled by the dependent Turkish dynasties 
autonomously as provincial governorships, Tunisia and Egypt went beyond the central 
Ottoman government in terms of efforts for the adoption of European modern 
administrative and private property legislation (Hourani, 2004, p.8). 
Cuno states that the origins of private ownership in Egypt can be found before 
19
th
 Century reforms. But due to the fact that the central power and control of the
Ottoman Empire weakened, private ownership was legalized in the 1854 land reform. 
This reform, made by Muhammad Ali Pasha, was aimed at increasing state revenue and 
control (Cuno, 2004, pp.195-196). 
One of the important figures that pioneered reformism in Egypt is Muhammad 
Abduh. Abduh’s idea is about reforming and improving Egyptian society in moral, 
scientific and political aspects. He argued that religious and scientific educations are not 
incompatible and that they should both be reformed in Egypt. He aimed to develop 
Egypt in economic, political and moral ways in the struggle against colonialism by 
benefiting from the reforms he argued for (Hourani, 1962, p.131). 
The Orthodox Islamists and Islamic clergy criticized him, as happened to many 
of the other reformist thinkers in the Islamic world, even though an important part of 
these reforms was to oppose foreign invasions of their homelands. Abduh does not 
support fundamentalism; instead he offers some reforms and adaptation of practices to 
contemporary problems and conditions. He underlines the idea that rationality is part of 
Islam, and that there is no contradiction between the religion Islam and modern 
rationality (Hourani, 1962, p.132). 
Abduh thinks the integration of Islamic ethical and social codes with capitalist 
development by achieving wealth for Muslims while avoiding the negative effects of 
capitalism and education plays a crucial role for this reformation. He adds that the 
Islamic ban on interest should be re-considered and that new ways should be found to 
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overcome this problem for the capitalist development of the Islamic world (Tripp, 2006, 
p.41).
In the early 1900s, Tal’at Harb in Egypt and ‘the virtuous capitalists’ (as 
opposed to foreign capital investors, referred to as ‘sinful capitalists’) of Sarekat Islam 
in Java stressed the dominance of the non-Muslim identity of modern capitalists and its 
effect on Muslims’ social and political life, and tried to start a new Islamic 
entrepreneurial movement (Tripp, 2006, p.6). Harb founded companies and banks and 
made links with foreign capital; however, he was against foreign control over the 
national Egyptian economy (Tripp,, 2006 p.31). 
Before the wave of modernization reached the Middle East, the region (except 
Iran) was under the control of the Ottoman Empire. The cities were the centres of 
international trade, craftsmanship and the ulema – the intellectual elite who dominate 
religious, juridical and intellectual activity. All these urban elites were connected and 
linked with political power: the Sultan, the government, local governors, the military 
and the bureaucracy (Hourani, 2004, p.4). 
After the weakening of the central power of the Ottoman Sultan and the 
government with the reformation period (Tanzimat), beginning in the 19
th
 century, the
bureaucrats increasingly gained important power in mediatory positions between the 
Sultan, the government and the social elites (Hourani, 2004, pp.8-9). 
In 1858, the Ottoman Empire established a land law, which led to some 
merchants and local chieftains forming large estates. But before this law, in Ottoman 
provinces like Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha had given the right of private land 
ownership (Hourani, 2004, p.9). In Turkey during the Ottoman period, up until the land 
law in 1858 private property had been predominantly forbidden. 
In the Ottoman Empire, the first response to the beginning of failures against 
European powers was the adopting of European military technologies. The 1838 
Commercial Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain caused the opening 
of the Turkish economy to foreign trade and capitalization of agriculture and industry, 
which led to European dominance in the Ottoman market and semi-colonialization by 
capitulations (Tripp, 2006, p.14). Khair-al-Din al Tunusi thought that Ottomans should 
adopt European institutions of Governance (Tripp, 2006, p.27). 
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This continued with the sending of young students and intellectuals to Europe to 
understand European modernization and adapt it to the Empire. The returning 
intellectual elites were so much influenced by European modernity that they started to 
advocate that economic or political modernization is impossible without exchanging 
traditional, religious social codes and culture for those of the West (Tripp, 2006, p.23). 
The social and political history of Turkey depended upon the basis of the power 
of the Sultan and the centralized bureaucracy organized around the palace in a society 
without any nobles, feudal landownership or private capital ownership among the 
Muslim population as a balancing power in any layers of the social sphere. It was 
mostly the non-Muslim minorities that owned the private capital; private capital or 
property ownership was the exception until the reforms of the 19
th
 Century, first in
Egypt and then in Turkey. In order to understand the roots of conservatism and what its 
proponents wanted to ‘conserve’, we should go back to the beginning of Turkish 
modernization and the cultural, political revolutions. Until the nineteenth century, 
during the empire, the members of Turkish society were subjects: people with none of 
the rights of modern citizenship, lacking economic ownership and political rights. They 
were also identified by their religious identities. This led the state to be the only source 
of power in the empire period without any social differentiation of classes or strata. In 
this period, the Sultan also had the title of Caliph, the religious leader of all Sunnite 
Muslims in the world, which added unquestionability to the political power of the 
Sultans, and the only remaining power was the bureaucracy that was first appointed and 
then sacked by the Sultan. 
The reorganizational reforms of 1839 (Tanzimat), through their establishment of 
some modern laws of citizenship on the basis of rights and duties, are regarded as the 
starting point of Turkish modernization. These reforms narrowed the authority and 
power of the Sultan, but this authority transferred mostly to the state bureaucracy of the 
Empire (Ortayli, 1983). Even if laws guaranteed citizenship, political and social power 
remained within state authority due to the lack of any civil society power in the country. 
This historical background evolved into the foundation of the National 
Assembly and then into the highest power of the government besides the Sultan, the 
Order and Progress Party (Ittihat ve Terakki). Since the most important source of the 
power of the state was the military, because of non-stop wars and military oppression 
over the government, the military used to be the third segment of the centre, especially 
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from the beginning of the nineteenth century. This political situation led the country to 
the continuation of the duality between the political, economic, and intellectual elites 
organized around the state (i.e., the dynasty, bureaucrats, military, scholars, 
businessmen, etc.), and the rest of the society on the periphery. The Sultan was 
overthrown by Kemal Atatürk, the head of the military who won the National War 
(1919-1922). The president was officially called the national chief afterwards, but the 
power of the state and bureaucracy did not change substantially. To sum up, even 
though the regime had changed, the relationship between ruler and ruled did not 
essentially change. 
3.1.2. Etatist Policies of the Republic and Single Party Regime: Creation of a New 
Capitalist Class, Social Engineering and Westernization (1923-1950) 
In order to understand state–society relations in terms of the relations of business 
and state in Turkey, the metaphor of centre–periphery is useful for understanding the 
duality in society and politics in Turkey. Turkish republican modernization, starting 
from its foundation in 1923, took place as a top-down, state-based transformation 
project towards Westernization, secularism, and positivism by taking up the heritage of 
the modernization reforms of the imperial period. But until the end of the one-party 
government in 1950, this transformation caused a dualistic social structure: as a social 
engineering project, the new state perhaps managed to transform social life in the 
central districts of big cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. A new urban, Western, 
secularist elite population with economic and political power emerged. However, the 
much larger rural population remained at the periphery in this duality in cultural, social, 
political and economic terms until the 1950s. Mardin puts the centre–periphery relation 
in Turkey as the basic division axis. ‘Centre’ is defined as the power groups of 
bureaucratic organization of politics, economics and even culture. Anatolia, not only in 
terms of culture and political attitude but also in terms of industrial and commercial 
investments, was the periphery of Turkey in comparison to Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and 
some Western parts of the country (Mardin, 1973). 
The distinctive feature of the Single Party Period was that there was no political 
party to be founded until 1946 except for the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which 
was founded by Kemal Ataturk in 1923. The Kemalist Revolution period (1923-1950), 
as seen in previous modern reformations in Turkey, was a political and ‘cultural 
revolution’ rather than a change to the economic base of the society. After changing the 
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political regime from Monarchy to Republic, the revolution continued through strict 
Westernization policies. Starting from Ataturk’s presidential era (1923-1938), these 
Westernization policies were, first, the change of dress code in the country by 
introducing ‘The Hat Law’ of 1925, which introduced the use of Western style hats 
instead of the fez (traditional Ottoman hat). Next, in 1926, the Swiss Civil Code 
replaced the previous civil code, and in 1928 the Latin alphabet replaced the Ottoman-
Arabic alphabet, which had been used for more than 1000 years by Turks. Moreover, 
Turkish folk and classical music was banned in the 1930s for a period of time and the 
azan (call for prayers in Islam) was compulsorily to be called in Turkish instead of 
Arabic. Thousands of people were sent to jail for being in opposition to these laws 
during the single-party period (Tunçay, 1987). 
By considering the centre–periphery duality in Turkish social and political 
history, these Westernization policies and Western acculturation were internalized and 
actualized by the political, intellectual and economic elites in the ‘centre’. The 
periphery remained conservative of the traditional Turkish-Islamic values inherited 
from history. These laws encouraged the tension and polarization of the centre–
periphery in this manner. This duality evolved into an economic as well as a cultural 
differentiation between the centre and the periphery in Turkey for decades. 
In the economic dimension, during the first few years of the Republic until 1928, 
the new regime tried to implement a liberal economy, but their efforts were not 
influential on development of investments because of a lack of private capital and the 
Great Depression of 1929. Then Etatism replaced this liberal policy. In the programme 
of the Republican People’s Party (Single Party), Etatism was accepted as a principle 
that could be understood as “the emergence of the state as a pioneer and director of 
industrial activity, in the interests of national development and national protection in a 
country where private enterprise and capital are too weak to do anything effective” 
(Sayan, 1968, p.1). The new Republic, as many late developing countries tried to do, 
intended to create a national bourgeoisie and national capitalist classes by supporting 
and giving incentives to certain people close to the new regime in terms of personal and 
political links. Especially during World War II, new commercial businessmen emerged 
and started to support investments in the country. 
There were four major mechanisms of the Etatist economic policies of Turkey 
used to create a ‘national capitalist class’. First, the public bank gives credit with 
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negative interest rates to support the new investments of these business people in times 
of hard economic conditions in the country. Second, foreign currency that was supplied 
by the government to importer-business groups was cheaper than on the open market 
because the government was subsidizing these foreign currencies. Third, there were 
strict and high barriers imposed upon the imports of foreign goods in many sectors to 
protect domestic production, but this policy led to poor quality production, without 
renovation or competitiveness of Turkish industrial outputs. This monopolistic structure 
resulted in very interesting price policies being implemented by the private sector. An 
example was the price of the poor quality, locally produced car, the Fiat Murat 124 (the 
lowest standard model of Fiat car), which was sold in Turkey at the same price as 
Mercedes in European markets due to high protection and support to the producers. 
Fourth, the products of State Economic Enterprises were provided to these selected 
capitalists at much lower prices than their actual costs. 
In a country where the state has autonomy, businessmen seek to secure 
connections with politicians in order to win their support. This goal necessitated the 
securing of state patronage through possessing a contractor, a buyer or a rent provider 
(Demiralp, 2009, p.320). Remembering that the monopolistic nature of the Turkish 
economy has been consolidated, especially during the planned economy and ISI (import 
– substitution – industrialization) periods, Mustafa Ozel, a scholar favouring Islamic
entrepreneurship and critical of the historical relationship between the Turkish state and 
business, accuses the Turkish economic regime of creating a bourgeoisie that is 
completely dependent upon state, and that can never mature enough to gain its 
independence. Since nurtured in a safe economic environment, which is free from the 
pressure of market competition, this Turkish bourgeoisie lacks the urge for invention or 
innovation according to Ozel. This idea leads us to the role of new Islamic 
entrepreneurship for the economic development of Turkey (Ozel, 21 July 2002). 
Despite the support of the state for these few business groups in order to found a 
strong national capital, these policies resulted in the emergence of parasitic groups who 
did not become an engine of development for the country nor for a radical growth of the 
country’s economy. This state support was not enough to create a national capital that 
could be competitive in international markets and that could transfer economic value to 
the country by profits and employment. At a time when Turkey was at the same level as 
Southern European countries and East Asian countries in terms of economic 
development, in the first half of the twentieth century, these efforts and policies to 
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develop Turkish capitalism failed and Turkey remained behind in the economic 
competition for decades. These four methods of providing subsidized rent and support 
by the state for this monopolistic business group constituted almost three-quarters of all 
national income (Karakas & Yildiz 2012). The bourgeoisie depended upon the state and 
the state ideology that created and supported it, including during the coup d’état periods, 
in order to perpetuate itself. As a result, Turkey was not able to break the chains of 
poverty, unemployment, and backwardness for a long time because of the economic 
problems caused by these structural policies. 
3.1.3. The First Democratic Era and Social Change: Hegemony of Power Bloc 
versus Governance of the Periphery (1950-1960) 
The single-party regime ended in 1946 and political parties were allowed to be 
founded as a result of the pressure of the international community on the Turkish 
government, but the CHP (Republican People’s Party) government continued to rule 
until the 1950 general election. In the elections, the Democratic Party gained the 
majority of seats in the parliament and was elected to govern the country. This 
governance took place between the years of 1950 and 1960. The government of the 
Democratic Party was important because it was first time in the history of the republic 
that an elected government dependent on the votes of the people was governing the 
country. The single party regime had been a period of political hegemony in the alliance 
of the power groups organized around the state in the political and economic centres, 
but in 1950 the periphery managed to take the political power of government. 
The government of the Democratic Party started in 1950 and caused massive 
change in the country in terms of economic and social change. Mechanization in 
agriculture, large industrial investments with foreign credit, and the Marshall aid of the 
USA led the DP government to have a more liberal approach to the Etatism of the 
single-party regime. The rates of foreign trade increased dramatically. Although the 
Democratic Party tried to implement a liberal policy, the public sector and public 
enterprises continued to expand in the 1950s (Aktan, 1993, p.64). In economic terms, 
the 1950s did not witness a break from Etatism, rather, a continuation with many 
similarities remaining. 
During 1950, as a result of rapid urbanization in the aftermath of the 
industrialization polices, mass migration from rural to urban areas began. This 
migrating population joined the urban poor in squatter districts of urban areas and urban 
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peripheries. The peripheries began to have an urban aspect as well, whereas before, the 
periphery had been the rural part of the society. 
Since the Democratic Party failed to remove the structural hegemony of the 
republican regime, the bureaucratic, economic and militaristic elites continued to be 
powerful and hung as a sword of Damocles over the elected government of the 
Democratic Party. This influence became apparent in regard to certain of the 
Democratic Party’s policies, such as allowing the traditional call to prayer (the azan) to 
be practiced in the traditional way, opening the mosques that had been closed during the 
single party regime, allowing private religious schools to be re-activated, and softening 
some restrictions about the dress code and Turkish music. These allowances were 
enough to disturb the Westernized bureaucratic, intellectual and business elites, and led 
them to support the military intervention in 1960. 
3.1.4. Re-consolidation of the Praetorian System of the Historical Power Bloc: 
Militarism as a Way of Politics, Roots of Right-wing Politics (1960-1980) 
The 27
th
 of May 1960 is a remarkable date for the history of Turkish democracy. 
The first elected government in the history of the Turkish Republic was overthrown by 
a military coup and the first elected Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, was executed 
afterwards. Symbolically, the hierarchy separating the elites and people, the centre and 
periphery, the hegemonic power and the elected government, was re-established. It was 
emphasized again that whomever the people vote for and elect should obey the rules 
established by the regime and the principles of Kemalism. Members of the Democratic 
Party and the Prime Minister paid for this with their lives, and the majority of the people 
who voted for them were punished. 
After the coup d’état, a new government and a new constitution was established 
by putting various mechanisms and institutions in place to decrease the authority and 
power of elected governments. These changes included the foundation of the Senate 
above the elected Parliament and the founding of the National Security Council to 
determine policies and to set limits on the policies of the government. This period was a 
hegemonic period of Kemalist militarism over the people’s will through 
militaristic bureaucracy and the institutionalization of a hegemonic structure in all parts 
of the state. In this era, the elected government’s authority and ability was limited, and 
the trauma of the coup d’état and the execution of the prime minister influenced the 
parliament and the government. 
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Even though the Islamist movement in Turkey had intellectual and theoretical 
roots back in the late nineteenth century, the first Islamist political party, the National 
Order Party, was founded in 1970. But this party was banned just one year later in 1971 
for “being against the secular regime and Kemalist revolutionary principles”. In 1972, 
Islamists founded another political party, the National Salvation Party, and it too was 
closed in 1980 by the coup d’état of the government. 
One of the most significant aspects of a new constitutional era influenced by 
strong military power within the political system was the beginning of central planning 
in the economy. The State Planning Organization was founded in 1960. The role of the 
state, as an investor and supporter, was increased in the Turkish economy. The state 
started to support the private sector by ensuring price stability and by minimizing the 
deficiencies of price mechanisms through indirect means such as tax, credit, money and 
foreign trade policies (Aktan, 1991, p.65). The state remained as the main actor and 
director in economy until the economic crisis in late 1970s, when the oil crisis emerged 
and Turkey was under embargo because of Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. 
3.1.5. Concluding Remarks 
Until the 1980s, Turkish society was predominantly an agricultural society, both 
in the population and in the socio-economic structure, which used to have dominant 
rural community relationships. The urban population was composed of government 
officials, a small population of workers, and a few entrepreneurs or businessmen that 
had been supported and chosen by the state. There is evidence that a difference between 
these government officials, businessmen, and the rural population existed in terms of 
not only economic, but also political backgrounds. The urban population that was 
formed by the state through business and bureaucracy was mostly Westernized and 
secular, in contrast to the rural population’s more traditional, so-called ‘oriental’ values. 
We can describe Turkish politics as having three legs before 1980. The state 
ideology can be defined as Kemalism, with militarism as the dominant influence on the 
political system and Etatism as the economic policy. Because the reforms before 1980 
were only within the borders of the paradigm of state-centred social and economic 
projects in the context of Etatism, the social or political features can barely be defined 
as having an aspect of structural change. The date 1980 is important for the whole 
change in the socio-economic and political paradigm. Within the framework of state- 
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centred economic policies, “the road to money and wealth had passed through 
government until 1980” in Buğra’s words (Buğra, 2002, p.191). 
The period until 1980 was characterized by the involvement of the state in 
inward-looking development. The state took the initiative to create an entrepreneurial 
class and also supported and protected them, which caused a monopoly in Turkish 
capitalism. The fixed rate currency that caused overvaluation of the Turkish lira made 
exports expensive and imports cheap. The state was largely responsible for the 
unproductive and non-competitive nature of import-substituting industries and import 
restrictions, while quotas and prohibitions decreased competitiveness, which created a 
comfortable, monopolistic structure for entrepreneurs and, furthermore, high tariff 
walls, import quotas, low interest rates, and preferential exchange rates for private 
entrepreneurs had reached such proportions that these industrial interests did not have 
much incentive to invest in higher technology in order to develop competitiveness of 
industry (Aydin, 2005, p.36). “Through overvalued currency and high protective tariff 
walls, Turkish industry was protected against outside competition. As a result of these 
measures, a group of rent-seeking Turkish business people went from strength to 
strength, to such an extent that monopolies in certain areas emerged” (Aydin, 2005, 
p.37). These businessmen were given opportunities to borrow from government sources
at rates much lower than the rate of inflation, which created an accumulation of capital 
and wealth aided by cheap inputs provided by State Economic Enterprises (Boratav and 
Türkcan, 1993). 
The important effect of this state support to businessmen was to keep them 
affiliated to state ideology and to persuade them to support the continuation of the 
power bloc system that had economic, political and ideological legs. Even if most of the 
governments were composed of right-wing parties during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
structure of businessmen remained in the axis of Kemalism, Westernism and militarism, 
since it was already known by them that the government could be overthrown by 
militarist interventions, and that the real power in the state organization is the civilian or 
militaristic bureaucracy. In other words, businessmen sought to maintain the power 
bloc, and those with Kemalist or Westernist tendencies were chosen to be supported and 
to be empowered. 
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3.2. The Shift from Etatism to Neoliberalism, from State to Civil Society: 
The roots of Islamic entrepreneurship and the 1980 Coup D’état 
After the long political and economic crises of the 1970s and massive political 
and urban violence, the coup d’état took place on 12
th
 September 1980. The leaders of
political parties were sent to jail, all associated political parties, trade unions and 
political associations were banned, and ‘the state of emergency’ was declared. 
Thousands of socialist and nationalist political activists were sent to prisons, some of 
them were tortured and a few were executed. Furthermore, the new government 
appointed by the military prepared a new constitution, known as the 1982 Constitution. 
The era after 1980 was characterized by the implementation of neo-liberal 
policies in the country. The remarkable aspect about the start of neo-liberal economic 
policies is that they were started in the state of emergency after the military coup in 
1980. It is difficult to claim that any governing political party which came into power 
by election could try to implement and lead this kind of shift in economy in terms of 
advocating privatization, decreasing real incomes, policies of de-unionization and 
harming social security by institutional re-organization. Otherwise they would not have 
been re-elected by the people in Turkey. 
3.2.1. From Inward-Oriented Etatism to Outward-Looking Liberal Strategy 
After the coup d’état and under the auspices of the army, Turkish policy-making 
began to have a powerful influence on the IMF and the World Bank. Soon after the 
coup, the government signed a three-year stand-by agreement in 1980 (Aydin, 2005, 
p.43). During almost the same time period of Thatcher’s and Reagan’s economic
policies in the UK and in the USA, neo-liberal economic policies were starting to be 
adopted and implemented by the several governments of Turkey. The earlier 
protectionist policies targeted the development of domestic industry by using the tools 
of tariffs and quotas transformed into trade liberalization. The neo-liberal reform 
policies began with the 24th January Pack Programme, a set of Structural Adjustment 
Policies, and involved the liberalization of the foreign trade regime, then the 
liberalization of the financial sector, and then finally, in 1989, the liberalization of 
capital accounts (Satoğlu, 2008, p.151). After 1980, the import-substituting economic 
model was abandoned and an export-based economic model was chosen following the 
series of long political and economic crises of the late 1970s. 
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For this transformation that took place throughout the 1980s, the state system 
was replaced with a market system through the opening of the economy, the 
restructuring of public expenditure priorities, and the liberalization of the financial 
sector as privatization and deregulation were implemented. For Zulkuf Aydin, despite 
its immediate intention to solve the foreign currency problem of the crises, the 
Structural Adjustment Programme of 24
th
 January 1980 introduced structural 
transformation measures to integrate the economy into the world capitalist economy 
(Aydın, 2005). For this purpose, priority was given to the design of a programme that 
would lead to export-oriented industrialization. Subsequently, foreign trade and the 
foreign exchange system were liberalized and other fiscal and monetary measures were 
also adopted (Aydin, 2005). 
In this period, the protectionist policies over the Turkish lira were removed, and 
Turkish currency was made convertible. More outward-looking economic growth 
policies were sought. The state actively encouraged the establishment of 
industrialization by creating incentives for small-scale and medium-scale manufacturing 
entrepreneurs. Three types of industrial zones were founded: first, small industrial 
zones; second, organized industrial zones; and third, industrial zones, moving from the 
small scale gradually up to larger investments. These industrial zones made an 
agglomoration of the industrial entrepreneurs to found a network of sectors and sections 
of manufacture. 
The Motherland Party government that came into power in the 1980s after the 
coup d’état tried to support small-scale and medium-scale manufacturers after 
witnessing the monopolization and lack of innovation of technology and development 
of industry in the country, and also the troubling alliance of the larger capitalists of 
Turkey with the militarist layer of the state. Furthermore, under the leadership of Ozal, 
the Motherland government made bank credit available for the importation of industrial 
machinery from Germany. The export rates as well as the industrialization rates 
developed remarkably in this era, and this went hand-in-hand with the urbanization 
process in the country. The high speed of urbanization increased the development of 
services and commerce in the country. Also, the outward-looking economic policies 
affected this progress in terms of a transformed foreign trade regime. 
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3.2.2. Right-wing Politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
The beginning of right-wing politics in Turkey could be identified with the 
foundation of the Democrat Party in 1946. The Democrat Party won the first ever 
democratic elections of the Turkish Republic in 1950, and ruled the country until the 
1960 military coup, accused of “being backward and opposing Kemal Ataturk’s 
revolutions”. The Prime Minister and two ministers of the Democrat Party were 
executed. After the coup, the Justice Party was founded by some of the former 
Democrats, and won and ruled Turkey until 1971. This rule was ended by another coup 
in 1971. After this coup, the political situation became tumultuous and unstable, a 
situation which continued until another military coup in 1980. The military coups were 
against right-wing governments, and these coups destroyed the civil society and 
democratic politics before they could become institutionalized and powerful. This 
means that even though right-wing parties formed the elected governments, they could 
not but fail to breach the boundaries of the Kemalist state ideology. This failure caused 
a lack of representation of the will of people on the governance level. 
After the mid-1980s, the right-wing parties formed coalitions with the left to 
establish governments, the political strata gained more power against bureaucrats in 
terms of decision-making concerning rent distribution, and bureaucrats began to be 
appointed on the basis of their political links with the governing party more than ever 
before (Aydin, 2005, p.35). The patron-client relationship was the main way of making 
policies in this era. Also, with the help of neo-liberalism, the economy was 
becoming liberated from its previous hegemonic relationships, and this made a 
space for the collapse of the monopolistic structure of entrepreneurship in 
Turkey. It could be claimed that these changes created a more equal territory 
for new entrepreneurs. However, as the politicians and governments gained 
more power, the hegemonic structure of these governments failed to change or to 
evolve, and they were unable to make decisions that opposed the ‘suggestions’ of the 
National Security Council, which consisted mostly of generals of the Armed Forces. 
This failure made the conservatives who were subordinated by this system unhappy 
and dissatisfied with the right-wing political parties of the 1990s, which caused a 
slump in electoral results for these right-wing parties, i.e., the Motherland Party and 
the True Path Party. This disappointment led, later on, to the rise of an Islamist party: 
the Welfare Party. 
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3.2.3. The Expansion of Exporting Networks: Customs Union and Collapse of the 
Soviet Union 
Turkey changed its development strategy and started to seek export-based 
development strategies. In addition to changing its development strategy, Turkey found 
a very suitable space for improving its export networks. First, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and then the liberation in 1989 of the Turkic countries of Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan all helped this improvement: 
Turkish entrepreneurs found great opportunities for the re-structuring of these countries 
due to the sympathy for and cultural similarities with Turkey in these countries. 
Moreover, Turkish entrepreneurs started to invest in these countries in the branches of 
construction, textiles, mining and services. 
The European Customs Union membership of Turkey in 1996 was a turning 
point in the increasing of export rates. Free customs helped Turkish entrepreneurs to 
enter the European markets, and this was one of the most important factors for the rise 
of Turkish entrepreneurship in Europe, and especially for the rise of new 
entrepreneurship in Anatolia. 
Exports have become the driving force of economic development in Anatolia. 
The Anatolian capital is mostly comprized of small and medium sized enterprises that 
are outward (export) oriented. Anatolia was formerly excluded by the Istanbul capital 
and Turkiye Sanayici ve Isadamlari Dernegi (TÜSİAD) has become more dynamic and 
diverse, as its cities have integrated with the world while globalizing and developing 
their middle classes (ESI, 2005). The influence of export-based trade is so high upon 
these new entrepreneurs that their growth is parallel to the growth of exports of the 
entire country. The share of manufactured exports in total exports rose from 36% in 
1980 to 92% in 2010, that is, since the structural adjustment in 1980 shifted the 
economy from ISI to export-oriented economic policies. 
3.2.4. The Rise of the Islamist Movement 
Islamists formed a new political party, the Welfare Party, in 1983. Previously in 
the history of political elections in Turkey, none of these Islamist parties could have 
received a significant proportion of votes, and they stayed marginalized. However, for 
the first time in municipality elections, in 1994 the Welfare Party won the 
municipalities of many big cities including Istanbul and Ankara and became a 
significant actor in political life. In 1995, the general elections resulted in the victory of 
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the Welfare Party, and for the first time in history, the majority of the government and 
the position of prime minister belonged to an Islamist party in Turkey. 
Ideologically, the Islamist parties were relying on some reactionary principles 
against Kemalism, secularism, and the policies of Westernism, as well as the cultural, 
economic and political aspects of globalization and Turkey’s potential membership of 
the European Union. The political agenda of these Islamist parties was identified as 
‘National Outlook’ by suggesting Islamic values as the basis of the society and culture, 
by representing traditional values instead of Westernism, by advocating the Islamic 
Union instead of the European Union, by opposing neo-liberal economic policies and 
emphasizing strong and well-established social welfare provisions to deal with poverty 
in the country. The rural population of Turkey and the newly migrated poor of the urban 
periphery, especially in big cities, mostly supported Islamist parties. 
However, the Islamists did not gain the support of all so-called religious 
movements or communities at that time. During this period, Gulen Movement had 
avoided all connection to the Islamist Refah Party, while at the same time pursuing on-
going dialogue with secular parties. In its early days, the movement had presented its 
ideology as one that was in opposition to political Islam (Veren 2007). 
The major reason for the rise of the Welfare Party specifically, and the Islamist 
movement in general, was the failure of centre-right politics to satisfy the demands of 
society. These demands mostly concerned the perceived victimization of religious-
conservative people by strict secularism, such as by the prohibition of wearing 
headscarves in universities or public buildings for civil servants, strict limitations on 
learning the Quran for children, insufficiency in the level of democracy, and the lack of 
authority of the elected government in the state structure. The collapse of centre-right 
politics and the weakness of left-wing parties in terms of gaining the trust of the people 
concerning traditional or religious peoples’ issues led to a huge rise in votes for the 
Welfare Party. In the literature there is a consensus that the deliberate usage of ‘Islamic 
justice’ (also known as ‘Just order doctrine’) by the Welfare Party appears to have been 
one of the major factors in mobilizing the masses through Islamic politics in the era of 
Neoliberalism (Aydın, 2005; Buğra in Balkan and Savran, 2002; Gülalp, 2001, 2003; 
Öniş, 1997; Yeşilada in Heper and Rubin, 2002). The Just Order programme (Adil 
Düzen), developed by Erbakan, the leader of the party, clearly rejected Westernism and 
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presented all other parties in Turkey as the imitators of the West. It opposed capitalism 
in rhetoric and called for the establishment of an Islamic common market (Yeşilada, 
pp.172-73 in Sayarı and Esmer 2002). 
The government formed by the Welfare Party tried to follow the principles of 
National Outlook in the government until the military intervention in 1997. Within this 
period of government, conservative entrepreneurs were supported and the monopolistic 
structure of capital in Turkey was diminished. These new entrepreneurs started to use 
their connections with this governance and municipalities to their advantage and grew 
in these years, especially in Central Anatolia. 
3.2.5. The Rise of New Entrepreneurs: Their Roots, Background and 
Development 
The new entrepreneurs began to find more equality in the economy for 
themselves, especially with the governance of the Welfare Party from 1996, in terms of 
the state’s more equal approach to business. 
It can be explained that what is new about the Turkish entrepreneurs is their 
conservative background, which can be observed in religious lifestyles, cultural 
values and tendencies towards political conservatism, that differs from the 
previous tradition of Turkish entrepreneurship. Previously, entrepreneurship in 
Turkey had been characterized by Western lifestyles, mostly without religious 
references. “The concept of secularism has become a designation for the ruling 
groups” (Yavuz, 1997, p.64). This caused an overlapping with the cultural cleavages 
in the society and the political struggles based on these cleavages. In addition to 
lifestyles, the most significant feature of the previous entrepreneurship had been 
being ‘created’ and ‘shaped’ by the state, which was dominated by a secularist, 
Westernized Kemalist perspective. Conversely, the new entrepreneurship has 
been based mostly on small entrepreneurship and the cooperation of small entrepreneurs 
that have evolved into a new large capitalist elite in recent decades without 
significant support from the state and without the negative reactions of the state 
ideology. 
“Some religious codes are more compatible with economic growth than others. 
If a religion lays stress upon material values, upon work, upon thrift and productive 
investment, upon honesty in commercial relations, upon experimentation and risk 
bearing, and upon equality of opportunity, it will be helpful to growth; whereas in so far 
as it is hostile to these trends it tends to inhibit growth” (Lewis, 1955, p.105). A famous 
Kemalist social scientist, Niyazi Berkes, linked every social advance in Turkish history 
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to the retreat of Islam, which he saw as supporting a social system lacking the capacity 
for innovation. According to him and many other Turkish scholars, the problem with 
Islam is that, unlike Christianity, it has never made its peace with modernity – never 
underwent its own Reformation (ESI, 2005). 
Newly-rising Islamic capital and the so-called new entrepreneurs became the 
driving force for the periphery, which was outside of state support and also outside of 
the cultural and ideological framework of the state and state ideology. Aided by the shift 
from import-substitution industrialization policies to export oriented industrialization 
strategies in 1980, the Anatolian small or middle-sized entrepreneurs – with the help of 
cultural and social peculiarities that are suitable for flexible organization of work and 
the developed business network integrating different sectors or branches together 
through contracting or outsourcing – found themselves in a highly profitable and 
dynamic environment. ‘Anatolian Tigers’ did not only grow due to export strategies and 
through their cheaper manufacturing prices, they started to grow in the domestic market 
as well. The term ‘tiger’ is an analogy indicating the similarities of Anatolian 
industrialization to the experiences of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong 
known as the Asian Tigers, where the export-driven model of economic development 
with the exportation of manufacturing goods succeeded especially between the 1960s 
and 1990s, with high industrial growth and development rates. Post-Fordist forms of 
flexible organization of work meant a rise in smaller-scale manufacturing, 
subcontracted production, outsourcing and piecework. The informal communitarian 
bonds increased the organizational flexibility of small and medium-scale firms, and 
helped them respond promptly to rapidly changing market parameters. The new 
entrepreneurs organized mainly in the industries of construction, textiles and furniture 
manufacturing, and in the manufacture of various industrial mediatory goods: wheel 
producing, plastics, etc. 
With regard to flexible organization of labour in terms of time and space, it is 
hard to tell where society (in the form of family and school ties or community 
belongingness and political identity) ends and where economic organization begins 
(Buğra, 2002). Keyder contends that after 1980, “market liberalization unleashed 
entrepreneurial energies at every level... [and] as Turkey exports gravitated towards 
labour-intensive manufactures a number of smaller Anatolian cities with craft traditions 
and nonunionized workforces, where households could be incorporated in 
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subcontracting deals, began to emerge as regional industrial centres” (Keyder, 2004, 
p.68).
The new Islamic enterprises are not located only in the hinterland of any 
traditionally industrialized provinces, nor are they developed with the help of 
entrepreneurial groups or capital from outside. The development of new Islamic 
enterprises is based on provincial entrepreneurs, local sources, and also the conjuncture 
of open economy (Satoğlu, 2008, p.159). The majority of their training is based on 
apprenticeship with either a family member or near kin. Also, the first generation who 
started their own businesses are mostly rural people without higher levels of education. 
These factors made this type of entrepreneurship even more interesting for social 
research in terms of exploring dynamics. 
Agglomoration is also said to have additional advantages for new 
entrepreneurs resulting from social ties of trust, loyalty and solidarity among 
enterprises that share a common cultural milieu. Agglomoration is the clustering of 
firms together in the same urban zone, which decreases costs of production because of 
the facilities of networking, chain production, division of labour, subcontracting or 
outsourcing. Also, clusters attract more suppliers and customs than a single firm could 
alone, even when rival firms gather in the same zone. In this framework, since small 
or middle scale entrepreneurs are concentrated on industrial zones and have close 
sub-contracting networks, they utilize the advantages of agglomoration. 
Nadir Sugur argues that the cooperation and collaboration of small or medium 
sized enterprises in the same zone results in a collective efficiency for each of these 
firms, and flexibility is achieved on a collective basis. For him, the networking of small 
firms helps flexibility by “borrowing and lending equipment, sharing their own 
technical knowledge, exchange of their own skilled labour force, financial assistance, 
distribution of subcontracting work, exchange of networking, marketing and organizing 
knowledge and the availability of second hand machinery” (Sugur, 1997, pp.99-100). 
One of the most remarkable advantages of the new entrepreneurs that has been 
suggested is low labour costs. Some Islamic entrepreneurs in Kayseri claim that the 
labour-costs in Turkey are too high to be competitive in the market against Chinese 
products that are produced with lower labour costs (Satoğlu, 2008, p.100). Islamic 
entrepreneurs benefit from short-term labour by offering three-month training periods 
without social security and by frequently changing workers, not being included under 
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legal restrictions regarding labour rights. Lack of collective bargaining is undoubtedly a 
big advantage for the new entrepreneurs in comparison to traditional entrepreneurs. 
Paternalism is also very important. Satoğlu quotes Saffet Arslan, owner of the 
İpek holding company, as saying, “I should behave to my employee as a father, thus 
even in recession I abstain from lay-offs, and reciprocally an employee should protect 
the employers’ rights by providing maximum productivity” (Satoğlu, 2008, p.103). 
Family bonds and political networks are the major obstacles for labour unionism. 
Because employment procedures are mostly dependent upon these kinds of personal 
networks and after this hiring process, many employees could find it very hard and even 
‘shameful’ to demand unionization or any other labour rights. 
One of the main characteristics of the new Islamic entrepreneurship in Turkey is 
the multiple ownerships of enterprises. These entrepreneurs are concentrated in 
industrial manufacturing – from automotive engines to petro-chemical production, and 
from furniture manufacture to construction and textiles – and they have mostly tried to 
adapt themselves for export. Also, the influence of some of the workers’ accumulation 
in Europe should be taken into consideration because the money collected for the 
foundation of this kind of ‘multiple owned’ companies was mostly from workers settled 
in Europe. 
Before being influential actors in big cities, Islamic entrepreneurs first became 
dominant economic and social actors in Central Anatolia. Since the 1990s, Central 
Anatolia has witnessed an economic miracle that has turned a number of former trading 
towns into prosperous manufacturing centres (ESI, 2005). Central Anatolia is the 
heartland of ‘other’ Anatolia, which was perceived as being characterized by 
backwardness, the dominance of village culture and community life, and economic 
activity based on wheat and sheep. The majority of companies are owned by 
conservative people who manage family businesses employing mostly family members 
or kins in Central Anatolia. Some of the conservative holding companies radically differ 
from these family businesses in terms of ownership structures, being based on capital 
outlay for the mobilization of the savings of thousands of people. 
In the 1990s, the largest and the most popular Islamic holdings were Kombassan 
and Yimpaş, which were founded with the investments of the many shareholders. 
Kombassan, a Konya-based Islamic holding, collected billions of euros from thousands 
of people in Germany alone in the 1990s. Kombassan started business opening a small 
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printing company and within ten years it became a giant industrial conglomerate. 
The holding had more than 30,000 shareholders/owners, the majority of whom 
lived in Europe and were Turkish migrant workers. Under the holding company there 
were forty different firms producing machinery, automotive engines, petro-chemical 
products and construction materials, and involved in mining, leather, textiles and so 
on. The holding also operated a small airline company and owned advertisement and 
film subsidiaries (Adas, 2006, p42). 
Another well-known example of new entrepreneurship based on multiple 
ownership was Yimpaş, a conservative holding company, established in the 1980s as a 
small commercial company but grown into a giant holding in a short time, employing 
more than ten-thousand workers, and owning diversified areas of investment ranging 
from food production to construction, textiles to services, and so on. “This remarkable 
growth of the holding was due to its ability to incorporate more than sixty-thousand 
small investors in both Europe and Turkey on Islamic principles of profit and loss 
sharing by preventing bank interest” (Adas, 2006, p.43). The fortune of the new 
entrepreneurs started to change in 1997 with the harsh criticisms and the anti-
propagandist discourse of the mass media owned by the large capitalists of Turkey, and 
their encouragement for a military intervention against the Islamist government and the 
economic and social bases of this government. 
3.2.6. The Discourse of Entrepreneurial Conservatism and Organization of 
Conservative Businessmen: MUSIAD and TUSKON 
New Islamic entrepreneurs founded two large business associations: the 
Association of Independent Businessmen and Industrialists (MÜSİAD) in 1990, and 
The Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) in 1993. 
One of the major characteristics of these new entrepreneurs is that they mostly have 
strong conservative approaches in terms of politics and tend to support traditional 
centre-right, nationalist or Islamist parties. Each of these right-wing political 
movements has defined themselves as conservative. These conservative entrepreneurs 
founded their businessmen’s association named MÜSİAD in 1990. MÜSİAD is the 
abbreviation of ‘The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’ 
(Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği), a name which pretty much conno tes the 
word ‘Muslim’, and the Turkish word ‘müstakil’ (meaning independent) was used to 
imply this similarity. 
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There are some discussions about these conservative entrepreneurs, about their 
attitudes towards rational capitalist business relations. Ayse Buğra notes that in spite of 
their clear stand against western rationalism, the MÜSİAD ideologues have in no way 
proposed mysticism as an alternative socioeconomic strategy (Buğra, 2002). The first 
president of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar, discussed the issue by explaining that the mystical 
motto ‘one mouthful of food, one short coat’ was misconceived and opened the way to 
sluggishness and, as a result, a complete lack of motivation towards the world. He tried 
to form a new ideological framework by using the concept of “homo-Islamicus” by 
adopting the concept of Adam Smith, “homo-economicus”. According to Yarar, Islamic 
societies will rely on this homo Islamicus that combines economic rationality with 
Islamic morality. Different from the concept of homo economicus, which limits 
‘benefit’ and ‘satisfaction’ with individual/selfish and material dimensions, homo 
Islamicus can be satisfied by helping others, and his understanding of benefit has eternal 
aspects (Yarar, 1996). 
There is a tendency in the literature about new entrepreneurs, especially in the 
literature of Marxist scholars, to label the new entrepreneurs’ pasts as Islamist or as 
radical (Tugal, 2009 Aydin, 2005; Atasoy, 2009. But the past of the new entrepreneurs 
was mostly concerned with supporting centre-right political parties in the 1990s. They 
mostly did not choose to define themselves as Islamist or radical, nor did the majority of 
them become official executives or MPs of Islamist parties like the Welfare Party. 
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 There is a significant wave in academia to evaluate the new conservative 
entrepreneurship in the context of Max Weber’s theory about the relationship between 
the Protestant Ethic and the rise of capitalism. The former metropolitan mayor of 
Kayseri, Sukru Karatepe, compared his fellow ‘Kayserili’ (people from Kayseri) with 
hardworking ‘Protestants’ and explained that “to understand Kayseri, one must read 
Max Weber” (a reference to Weber’s celebrated 1905 essay, “The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism”, which argued that the “this-worldly asceticism” of Calvinism 
provided the spark for the rise of modern capitalism). Also, C.H., the owner of a textile 
company and a branch chair of the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen 
Association (MÜSİAD), stated: “the rise of new Anatolian capitalists is due to their 
Protestant work ethic: No personal waste, no speculation, reinvest your 
profits” (Interviews in ESI, 2005). 
With the help of global relations and incentives for export, 
Turkish entrepreneurs grew dramatically. This went hand-in-hand with the 
processes of industrial investments, urbanization and enrichment, which led to the 
emergence of a new middle class rising in cities (mostly Anatolian cities which were 
poor in terms of entrepreneurship). This new middle class is composed of enriched 
entrepreneurs, their educated children, and also their educated, white-collared 
employees. 
The discourse of MÜSİAD was not supported by Islamism or by the Welfare 
Party government. MÜSİAD was suggesting more openness to global relations and the 
European Union and decreasing the role of the state in the economy more drastically. 
The discourse of MÜSİAD publications was more moderate, democratic and pluralist 
than the discourse of the Welfare Party. 
3.2.7. Antagonism in the Capitalist Class: Secularist versus Conservative Business 
This division of entrepreneurs or capital owners was expressed as two 
separate and opposing associations of capital owners and businessmen, the 
Association of Turkish Capitalists and Businessmen (TÜSIAD) and the Association 
of Independent Capitalists and Businessmen (MÜSIAD). TÜSIAD is the representative 
of the secularist 
Page | 66 
capital owners and entrepreneurs that had been the most powerful civil association in 
Turkey for many years. These capitalists had been supported by the state subsidies. 
MÜSIAD is much younger than TÜSIAD and is mainly composed of new, 
relatively smaller Anatolian entrepreneurs that have emerged in the last few decades 
without substantial subsidies or other types of state support, and that have evolved into 
middle-size or larger capitalist enterprises. MÜSIAD has not only been influential for 
being a union for conservative entrepreneurs, it has also been a hub for spreading the 
ideals and political discourse of the new conservative entrepreneurship in Turkey (Adas, 
2006, p.123). This can be defined as the making of a new middle-class ideology. 
The antagonism between these two associations emerged especially in the 
government of the Welfare Party government after 1995. MÜSİAD criticized TÜSİAD 
as being developed by state subsidies and not being the authentic bourgeoisie of Turkey, 
and also accused it of being a monopoly in the market and avoiding developing 
innovation and technology for the country. On the other hand, TÜSİAD blamed 
MÜSİAD for being reactionary instead of being progressive and being against 
secularism and the ‘values of Western civilization’. This debate evolved into a political 
struggle. TÜSİAD supported the military intervention against the Welfare Party 
government and the ‘Islamic Capital’, and started to wage a public campaign through 
their big mass media facilities such as newspapers and television channels. This process 
led the country to the military intervention of 1997. 
3.2.8. Militarist Resistance to Islamism and to New Entrepreneurs – 28 February 
1997 and the Power Bloc: Five-Members-Gang 
The Welfare Party won the elections and became the primary partner of the 
coalition government in 1996. This governance helped the new rising conservative 
companies and entrepreneurs to be strengthened. Both the rise of Islamism in politics 
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and the growing role of Islamic entrepreneurs in economic life led the Nation Security 
Council (the militarist structure oppressing elected governments until recently) to 
declare Islamic fundamentalism as “the most serious threat to national security and the 
secularist political regime”, and the government called for effective measures to block 
and weaken the activities of Islamic groups. With the initiative of the military and 
secularist groups, organizations such as business groups and trade unions (the 
traditional power bloc) organized and campaigned against the Islamist-led coalition 
government. All this militarist pressure caused the collapse of the Islamist coalition 
government. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court banned the Welfare Party for its 
‘anti-secularist’ activities. 
The state not only targeted Islamic political actors but it actively intervened in 
both the domestic and transnational sphere to disrupt and undermine the economic basis 
of Islamic groups.” Because they see the conservative entrepreneurs as the meeting 
point of Islamist groups with the masses, as shareholders or consumers, this can be 
perceived as a primary danger in the growing civil power against the militaristic 
Kemalist power bloc that was constructed around the state and state-supported 
capitalism. “For instance, newspapers published a list of Islamic companies handed to 
them by the military. Some of the companies in the list became afraid of prosecution 
and economic loss and complained that they were mistakenly included in ‘the list of 
Islamic companies’ and tried to clear their names by running full-page advertisements 
in the newspapers pledging their loyalties to Atatürk and the principles of secularism 
and the republic” (Adas, 2011, p.632). Also, the state froze the assets of some Islamic 
holding companies because of their illegal money-collection practices and their capital-
generating activities in Turkey and abroad. The state took out advertisements in the 
Turkish newspapers published in Europe warning Turkish migrant workers in Europe 
not to give their money to these companies. 
The most remarkable aspect of the military intervention is making the historical 
power bloc concretely real. Major NGOs gathered together and declared their support 
openly and publicly towards the military intervention. These associations were the 
Turkish Confederation of Employers Unions (TİSK) that was mostly influenced by 
TÜSİAD), the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey 
(TOBB), the Confederation of Labour Unions of Turkey (Türk-İş), the Confederation of 
Revolutionary Labour Unions, and the Turkish Tradesmen and Artisans’ Confederation 
(TESK). This formation could be called a power bloc because they were linked with 
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military groups that wanted to prepare the country for the military intervention. This 
totally resembles the alliance between the large capitalists of Turkey, the militarist 
bureaucracy and the Kemalist elites, which control some ‘non-governmental’ 
organizations, like employer or labour unions. 
On the other hand, Fethullah Gulen and the media channels of the Gulen 
Movement openly supported the military intervention against the Welfare Party 
Government by demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Erbakan, accusing him of 
being the reason for the chaos (Hale & Ozbudun, 2010, p.50). But somehow, later the 
military and supporting judges and prosecutors perceived Gulen also to be a threat to 
secularism, and opened a case against him. This process resulted in the fall of the 
government and the emigration of Gulen to the USA. 
The consent shown by these groups presented an ideological hegemony of 
Kemalism and its military apparatus in Gramscian terms, wherein whoever is the 
elected government is whatever the will of the people says. 
3.2.9. Dissolution of Islamist Politics and Time for Separation 
After the military intervention on 28 February 1997, massive changes occurred. 
After the closure of the Welfare Party, its leader and Prime Minister of the Government 
Erbakan, and the mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan, were banned from politics, and the 
government collapsed. The rest of the cadre of the Welfare Party that was not banned 
from politics founded the Virtue Party and remained as an opposition party. 
The people of Turkey – including conservatives and almost all of the people 
supporting right-wing politics – were dissatisfied with the weakness of the Welfare 
Party and other centre-right political parties in terms of their reactions to the military 
intervention and the Kemalist elites. Significant criticisms against these politicians and 
parties caused a notable decrease in the votes for the new party of Islamists, the Virtue 
Party, and the other two centre right political parties, the True Path Party and the 
Motherland Party, in the general elections of 1999. In the general congress of the Virtue 
Party, for the first time in history, there were two candidates for the presidency. One of 
them was Recai Kutan, who was a symbol for traditional Islamism, and the other was 
Abdullah Gül, who presented himself as a reformist. This congress ended in victory for 
the traditional Islamists, but this division continued in the movement in a growing trend. 
After this election, and as the process of the 28
th
 February military intervention
continued, the Virtue Party was also closed in 2001. This closure ended in the Page | 69 
foundation of two separate political parties: The Felicity Party and the Justice and 
Development Party (AK Party). The Felicity Party was the representative of traditional 
Islamists and the AK Party has represented the reformists, conservative-democrats in 
their own words. 
3.2.10. Concluding Remarks 
Decreasing state intervention in the economy under the influence of neo-
liberalism has caused a space for the participation of civil society in the economy 
without the intervention of the state, as, for example, in small-scale entrepreneurship. 
Why was this free zone for civil society utilized by Islamist or conservative 
entrepreneurs? There might be multiple answers, but the first reason that can be claimed 
is that the conservative people have composed the majority of the society in numbers. In 
other words, there had been a strict differentiation between the social centre and 
political centre until recently in the conception of Shils (1961). Also there are several 
advantages for the new Islamic entrepreneurs in the networking and organization of 
their work, which also benefits the export strategies of Turkey. 
The resistance of the power bloc bureaucracy, the military, traditional capitalist 
monopoly, Kemalist political party and Kemalist elites to the Islamist government and 
conservative entrepreneurs included waging campaigns against these enterprises and 
banning them. 28
th
 February 1997 was a turning point in the fortunes of both Islamism
and conservatism, and both in political and economic spheres. In the political sphere, it 
accelerated the transformation of Islamism and centre-right politics into the new 
conservatism and also revealed the resistant alliance to the conservative entrepreneurs. 
This period might be analysed as witnessing the differentiation between the 
social centre and political centre, as the demands of the social centre were not satisfied 
because of the failure of political parties. In addition, there is significant evidence to 
argue that this failure of politics had internal and external causes. The internal cause 
could be the lack of a new discourse and principles to effectively diagnose social 
change and the rise of a new urban, middle-class society. The external cause could be 
the historical power bloc that struggled to block the impact of the social change on the 
political sphere through militaristic means. 
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3.3. The Emergence of New Conservatism: Politics, Ideology and Business 
3.3.1. The Foundation of AK Party (Justice and Development Party) 
New conservatism became a political position after the foundation of the Justice 
and Development Party (AK Party), and it’s coming to power as a government party 
from 2002 onwards. Turkey has been dominated by this new conservative political party 
(the AK Party), and Turkish intellectuals – who are open to democracy, plurality and a 
market economy – criticize traditional Islamism for being closed and reactionary to the 
rest of the world. The AK Party defined itself as the ‘new conservative democrat party’, 
and its leader, Erdogan, criticized the Islamists openly for the first time and declared 
that they are changed and different now from how they were in the past. He also 
rejected the concept of ‘Muslim Democrat’, underlining their preference for the concept 
of ‘conservative democrat’ (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, p.57). 
The AK Party put some major economic, interior and foreign policy principles 
into its party programme, such as prioritizing the market economy by privatizations, 
increasing the efficiency of production and services, and the resulting rise in export 
levels. The AK Party placed European Union membership as the main goal for the 
country, and the Copenhagen political criterion, which necessitates the development of 
democracy in the country, suggested accepting and implementing European Union 
membership in the country. Moreover, the USA was defined as a strategic ally, and a 
relationship with the USA was declared to continue in the programme. The AK Party ’s 
party programme suggests “religion as one of the most important institutions of the 
society, but at the same time claims “secularism as the prerequisite of democracy”. In 
order to understand the secularism of the AK Party, we have to make a distinction 
between the oppressive secularism that forces religion to be limited to the private, 
individual sphere and the ‘passive secularism’ that is the neutrality of the state towards 
religion and that permits the visibility of religion in the public sphere. The AK Party ’s 
understanding of secularism is more compatible with that passive secularism that rejects 
both the secularist oppression of religion in society and politics, and also the top-down 
Islamization of the society (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, p.59). All these were major changes 
from the traditional Islamism that had been represented by several parties previously. 
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3.3.2. The Relations of the AK Party and Conservative Businessmen in the Early 
Period of the AK Party 
The process of transformation of the new entrepreneurs into the new 
conservatism has some accelerating historical turning points. There has been a solid 
relationship between the AK Party and MÜSIAD since the foundation of the AK Party. 
Ten members of MÜSIAD were among the founders of the AK Party, and twenty 
MÜSIAD members were elected as AK Party parliamentarians in the 2002 elections 
(Jang, 2003 pp.214-217). This fact reveals the interdependent nature of the relationship 
between the conservative party and conservative entrepreneurs, contrary to the belief 
that there is a hierarchical relationship between the politicians above and the 
entrepreneurs below, and that the new entrepreneurs are just following the political 
party. 
At the same time as changes on the political level were occurring, in Central 
Anatolia, the core of new entrepreneurship, interest in the new conservative politics 
gradually grew. Parallel with the economic changes in Central Anatolia, the political 
situation also changed. The electoral strength of traditional right-wing movements, the 
centre-right, nationalists and Islamists evolved into the only route for the new 
conservative party, the AK Party. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Prime Minister) and Abdullah Gul (President Kayseri’s most 
prominent politician), and its political philosophy of so-called ‘democratic 
conservatism’ are very popular in Central Anatolia. In the general election of 2011, the 
AK Party received 65% of the votes in Kayseri and 70% of the votes in Konya, which 
are the highest for any political parties in the history of these cities. Similar change was 
also seen in big cities like Ankara and Istanbul; however, the dominance of secularists 
in business life made it less noticeable in those large urban centres. 
3.3.3. New Discourse: From Traditional into Modern Conservatism 
There is a tendency to discuss political Islam or conservatism in the Middle East 
– specifically in Turkey – within the framework of identity politics. However, without
understanding socio-economic dynamics, identity politics have little meaning. In his 
study of the “Islam of the Market”, Haenni asserts that Islamism becomes moderate by 
interpreting Islam as compatible with market economics. According to his view, this 
moderateness is not about secularization or decreasing religiosity, but is about the 
emergence of the ‘individual’ in Islamist social groups. The image of the ‘virtuous 
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businessman’ become more and more highlighted each year, and ‘virtues’ are about 
making more money through business, and also a kind of image-making of a Jihad 
through peaceful means and businesses in his terms. “Mecca Cola” in France or “Cola 
Turka” in Turkey are examples that he cites to support his claims (Haenni, 2011, p.10). 
Discussions about the “Arab Spring” are also part of this global trend of change from 
‘radical’ Islamism into the new type of conservatism. The changes in the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and their separation from radical Salafi groups can be considered 
a remarkable example of this change. In comparison to the Muslim Brotherhood’s past, 
the discourse about freedom and democracy is significantly upheld by Muslim 
Brotherhood today. 
Social change is reflected on the ideological level as well; political Islam itself 
has also changed. The political viewpoints of rural-communitarian societies will 
eventually disappear as the society progresses into urban, middle-class societies. But a 
reflection of this social change in politics could take more time because of the distance 
between the social centre and political centre, and also because of the hegemony of the 
political-social-economic power bloc in Turkey. 
The anti-capitalist and anti-modernist confrontational Islamic discourse of the 
Islamic revival was to be replaced by what Asef Bayat calls “the post-Islamist turn” in 
the last decades of the century (Bayat, 2007. This was a period in which a new 
generation of Islamist intellectuals – together with the old ones who started to re-
position themselves – began to re-consider the established perception of concepts of 
Western-origin such as globalization, modernity, human rights, democracy, civil society 
and multiculturalism. 
An analysis of the Islamist or conservative intellectual production in this period 
will show us that the novels, Islamist idioms, concepts and concerns of the late 1990s 
and the 2000s were actually discussed, elaborated and debated by and within the 
Islamist or conservative journals and the periodicals of MÜSIAD. The ruling party for 
ten years, AK Party that has political Islamist roots is argued to be the representative of 
this new entrepreneurship and new middle class (Tugal, 2009). This change in the 
political parties of political Islam can be seen easily. These parties are remembered for 
their discourse of anti-Westernism, anti-globalization, blaming Western capitalism as 
‘causing inequalities’ and promising to form a ‘just order’, using anti-Israeli slogans, 
and being against Turkish membership of the European Union. But the AK Party, which 
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has governed Turkey since 2002, denied the label of ‘Political Islam’, and began to 
challenge all of the former Islamist parties’ principles listed above. They preferred to 
identify themselves as ‘conservative’. Also, this term has latterly been preferred by 
most of the intellectuals who identified themselves as ‘Islamist’ previously. We have to 
say that the conservatism of centre-right parties and today’s AK Party is more a 
‘cultural conservatism’ than a political one as in European examples. Turkish 
conservatives try to conserve their cultural/national/traditional values against strict 
Westernism and oppressive secularism by also being critical of the political institutions 
and power bloc. 
In the literature, there is a trend towards considering the change in ideology of 
the Islamists as the absorption of Islamists by Neoliberalism. In his study of passive 
revolution, Cihan Tugal articulates this change as being a result of the struggles 
between radical Islamism and Western capitalism, and concludes that these Islamist 
groups were transformed into a moderate, secular and neoliberal conservatism which is 
suitable for the integration of these people into capitalism in terms of production, 
services and consumption (Tugal, 2009). But this kind of objectification and forming of 
external relations between Islamism and capitalism without taking the sociological 
change into consideration could lead us into a one-sided analysis. Furthermore, this kind 
of analysis also holds Neoliberalism as an active subject and approaches Islamism as a 
passive object, but as we know in social science epistemology, this could mislead the 
analysis of politics and ideology, and result in underestimation of sociological change. 
3.3.4. Militarist Resistance to the AK Party and the Victory of Civil Society 
The collapse of the power bloc and hegemonic ideology did not occur quickly 
and easily after the governance of the AK Party began. Even though the AK Party came 
into power by having the majority of the votes, in 2007 the military intervened in 
politics by accusing the government of being against secular rule, but the government 
did not step back and took the country to the elections. In the election, the AK Party 
increased its votes and showed the people’s support, and started some investigations and 
trials concerning the military interventions. For the first time in the history of Turkish 
democracy, the will of the people determined who would be governing the country 
without any influence of the military or anti-democratic power group. The influence of 
the military over politics has been claimed to continue until 2010. The influence of the 
National Security Council was significant until this date, when the elected government 
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forced the top-level general to resign from the military because of his opposition to the 
government. 
3.3.5. Governance of the AK Party and the Strengthening of Conservative 
Businessmen 
Some of these entrepreneurs have Islamist roots, and were initially advocating to 
take control of state power and to form an Islamic economy and ‘just order’, as in their 
Islamist past. But then the conservative entrepreneurs’ associations (i.e., MÜSIAD) 
started to change their approach towards state intervention in the economy in the mid 
1990s, especially after the military coup in 1997, and they started to adopt similar 
premises to those of neo-liberalism. This change was regarded as the absorption of 
Islamists by the neo-liberal-capitalist hegemony in the majority of the literature (Tugal, 
2009; Keyder, 2004; Atasoy, 2008). In other words, some Marxist-oriented views 
interpreted Islamism as having an anti-capitalist standpoint, and regarded their evolution 
to a position which is open to market economy relations and discourse of democracy as 
being reliant on the absorption of Islamism by hegemonic neo-liberal trends. 
Initially the conservative entrepreneurs were not supportive of state intervention 
in the economy, since the state itself was considered to be the natural ally of large 
Istanbul business. But it is hard to say that this reaction against state intervention is the 
consequence of being committed to neo-liberal premises because, as we can see in the 
government of the conservative Justice and Development Party from 2002 onwards, the 
new entrepreneurs have become economically and politically linked with the state 
apparatus. Some of the privatized state enterprises and some construction and service 
facilities have begun to be implemented by the new conservative entrepreneurs. Thus, 
the declared reaction apparently was not against the state as an institution, but it was 
against the Kemalist state favouring the secular bourgeoisie. To some extent, there is 
evidence in the literature that they prefer states having an incentive and directive role in 
the economy, but not dominating and determining it. There is a need to question the 
approach of the new entrepreneurs and their associations towards state intervention 
when considering the changes in their attitudes towards the state across time. 
In sociological terms, the changes in networks of businesses, families, political 
groups or communities can be influenced by changes in worldviews and through the 
attainment of an individual consciousness and different ways of conceptualizing 
rationality, democracy and human rights. The businessmen who founded MÜSIAD and 
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who later evolved into proponents of conservatism can be listed as the most influential 
category of new entrepreneurs. It has been claimed that during the 1990s, mosques were 
used for networking and for the organization of businesses in the beginning of this new 
entrepreneurship (Tugal, 2009). This does not mean that religious clergy or any other 
officials in mosques were involved in this organization of business networks, but since 
the mosques are the most suitable places for socialization amongst conservative-
religious people, these entrepreneurs utilized these places as a space for networking. In 
some cases, some religious sects and communities strengthen their social and political 
power by using the businesses and the entrepreneurs, but these are mainly some 
traditional religious communities that are concentrated in a very few and specific 
neighbourhoods. In addition to religious communities, multiple ownership of businesses 
by conservative people creates communities that more than a few people join and in 
which they begin to do business together by producing and exporting. They have started 
to employ large numbers of people, but their hiring preferences depend mainly on 
shared family/religious/political backgrounds – in other words, on personal 
relationships. 
Recent studies on Anatolian cities underline their changing nature: “we are no 
longer faced with a space and living, which is identified with ‘underdevelopment,’ 
‘traditionalist,’ and ‘periphery’” (Keyman & Lorosdagi, 2010). As has been underlined 
by the 2005 ESI report, “a number of Anatolian trading centres, ranged along the old 
silk routes, have undergone an industrial revolution which has turned them into major 
manufacturing centres and players in the global economy” (ESI, 2005). They were 
“loyal to religious values, but open to change”, and had a high degree of economic 
rationality (ESI, 2005). 
This new entrepreneurship has started to grow very quickly, and the increasing 
industrialization and widening service sectors in the economy accelerated the 
urbanization process after the 1980s. In 2011, about three persons out of four lived in 
urban areas in Turkey, an increase from around 20% sixty years ago. This change in 
numbers means a change in society as well. Besides this social change, the new 
entrepreneurship specifically has driven the emergence of a new middle class or 
bourgeoisie. 
Islamic business is very dominant in Central Anatolian business life. The cities 
of Konya and Kayseri, especially, are the cores of Islamic entrepreneurship. The city of 
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Kayseri has grown from sixty-five thousand inhabitants in 1950 to about six-hundred 
and fifty thousand today. There has been a migration from rural areas to urban centres. 
Migrants from rural areas utilized the advantages of rapid industrialization. The new 
industrial zone of Kayseri is one of the largest in Kayseri, and started with the 
construction of one-hundred and thirty-nine new businesses in a single day, which was 
recorded in the Guinness Book of World Records. There are a number of case studies 
concerning how industrial capitalism emerged from a predominantly rural or merchant 
society within a single generation, such as studies on the rise of Orta Anadolu, 
producing one percent of the world’s denim, and on the impact of the Kayseri sugar 
refinery and its effects on local agriculture (ESI, 2005). 
The sector of furniture manufacturing might be a good starting point for 
understanding the change in Kayseri. Twenty-five thousand pieces of furniture are 
being produced in Kayseri each day, which is almost half of all production in Turkey. 
This production requires the employment of around fifty thousand people in Kayseri. 
This furniture includes high quality sofas, beds, kitchen tables, etc., and some of these 
products are being exported to Middle Eastern and European countries. 
A producer of high-quality denim (the fabric from which jeans are made) is also 
a part of the industrial production in Kayseri. Orta Anadolu, Kayseri’s fabric giant, has 
been among Turkey’s twenty-five most profitable companies. More than one percent of 
the world’s denim output was produced by Orta Anadolu in Kayseri, and exported to the 
USA, the UK, Japan and China, and used to manufacture the primary brands of jeans in 
the world. 
“The development in Central Anatolia has caused a birth to a new class of 
entrepreneurs, engineers and urban workers. The traders and artisans, which made up of 
the local economy of the late 1970s have now shifted to mass production. Product 
catalogues; sophisticated branding and franchised sales outlets have replaced the 
tradition of haggling over the price of unique, hand-made items. Kayseri’s industrialists 
have now business horizons which stretch beyond Turkey, west towards Europe and 
east towards Middle East and Central Asia” (ESI, 2005). 
As seen in the literature, Islamic entrepreneurship is identified with Central 
Anatolia because Anatolia is the dominant actor in the business life in this region. 
However, most of the largest and most influential Islamic business people are located in 
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big cities like Istanbul and Ankara, which are also where the headquarters of MÜSİAD 
and TUSKON are located. 
3.3.6. Change and Diversification in Conservative Businessmen 
The literature mostly discusses the new entrepreneurship as if it consists of a 
homogenous group of people of Islamist past. It would be wrong to identify the new 
entrepreneurs as a homogenous social group and as sharing a common past. Instead they 
can be categorized in three main groups; the former (or still) Islamists, the strictly 
hierarchical religious communities, and the multiply-owned business 
organizations of ordinary people. 
In the context of EU enlargement studies, in 2005, after spending six months in 
Kayseri, the European Stability Initiative used the term ‘Islamic Calvinism’ to define 
the mentality and the life styles of Anatolian businessmen. The ESI report, entitled 
“Islamic Calvinists in Kayseri”, looks closely at a small town in Kayseri, the industrial 
district of Hacilar, whose twenty thousand inhabitants have given birth to nine out of 
Turkey’s top five hundred companies (ESI, 2005). In the statistics for 2011, this number 
increased to fourteen out of Turkey’s top five hundred companies (ISO, 2011). 
While discussing the theories of Max Weber, Werner Sombart and Karl Marx in 
the context of social change, Özel assumes that ‘rationalistic’ drives for economic 
success are not enough to provide adequate impetus for capital accumulation and 
economic expansion. The economy in general and entrepreneurs in particular are in 
need of cultural and spiritual drives for successful economic performance (Özel, 1993). 
In addition to the periodicals and reports of MÜSİAD, independent intellectual circles 
(mostly Islamist economists and scholars of business administration) gathered around 
journals or publications of MÜSİAD, such as “İktisat ve İs Dünyası Bülteni” 
(Economics and World of Business Bulletin) and tried to develop an enabling spiritual 
and ideological framework for conservative entrepreneurs’ success. What makes 
Islamic business associations (MÜSIAD and others) unique is the ways in which they 
combine an Islamic work ethic with the need for high technical educational attainment 
(Atasoy, 2008). 
As Ziya Öniş states, “the professionals, the businessmen, and the intellectuals 
whom we would classify as the rising ‘conservative bourgeoisie,’ are clearly benefiting 
from globalization. However, as we will see in the MÜSIAD case, while integrating 
themselves to global networks, the new economic, political and cultural 
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intellectuals/elites, defining themselves as conservative, develop a genuine articulation. 
The conservatives argued that while Islam was globalizing it was globalizing in its own 
way” (Onis, 1997). Rather than submitting themselves to the homogenizing effects of 
neoliberal globalization, they claimed to have established a synthesis, which protected 
the ethical core of Islamic societies. 
The changes, through time, became reflected in symbolic or cultural priorities 
such as changes regarding ownership of multiple cars; most Islamist movements, 
communities or intellectuals did not appreciate multiple houses, investing money in 
interest-paying bank accounts, and participation in art exhibitions, opera, theatre or 
cinema. For example, the famous Islamist intellectual Sevket Eygi blames a new 
generation of conservative rich people for “wasting money on expensive cars and 
houses, and acting like Westerners or secularists” (Eygi, 10 June 2009). Conspicuous 
consumption has become one of the major topics of discussion in conservative journals. 
The culture is also changing in terms of urbanization, education and increasing 
progress. There are big differences in the generations of entrepreneurs, both in the 
perceptions of consumption and also in social relations. Individual consciousness and 
the sense of belonging to the community are important areas for social research to 
explore. For example, in her study on a conservative clothing company, Navaro- Yashin 
asserts that through the use of modern production techniques and marketing strategies, 
the female image is constructed for the conservative upper classes (Navaro-Yashin, 
2002). 
3.3.7. The Conflict among AK Party -TUSKON 
TUSKON is mostly characterized with its affiliation to Gulen Movement. The 
Gulen Movement, one of the strongest and largest Islamic groups with its educational 
institutions, business people, media channels and followers, had supported the AK Party 
since its foundation in 2001. This continued for 11 years until 2012. Some Gulenists 
became MPs and bureaucrats of AK Party governments, and Gulen and many Gulenist 
figures openly declared their support for the AK Party until 2012. And then this broke. 
Three remarkable incidents caused the break. The first incident that caused 
tension between the AK Party, other conservative social groups and Gulenists happened 
in 2012. Attorneys who were Gulenists prepared a case against the Chairman of the 
National Intelligence Service (MIT) and an important member of Prime Minister 
Erdogan’s team, Hakan Fidan, and tried to arrest him. Prime Minister 
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Erdogan accused these attorneys of committing treason and of being a part of foreign 
intelligence services (CIA and MOSSAD were implied). 
Second, the AK Party government’s plan for closing the private courses that 
prepare young people for university entry exams was beginning, and since the Gulen 
movement has many private education institutions, they reacted and vigorously opposed 
this plan. The Gulen movement perceived this policy as a declaration of war. 
And lastly, the most important turning point of the breakdown of the relations 
between the AK Party and the Gulen movement occurred during the preparation of 
corruption cases against four ministers in the cabinet on 17
th
 December 2013. These
cases were prepared by the Gulenist prosecutors and were taken to the courts by 
Gulenist judges. Since the end of 2013 there has been a cold war between the AK Party, 
the rest of the religious brotherhoods and conservative groups that support the AK Party 
(i.e. MÜSİAD) and the Gulen movement. The AK Party government initiated a 
programme of detection and stigmatization of Gulenist government officers, and began 
removing them from important government positions in 2013. Also, the government 
opened some financial investigations into the activities of some Gulenist business 
people and the bank of the Gulen movement: Bank Asya. 
3.3.8. Concluding Remarks 
Two significant factions of right-wing politics in Turkey – Islamism and the 
centre-right – evolved into a new conservatism, which is more integrated into 
democracy, pluralism and the European Union membership process. This change had 
causes related to global trends, such as struggles with rigid secularism within the 
country, and this type of change should be examined in terms of its social base. The rise 
of new entrepreneurs and the social change towards urban, middle-class society in 
general encourages this type of ideological and political transformation. 
The political demands and viewpoints of rural, agrarian, communitarian societies 
are different from those of urbanites and the middle-classes. Middle-class societies are 
composed of individualistic social relations where the individual seeks freedom and human 
rights, thus veering away from radicalism and supporting moderation. Since Turkey became 
an urban society with increasing individual consciousness rather than communitarian 
relationships, the change in the demands of the society could be expected to move towards 
democracy and human rights. Also, the decline in 
communitarian relationships could increase the religious consciousness that there is no 
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necessary mediatory between the individual and God, and this type of rationality could 
lead to the formation of the separation of economic and political behaviour from the 
religious. This could create a secularist drive among the people. 
One of the most important aspects of conservative politics is that the most 
successful political actors saw the social change and benefitted from it. First, they 
perceived the importance of the rise of new Islamic entrepreneurship and made close 
connections with it through the establishment of interdependent relationships. Second, 
the huge growth in urban poverty, which is the result of the rapid urbanization and the 
migration from rural to urban life, caused a social welfare problem in large cities. 
Conservative political parties – with the help of the local municipal administrations that 
were won by their parties – started to apply significant social welfare provision by the 
distribution of social aid. Charitable organizations of conservative parties also provided 
support for the needy through the donations of Islamic business people. 
On the other hand, not only conservative political parties, but also Islamic 
business people benefitted from this relationship with politics by securing prestige, 
status and credibility, and also by establishing further business links with the help of the 
government and municipalities. The rise of the new entrepreneurs was based upon this 
social change, and they in turn accelerated this change even more. They had a power to 
influence politics, and the transformation that they demanded would be seen in 
conservative politics later. 
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CHAPTER 4 - MÜSİAD: ANALYSIS OF 
AN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND 
POLITICAL MOVEMENT 
In this chapter, the background, processes and consequences of the 
empowerment of MÜSİAD and MÜSİAD-member business people will be discussed by 
analysing the perceptions and opinions of MÜSİAD members in the interviews. I will 
evaluate the conditions that made MÜSİAD’s emergence possible, the mechanisms that 
enabled the MÜSİAD members to grow dramatically and that transformed them into 
important economic, social and political actors, and the self-interpretations of their 
economic, social and political story of this transformation. 
I will begin this chapter by introducing MÜSİAD with a historical-contemporary 
overview and general information concerning my field study of MÜSİAD. MÜSİAD, as 
an association of business people, will be regarded as a social and a political movement 
as well as an economic movement. MÜSİAD’s emergence, empowerment, change and 
identity will be analysed in terms of its three dimensions: economic, social and political. 
It is not easy to separate these three dimensions of MÜSİAD, since all of them 
have closely interacted with each other. However, in order to analyse and explain the 
interception of the line of change of Turkey and MÜSİAD, categorizations and sub-
divisions are the best ways to touch upon the pieces of the whole concrete reality. 
The first category is the economic dimension of MÜSİAD. This is chosen as the 
first category because MÜSİAD’s most distinctive feature, more than any other 
conservative or Islamic social or political actor, is being an economic movement that 
consists of business people. MÜSİAD is the largest and most well-known representative 
of conservative, Islamic business. As an interest group, MÜSİAD is an organization of 
business people who share common interests. Included in this analysis – by applying the 
self-interpretations and life-stories of the MÜSİAD-member business people – will be: 
the ways in which MÜSİAD-members started their business lives, made business 
partnerships and established trust networks; the role of religiosity in business relations; 
the stages of change in their economic activity and priorities; in what features they 
conform to the role of a modern, secular business person type and how they differ in 
this role; the influence of global economic trends on export opportunities; and their 
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approaches both to the relations of capitalism and Islam in the frame of Islamic finance, 
and to the concepts of interest, wealth, social justice and labour unions. In this analysis, 
the main aim is to trace the line of economic change and the dynamics of forming a new 
business elite based on conservatism and Islam. 
In this research, beside the perceptions, interpretations and opinions of MÜSİAD 
members, the role of MÜSİAD as an institution in making the new elite through 
publications, activities, events and public visibility will be another focus. The opinions 
of the MÜSİAD executives, including the former chairman, are important in order to 
see the institutional view as well as the individual views of the members. Also, the 
economic mechanism that made conservative business possible is partially formed by 
MÜSİAD as an institution. So the economic trajectory of conservative business goes 
hand in hand with the trajectory of MÜSİAD. It is important to include the perception 
and identifications of individual members and executives of MÜSİAD cohesively in 
order to see the line of change and development of Islamic business. 
Moving on to the second category, MÜSİAD is not just an interest group; it is 
much more than that. MÜSİAD is also one of the most important social movements in 
Turkey. Social self-realization was required as the new elite established a social and 
cultural sphere in terms of literature, music, popular culture, consumption culture, 
leisure, education and daily life. As an expected consequence of successful and 
flourishing business, all of these social and cultural routines and identities have 
transformed into a new, conservative elite. In this chapter I will examine the ways in 
which this social and cultural change happened, how the business people see and 
explain their own change, and what kind of cultural backgrounds are being established 
in the dualities of traditional versus modern, Islamic versus capitalist, and peripheral 
versus central. 
To understand the transition from the acquired status of traditional people in the 
social periphery to their adopted status towards the social centre it is important to see 
the line of change and to explore how business people integrate themselves to modern 
society with their religious and traditional values. Also, the ways in which inter-
generational differences are viewed in terms of the changing educational levels from 
older generations to younger, and interpretations by business people are important. 
These dimensions serve to identify the line of the transformation of a rural-based, non-
Westernized and barely-modernized, traditional, religious group into a group of modern 
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business people without sacrificing their social values and maintaining a unique 
character. 
Starting from the military intervention period in the mid-1990s, MÜSİAD 
became one of the most important and visible conservative civil representatives of 
conservative society in Turkey. Almost as much as conservative political parties, 
MÜSİAD had been one of the most important entities in social and political discussions. 
Coming to the third category, the political character of MÜSİAD has also 
transformed since its foundation in 1990, particularly after the trauma of the February 
28
th
 Process in 1997, and also with the coming into government of the AK Party, which
is widely accepted in the media as the political representative of the members of 
MÜSİAD. However, MÜSİAD itself was a political actor in the 1990s and partially in 
the 2000s, as it challenged the government and military intervention of the 1990s and 
transformed into a partner of the government from 2002 onwards. 
The transformation of MÜSİAD into a political movement will be analysed in 
this last section. The change affected MÜSİAD’s relations with political parties and 
figures, the attitude of the association during the turning points of the recent political 
past in the country, the political identities of MÜSİAD members and their political 
position in foreign relations, how they see ‘the others’ in the society, and how the 
governance of the AK Party influenced the members’ political and economic lives. 
Also, as an association, MÜSİAD works as a political indoctrination centre for 
conservative business people by organizing seminars, conferences and political 
discussions through their publications. The key concepts used to define themselves and 
the change in the way they perceive politics will be analysed in this part in order to 
understand their position on the conceptual debates about political Islam, moderate 
conservatism, liberalism, secularism and modernity. 
4.1. The Institutional Background of MÜSİAD 
In order to analyse the economic, social and political dynamics of MÜSİAD as 
an association and its members as a movement, it is important to know the historical 
background of MÜSİAD. Islamic entrepreneurs founded the Association of Independent 
Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD), the first large business association, in 1990. 
Islamic entrepreneurship emerged in Anatolia and in the most populated cities like 
Istanbul and Ankara as a new phenomenon after 1980, triggered by the arrival of 
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neoliberal policies that cut the state’s organic relationship with the large Istanbul 
capitalists and liberated the Turkish business and market from interventions of the state. 
During this period, MÜSİAD emerged as an economic movement as well as a social 
and political movement. 
MÜSİAD is the largest and most influential social, economic and political 
representative of Islamic entrepreneurs. However, defining MÜSİAD only as the 
association of entrepreneurs can be misleading as an underestimation of the association. 
Islamic businesses in general and MÜSİAD in particular comprised the social and 
economic bases of the political transformation of Turkey in the past two decades. The 
rise of conservative politics and changes in the political and economic structure of the 
country went hand in hand, and was spurred by Islamic businesses and newly-rising 
conservative elites, including economic, intellectual and political elites. 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Prime Minister 2002–2014, President 2014–present), 
Abdullah Gül (Prime Minister 2002, President 2007–2014) and Ahmet Davutoğlu 
(Foreign Minister 2009–2014, Prime Minister 2014–present) have been the most 
important political actors of Turkey since 2002. They founded the AK Party and won 
every election and governed the country from 2002 to 2014. There is another 
commonality amongst these names: they were all members of MÜSİAD. Even 
Davutoglu, the Consultant for Foreign Affairs in MÜSİAD, became Foreign Minister 
from 2009 to 2014 and Prime Minister from 2014 onwards. These facts can be used to 
explain the importance of MÜSİAD as a social movement and as a base for the political 
change in the recent history of Turkey. 
The aim of the association is to represent a new entrepreneurial ideology as well 
as a strategy. MÜSIAD is very important in terms of business networking and building 
collective identity. MÜSIAD has almost eleven thousand members and represented 
forty-five thousand workplaces that employ 1.6 million employees in total across the 
whole country. “Turkey’s Largest 500 Firms List” (2009) presents thirty-one MÜSİAD-
member firms whose success made them eligible to be included in this prestigious list 
(ISO, 2009). 
MÜSİAD helps its members to share information about opportunities and 
difficulties in several spheres of business. These associations give opportunities to 
business people to meet new people, thus expanding their social and economic networks 
through building connections and partnerships. Moreover, these associations also help 
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business people to gain status and to raise the consciousness of identity by emphasizing 
political standpoints as well as religious and political identities. Furthermore, through 
spreading ideology and being a bridge between the political parties, the government and 
business people they are quite influential. They are not simply solidarity organizations 
of business people; they have a critical role in spreading and supporting conservative 
politics in Turkey. 
4.2. The Field Work:  The Case of Islamic Business in Ankara and 
Istanbul 
The field study to explore Islamic entrepreneurship in Turkey was conducted in 
2014 in Ankara and Istanbul. These cities were chosen for several reasons. First, Ankara 
is the capital of Turkey and the centre of political life, and Istanbul is the centre of 
business and culture. So the influence of the political and economic changes and 
struggles can be seen and felt by the entrepreneurs in Ankara and Istanbul more than 
those on the political, economic and geographical peripheries. 
Second, the business people in Ankara and Istanbul interact closely with the 
political establishment since both the businessmen and the political parties seek each 
other’s support for their financial and political interests. The business people seek new 
fields for business with state enterprises, and political parties seek the financial, 
symbolic and electoral support of the business people. 
Third, Istanbul is one of the major centres of global business, with different 
sectors on different scales. On the other hand, Ankara is not only the political centre, 
but also the second largest industrial and commercial centre of Turkey after Istanbul. 
Fourth, Ankara and Istanbul are centres and symbols of the strict secularist 
policies of the state, but at the same time both of the cities have been governed by the 
elected Islamist-conservative parties (Welfare Party and AK Party) at the municipal 
level since 1994. Ankara and Istanbul elections results show the largest electoral 
support has been for AK Party, but also demonstrate significant support for the 
secularist CHP (Republican People’s Party) at the same time. Thus, the conservative 
population of Ankara and Istanbul faced the strict secularist impositions of the state 
directly as they lived and interacted with the Westernized, secular part of population. 
This fact makes the Islamic entrepreneurship in Ankara and Istanbul more interesting, 
because of the sharing of the same social space, in terms of the reactions and attitudes of 
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the business people against the influence of the socially and politically secularist and 
Westernized climate. 
As discussed in the introductory chapters, in the fieldwork only the members of 
two associations, MÜSİAD (Independent Businessmen and Industrialists’ Association) 
and TUSKON (The Confederation of Producers and Industrialists of Turkey), were 
taken into consideration in this study. Ten members of MÜSİAD and five members of 
TUSKON were interviewed. All of these participants’ business was based in Ankara, 
and each of them has different scales of business. Additionally, the former President of 
MÜSİAD, members of MÜSİAD’s Executive Committee, the Vice-President of 
MÜSİAD’s Ankara Branch, and a number of other member business people were 
included in the interviews. 
Some interviewees wished not to be audio-recorded, and in these cases, key 
themes and answers were recorded as notes. Also, some interviewees asked to be 
anonymous, and in the thesis they are coded with fake initials of names and surnames. 
The interviewees never declined to answer a question, although sometimes it was 
obvious that they preferred to give diplomatic answers. Since MÜSİAD is more 
heterogeneous and open than most such Islamic organisations like TUSKON, in that its 
membership is of individuals from all shades of the conservatives of Turkish society 
and from all types of Islamic religious movements, it is relatively easy to gain access to 
association members for interviews. 
In addition to one-on-one interviews, conferences by MÜSİAD were attended 
and observed. Some famous politicians of AK Party attended these conferences and 
made speeches to members of the association in Ankara. The first speech was about the 
AK Party ’s foreign policy and the second was about how conservative people suffered 
in the 1997 military intervention. As discussed in related chapters, the 1997 military 
intervention had overthrown the Welfare Party (which had Islamist tendencies), and 
also banned and blacklisted some enterprises of some MÜSİAD members. With these 
activities, MÜSİAD’s board both indoctrinated the members ideologically and played 
the role of a non-governmental organization. This also shows how much the members 
and the association are involved in politics. 
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4.3. Analysis of Economic, Sociological, and Political Empowerment of 
MÜSIAD and Tendencies of MÜSIAD Members 
In the first section of this analysis (4.4), MÜSİAD will be analysed as an 
economic movement in terms of its status as an association and a representative of its 
members. The perceptions and attitudes of MÜSİAD members towards capitalism, 
Islamic finance, partnerships, methods of networking and trade unions will be analysed. 
Also, the paths of Islamic business people who are MÜSİAD members to becoming 
entrepreneurs and important business actors will be tracked by evaluating their life-
stories. Tracking this pathway will shed light on the socio-economic transformation of 
Turkey by the new Islamic business. 
In the second section of this analysis (4.5), MÜSİAD will be analysed as a social 
movement that has the unique characteristics of social mobility and consumption culture 
trends, cultural and intellectual priorities and preferences and reactions to the relations 
of exclusion and inclusion throughout the transformation from secularist-westernist 
cultural policies of the Republic to the present, pluralistic social climate. 
In the third and final section of this analysis (4.6), MÜSİAD will be discussed as 
a political movement, which has been the base of conservative political rule in Turkey 
since 2002. The perceptions of MÜSİAD members about political issues and their self-
definitions of political identities, as well as the ways in which they make connections 
with politics and attitudes will be analysed. 
4.4. MÜSİAD as an Economic Movement and the Economic 
Empowerment of MUSIAD 
4.4.1. The Attitudes of MÜSİAD Members towards Capitalism and Islamic 
Finance 
Islam and capitalism were argued to have a controversial and complicated 
relationship with each other. Weber argues that Islamic principles are not based on 
rationality, but instead encourage a person to be altruistic, and the concept of jihad 
makes capitalist accumulation impossible since Muslims generally tend to invest in ‘the 
other world’ rather than this world (Weber, 1978, p.624). Rodinson opposes this idea 
and gives examples showing that the Islamic world was born in a society where 
capitalist trade was predominant and did not put any obstacle to the development of 
capitalism. He gives many examples of Islam as a religion which encourages trade and 
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production and also of Islam itself being based on rationality while interpreting the 
principles and proofs of Allah (Rodinson, 1974, pp.79-119). 
The banning of bank interest (riba) was seen as the highest obstacle to capitalist 
accumulation in Islamic countries. This view influenced many scholars and politicians 
in two ways: first by radically and categorically opposing modern capitalism and 
suggesting an Islamist alternative, and second by seeking Westernization policies and 
the secularization of religion by dividing private and public spheres and limiting the 
influence of religion in private life. These strategies were considered to be a solution to 
this ‘obstacle’ on the road to modernization. Rodinson thinks that the banning of riba is 
not clear in Islam and that is why the influence of riba wit regard to the rise of modern 
capitalism is not that simple (Rodinson, 1974, p.14). However, this ‘banning’ caused the 
emergence of Islamic finance and is crucial at this moment, as discussed in several parts 
of this study. 
The Islamic entrepreneurs who synthesized and legitimized their religious values 
and capitalist methods in unique ways are now opposing this euro-centric view: 
Money is not a monster to run away from. Our business people should grow to larger 
scales so that they can create larger employment rates and be more useful to Islam. If we 
cannot earn money, those who are against Islam will earn money. If this was wrong, 
would 250 million Arabs have been desperate against a few million Israelis? (Interview 
with O. T., MÜSİAD Former President). 
The founder and president of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar, argued in a televised debate 
that when money is accumulated but not transferred into an investment, this money is 
wasted, and this waste is a sin. He defends this idea by pointing out that using this 
money, making investments, helping the nation grow and employing new people is 
already enough to demonstrate how beneficial Islamic entrepreneurship is for the 
people. 
Most of the MÜSİAD members interviewed view business and money as tools 
for increasing the power of both the country and Islam, and as tools to create welfare for 
Muslims, not as the aim of life but just as a tool. This perspective contradicts the point 
of view that claims that Muslims are absorbed by capitalism and that religion has 
become an apparatus of capitalism. In this way, religious people use capitalism as an 
apparatus for greater power in struggles between nations and civilizations (by 
‘struggle’, a political and cultural struggle is meant). 
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By seeing capitalist business relations as an apparatus, T. and almost all of the 
other interviewees quote the Hadith of the Prophet: “He who sleeps on a full stomach 
whilst his neighbour goes hungry is not one of us.” This quote shows the emphasis on a 
commitment to the principle of social justice in Islam. While being aware of the 
problematic relation of Islam with capitalism in both the use of interest and in the 
favouring of social justice over accumulation of wealth, Islamic business people try to 
find ways to overcome these problematic relations, especially within the foundations of 
Islamic financial institutions in the country. 
In the guiding publication of MÜSİAD, Homo-Islamicus, and also in interviews 
with the MÜSİAD presidents, the ‘evil’ aspects of capitalism are also defined. Greed, 
jealousy, class oppression, class conflict and social degeneration are all defined as 
negative aspects of capitalism. In this definition, the ideal Muslim businessperson-type 
is depicted as avoiding these characteristic weaknesses of capitalism (Vardan, 2012; 
Özel, in Bugra, 2009, p.206, 2014). In Homo-Islamicus, MÜSİAD proposed a model of 
development in which being Muslim without Westernization is possible. It is argued 
that the Westernist- Etatist modernization project of the Republic failed to reach the 
level of Western developed countries, and on the contrary actually caused an 
unwholesome dependency on these Western, capitalist countries. In this frame, the 
Westernist businessperson is criticized for being an imitator and for being alienated 
from traditional Turkish culture and society, and is also criticized for not contributing to 
the development of the country. Also the ‘traditional business person type’ is criticized 
for lacking the entrepreneurial spirit of growth and progress, and for being content with 
what they already have, not striving for more. ‘Moral capitalism’, which is defined as 
being innovative and competitive, and contributing to the common good of the country 
without losing sight of traditional moral, cultural and religious values is the key concept 
offered in this work (Hosgor, 2014, pp.229-230). 
In the 1980s, Islamic financial institutions were permitted to found in Turkey for 
the first time. There are several Islamic financial institutions at the present moment. 
There is not a consensus about investing money in Islamic financial institutions among 
Islamic entrepreneurs. Some MÜSİAD members declared that they keep investments 
only in Islamic financial institutions, not in capitalist banks. H.G., one of the largest 
furniture retailers in Ankara and a MÜSİAD member, says in his interview that he never 
takes any bank credit; he always uses Islamic financial institutions as a source of 
funding. He even says that he does not allow the largest supermarket chains to open 
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shops in H.G.’s shopping mall, because these large chains do not accept his principles 
forbidding the sale of alcohol in their stores (H.G. interview). 
The Vice-President of MÜSİAD’s Ankara branch adds, “Bank credit is not 
common among MÜSİAD members. Islamic financial institutions are very important to 
the flourishing of Islamic entrepreneurship”. On the other hand, he continues to talk 
about his own business as follows: 
Unfortunately, we use bank credit, but we prefer to use public banks because they are for the 
public good. If we need money, we first seek our own sources and then apply to Islamic 
finance institutions. If this is not the solution, we apply for public banks’ support. Private 
banks are the last alternatives for us. Because of this limitation, it is true that we cannot grow 
as fast as we could otherwise. If we were allowed to use bank credit, we could flourish more 
(I.G. interview). 
As we see in these words, the vice-president highlights public interest, and a 
sense of collective rather than individualistic interest is most important here, because he 
justifies usage of interest by claiming that it is for the common good. Understanding the 
ways justifying these kinds of contradictions are justified is important in order to fully 
grasp the ways in which Islam and capitalism and also Islam and modernity interact. 
N.L., emphasizes that he never used bank credit; instead he always chose to
work with Islamic financial institutions for ‘spiritual’ reasons. He adds that as long as it 
is not in a very difficult situation, he will not take bank credit that is based on bank 
interest. “I estimate that 80% of MÜSİAD members in Ankara use Islamic financial 
institutions instead of banks” (I.E. interview, 2015). 
The Government declared that the state banks Ziraat Bank and Halk Bank will 
open ‘Islamic banking sections’ for the first time among state banks in Turkey. This will 
surely have a positive impact on Islamic finance in Turkey in terms of trustworthiness 
and credibility through providing a state guarantee. N.L. thinks this policy will promote 
the institutionalization and internalization of the idea of Islamic banking, which is still 
seen as marginal to some extent. 
Another MÜSİAD member, a large car-tyre retailer, E.T., states that when he 
needs financial resources, he tries to sell properties, or to borrow from people in his 
personal network. By this he means owner’s equity. He does not take bank credit at all 
since it is not halal (E.T. interview). On the other hand, E.Ö., a young businessman who 
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is in the construction business defended himself by explaining that he has to take bank 
credit in order to survive. He also tried to justify himself by claiming that he does not 
spend this money for his own personal needs such as food, shelter or clothing; rather, he 
uses interest money only in his business because it is haram (forbidden) (E.Ö. 
interview). This kind of justification shows the conceptual difference between spending 
money for one’s own personal needs and spending money for business, and he atones 
for his ‘sin’ by employing workers and paying their wages. 
There exists a commonly shared opinion concerning the problems of 
inefficiency and the inadequacy of Islamic finance in Turkey. Almost all the 
interviewees stated that the Islamic financial institutions in Turkey are not adequate to 
support their competitiveness with secular firms. Some MÜSİAD members tried to 
overcome this obstacle by forming partnership deals, providing self-resources, or public 
offerings, as Mr T. suggests: “Thank God, I have never gained or given any interest 
money. It is true that to grow or to join in large-scale bids, there must be an increase in 
capital, but how? Why do you not form consortiums with your rivals, find partnerships 
or use the option of public offering? Some of them just find excuses to use interest 
banking” (T., interview). 
In his interview, Yücetürk, a carpet importer and retailer, first claimed that he 
never took any bank credit because this is against his religion. However, he also added 
that he knows many MÜSİAD members that need to use bank credit because the 
Islamic financial institutions are not adequate to meet their needs for short term cash 
payments. Like many other interviewees, Yücetürk claims that Islamic financial 
institutions do not meet the demands of business people. Instead, they merely offer 
partnerships in the beginning of a business investment, and provide no further support 
during the process of building the business and its investments. 
During his interview about the pressure on Islamic finance institutions during the 
28
th
 February Military intervention process, O. T. remembered that after the process
ended and the rule of the AK Party began, the share of Islamic financial institutions in 
the total finance of the country increased from 2.5% to 5%. 
As revealed in the interviews, Turkish business people find ways of doing 
capitalist business, of participating in modern working life, and of maintaining their 
Muslim identities in their own understanding of the term, all at the same time. Each 
justification of their own standpoints shows that the perception of banning bank interest 
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differs from one entrepreneur to another, but they all survive and even develop into 
large Islamic capitalists in their own way. Some of them insist on staying away from the 
benefits of bank interest. To this end, some use Islamic financial institutions and others 
use public or private bank interest, but all of them are extremely sensitive about 
justifying their attitudes by referring to Islamic principles. In other words, this apparent 
contradiction cannot be explained as simply choosing to make money instead of 
remaining sinless and pure. This justification must be understood in the context of other 
Islamic aims such as disseminating Islam across he world and increasing the power of 
Muslims through money and trade, employing more Muslims, and developing the 
country into the major world power it had been for centuries in the past. 
4.4.2. The Importance of Trust Networks and the Moral Economy of Kinship for 
MÜSİAD members 
The importance of social capital is sometimes even more important than that of 
financial capital, because entrepreneurs can provide for their financial needs and 
conduct business through the use of social capital. Islamic entrepreneurs have a distinct 
advantage to build this network of social capital. Islam has tended to divide people into 
two categories, believers and non-believers, and in this sense the most important 
collective identity among Muslims is religious in nature. This collective identity worked 
through abolishing the concept of ‘self’ as an intellectual, social, economic and political 
identity and through promoting self-sacrifice for the Islamic people at large (ummah). 
How did this situation impact the new conservative Islamic business people? Did they 
change under the influence of modernization? 
In the case of Islamic business people and MÜSİAD members, business life is 
based on a moral economy of kinship, not only in political and religious networks. 
Supply of the necessary capital resources, partnerships and subcontracting relations, 
along with trustworthy employees, can be obtained primarily through kinship relations. 
In a society where traditional and rural bonds are still stronger than in European 
societies, and especially within a social group that has only recently urbanized and is 
defined as conservative (which means conserving the culture, tradition, family and 
religion), these bonds are stronger than those of the secularist urban Turkish elites. 
Among MÜSİAD members, many interviewees stated that whenever they 
require capital resources, the first place they apply is with their families and relatives. 
This is not just because of the strong kinship ties, but also because of the religious ban 
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on bank credit. Also, many of these members rely on the networks in their workplace 
for financial security and reliability. In Islamic enterprises, kinship relations are of 
primary importance in employment relations. Most of the children and grandchildren of 
business owners work together in their enterprises. Women are both involved in 
domestic labour processes and also in the promotion of the public face of businesses 
through social events and causes such as charities. This is based upon an internal regime 
of obligation and reciprocity in which family members expect to support others and 
expect to receive support in return (Maynard, Afshar, Franks & Wray, 2008, p.76). 
The similarities between moral economies of kinship can be seen in the 
networks of Islamic brotherhoods. Islamic entrepreneurs commonly use the analogy of 
‘being like a family’. Their shared values, ideas, beliefs and religious motivations help 
Islamic business people to trust in each other more than non-Islamic business people. 
We are like a family. The chairman of the company also works as an surgeon. We all have 
the same worldviews and values. The most important of them is religiosity, faith in the 
otherworld and consciousness of the concepts of halal and haram. We have the desire of 
profiting, not dying for money. We do not accept partners that legitimize ways of making 
money in any religiously forbidden (haram) way (I.G., MÜSİAD Ankara Vice-President). 
The membership process to join MÜSİAD requires meeting certain criteria. 
First, every applicant for MÜSİAD membership must have at least two references that 
can guarantee the commercial morality of the applicant, says N.L., MÜSİAD Ankara 
president. Next, further investigation by the relevant committee is implemented. Passing 
these two stages cause MÜSİAD and its members to have moral credibility and 
trustworthiness in terms of business relations. 
N.L. says that even if most of his employees do not have official kinship
relations with him, he always tries to build family-like employment relationships. 
Throughout my observation in the workplace, I observed employees addressing him as 
‘older brother’’ mostly in a very informal way. He tells that the majority of his 
employees have been working for him from the beginning of when his business started. 
Almost all the interviewees explain that the lack of institutionalization and the 
difficulty of finding trustworthy and efficient partnerships is a problem in Turkey. 
These business people said that even if most of them work with partners, it is extremely 
difficult to manage such business partnerships in Turkey. There are so many problems 
among partners, and MÜSİAD formed a commission solely devoted to solving the 
problems of business partnerships. 
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One young businessman in the field of construction, who was born in Germany, 
said that he became a member of MÜSİAD thanks to one of his relatives. He adds that 
he has issues with trusting people in making business partnerships, but he feels more 
trust towards MÜSİAD members than towards other people. 
MÜSİAD helps business people to find a basis for establishing partnership 
networks by providing a feeling of belongingness to a group of individuals who share 
the same values and ideals. President of the MÜSİAD Ankara branch, N.L., developed 
his business by entering into a partnership deal for the joint construction and ownership 
of a shopping mall in Ankara. “We are not only members of the same association as 
sixteen partners, we also feel spiritually connected to each other” (I.E., interview, 
2015). 
As is commonly emphasized by the interviewees, there exist complex issues 
concerning the lack of institutionalization as the social base for teamwork and trust 
between partners in Turkish business. At this point, the members of MÜSİAD maintain 
that they have more trust in the partners who belong to the same association and share 
common values with them. MÜSİAD established the commission for solving the issues 
about partnerships and declared the principles of building partnerships to the public. 
This trust network does not function solely for business networking and 
partnerships; it also functions for employment relations and entrepreneurial strategies. 
Common membership in the same religious community, coming from the same 
hometown or village (hemşeri network), kinship, having an Islamist background, and 
supporting AK Party play important roles in finding appropriate jobs or employees. 
Having a reliable reference from one of these networks gives an advantage to the 
employee in seeking employment. 
Another significant segment of the trust network exists in kinship relations. 
These kinship relations have emerged in different types. First, business partnerships are 
formed on the basis of kinship relations, which helps the partners to build trust and 
solidarity relationships with greater ease. Secondly, during the development of their 
business lives business people tend to benefit from their sons’ and daughters’ marriages 
as a way of forming business or political relationships. There are many examples of 
Islamic business people’s sons or daughters marrying other business people or political 
figures’ sons or daughters.
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 A third type of kinship relation functions in employment strategies. 
Vacant positions are filled on the basis of kinship relations. This increases the trust 
between employee and employer but can also cause problems in terms of 
professionalism and institutionalism. This affects the formation of trade unions in 
workplaces because most employees consider union membership to be disrespectful 
to the employers who have trusted and employed them because of their personal 
relations (kinship, religious or political bonds). 
The Vice-President of MÜSİAD’s Ankara branch states that employees with 
kinship bonds are the best choices for positions in accounting because they are believed 
to be trustworthy and honest, and above falling prey to fraud or any other kind of 
corruption. He also adds that in general, personal skills are more important than network 
references. This opinion is shared by most of the interviewees, as here: 
O.B.: Do you find personal skills or references more important for employment?
F.K: We care about personal skills more. We look at the person, whether he really deserves
the job or not. But they [he means TÜSİAD members] do not care about personal skills or
deserving. They never hire conservative people. Do they have any veiled employees? But
we have both veiled and unveiled. Because we don’t care about the shape, the appearance;
the minds and the hearts are important for us (T.U., interview).
The degree to which MÜSİAD members see themselves as ‘others’ and 
‘excluded’, and how this self-image reflects individuals’ feelings and perceptions is 
remarkable, even after the long years of conservative rule in the country. This is 
important as the major motive behind Islamic business and MÜSİAD as a movement. 
4.4.3. Approaches of MÜSİAD Members towards the Role of Values of Islamic 
Business 
MÜSİAD members mostly define themselves by comparing themselves with the 
laic (secular) business people in the country. The Islamic business people have 
significant differences from the secularist business people (represented by TÜSİAD) 
who were created by the state subsidies within the axis of the Kemalist ideological 
principles of Westernization and secularism. Political and cultural contradictions as well 
as economic competition with regard to both of the groups play important roles in 
Turkish politics and society. Even though secularist businesses are criticized by 
MÜSİAD for not contributing to Turkey’s industrial and technological development, 
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one of MÜSİAD’s Ankara branch’s founders, E.T., criticizes Islamic entrepreneurs for 
not investing in technology and innovation as well. He appreciates the importance of 
Koc and Sabancı (the two largest capitalists and founders of TÜSİAD) for their 
contributions to the production of technology in Turkey, even if they are secularist and 
Westernized. In defining ‘the other’, conservative business people describe themselves 
by maintaining that unlike TÜSİAD members, they care about religious, traditional and 
national values. 
A keystone in the debates about Islam and capitalism concerns rationality. 
Weber maintained that Islam is not compatible with capitalism since it is not suitable 
for the growth of economic rationality and capital accumulation. Among interviewees, 
there were different views of what constitutes functional and rational economic 
behaviour. 
Among MÜSİAD members, there are different tendencies. MÜSİAD member 
E.T. does not conduct any business with the state because he does not think it is halal 
since the state is secular and sells alcohol and organizes lotteries, a kind of gambling 
enterprise. Once he accidentally saw his potential partner at a table with raki (a Turkish 
alcoholic drink) and decided that, even though it would have been very profitable, he 
did not want to be a partner with that person just to earn large profits. He gave another 
excuse to his potential partner for this rejection to avoid being rude. 
One of the important Islamic values observed during the research is the concept 
of tevekkul, which means doing one’s best and accepting Allah’s outcomes without any 
objections or complaint. They make their own rational investments or projects and 
expect the best from God. 
The existence of masjids (small mosques) is the main difference between Islamic 
firms and secular ones due to the presentation of an Islamic symbol in the public sphere. At 
prayer times, H.G., a MÜSİAD member and Ankara’s largest furniture retailer and 
distributer, goes to masjid together with his workers, and after prayers he opens the Quran 
to read verses and then discusses these sacred scriptures with his workers every day. The 
headquarters of his company lie outside of Ankara atop a high tower, and consists of large 
storage units, management departments, furniture showrooms and a large and historically 
authentic masjid. This masjid is used for noon, afternoon and evening prayers. Since he has 
a background in theology, H.G. knows how to learn, teach and discuss the Quran with 
professional authority. During these discussions, he 
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listens to all of his workers’ and employees’ comments about verses and then shares his 
own interpretations and opinions. Participation in the prayers is not obligatory and he 
jokes with workers who do not attend prayers (H.G. interview). Artistic calligraphies of 
the hadiths and the ayats, portraits of great Ottoman sultans, and portraits of Rumi are 
the most common religious and national symbols in the workplaces. These symbols are 
important to symbolize that the difference of these pious business people and their 
secular counterparts is not only in being religious, but also in their emphasis on 
traditional and national values more than other groups. Being conservative in this sense 
is not only about religiosity; it is also about defending these values against Westernist 
modernization. 
The use, by some members, of bank credit and interest is a significant sign of the 
heterogeneity within the association. A young member of MÜSİAD, E.Ö., stated that 
there are MÜSİAD members who benefit from bank credit and so he himself receives 
bank credit too. He defines other MÜSİAD members as being ‘too Islamic’ and himself 
as ‘more colourful’ in reference to his social life. He adds that there are not many 
‘colourful’ members in MÜSİAD. 
Almost all the interviewees stated that being religious is an important factor for 
them to build partnerships or employ people. But they also mentioned that rather than 
practicing religion, having the faith and the ‘fear of Allah’ is most important. Islamic 
moral values are perceived by interviewees to be more important than devotional 
practices such as daily prayer. Former MÜSİAD president O. Cihat Vardan describes 
this as “both earning the money and gratitude for good service”. This is also the case for 
the conditions that led Islamic finance to emerge. Nine out of the ten MÜSİAD 
members interviewed declared that if any business contradicts their perception of 
Islamic principles, they would not be involved with that business. This exhibits this 
commonality among Islamic business people regardless of their associational 
affiliations, and demonstrates the fact that Islamic values play an important role in their 
business lives. Religion is not limited to their private lives as the Kemalist 
modernization project advocated, and they can transform into successful, larger-scale 
business people by merging their religious values with their business lives and 
principles. This is one of the important features that prove the unique impact of the rise 
of Turkish civilian modernization on Islamic business people and elites. 
Page | 98 
O.B.: What is your decision when you have an employee drinking alcohol?
F.K.: We prefer not to employ or make partnership with an alcohol drinker. We never let
alcohol be served in our own hotels. If there is alcohol served in a meeting we have to
attend, we always declare our point of view in a very kind way that “it would be better if
there was no alcohol here”. And next time, they stop serving alcohol in the meetings. The
keyword is adaptation here. After hiring a person, if we see that that person is disrupting
our harmony, we eliminate in the process, not from the beginning (T.U., interview).
As MÜSİAD Ankara president N.L. explains, “Even the Prophet Mohammad 
gave the responsibility of protecting the key of Qaba to a non-Muslim person”. This 
shows us the reality that the person deserving the position most is more important than a 
person having religious faith. 
Conservative businessmen accuse secular business people of being 
discriminatory against conservative people and of not hiring a person with an Islamic 
veil or beard. But they claim that they themselves do not discriminate during the 
employment process or afterwards in the same way, as long as the employees do not do 
anything to disrupt the harmony of the workplace. 
4.4.4. Commonalities and Differences of Economic Background and Development 
of Islamic Entrepreneurs within MÜSİAD 
Modern societies are urban, industrial and educated societies that provide 
chances for upward social mobility. The life-stories of the business people are examples 
of how Islamic entrepreneurs have opportunities for upward social mobility no matter 
what kind of social background they come from. MÜSİAD member E.T., the owner of a 
large retail tyre company, started working as an apprentice in Kızılcahamam, a small 
town near Ankara, in 1967. He worked for nine years as an apprentice and qualified as a 
workman. He survived on just one meal a day for many years because of very low 
wages. He used to eat, from the same dishes, other people’s leftover ‘pide’ (Turkish 
food like pizza) in a restaurant. He later started employment as an iron supplier in a 9m
2
shop in Ankara while wearing a borrowed suit. 
One of MÜSİAD’s founders, H.G., the central retail furniture distributer in 
Ankara, was a peasant when he was a child. He worked as an apprentice in a small 
workshop in his teenage years. Later he entered the Faculty of Theology at Istanbul 
University. While studying, he also continued to work selling home appliances and 
furniture, and delivering and marketing at the doors of houses. He says he still has the 
pain in his waist from the many times that he had to deliver heavy sofas to houses. The 
city of Kayseri, his hometown, is famous for its people’s intelligence and success in 
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trade, “but at the same time people from other cities believed that being from Kayseri is 
a disadvantage, as if all the people in Kayseri are unreliable, liars, and capable of 
deception in commerce”. He would go to the producer in Kayseri and bring furniture 
from Kayseri to Ankara to peddle it in neighbourhoods. He explains that this way of 
trading began to flourish in time, and so he decided to open a furniture shop in 
Keçiören, a conservative neighbourhood of Ankara. He says that his was the first 
furniture showroom in Ankara, and this innovation made his business flourish. The 
owner of the furniture producing company rewarded his success, and he was given the 
privilege of distributing all of the furniture produced in three furniture factories (these 
three factories produce half of all the furniture produced in Turkey). Then he entered the 
construction business and became a partner of a large construction company that built a 
large shopping mall and one of the most famous five-star hotels (JW Marriott) in 
Ankara. He is one of the founders of the MÜSİAD Ankara branch (H.G., Interview). 
Carpet importer and retailer Ş.Y. was also born in Kayseri, the city in Central 
Anatolia famous for successful merchants, and came to Ankara for university education 
in Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences. He went through difficult times 
during the military coup of 1980; he was put in jail for seven months without any 
specific accusation and was then released by the courts. After graduation, instead of 
being a white-collared or government officer he chose to be a businessman. With the 
help of his education and foreign language skills, he formed a business network based 
on importing cheap but high quality carpets from Belgium, and retailing them with a 
good profit in Ankara. 
T.U., a member of the founding group of the MÜSİAD Erzurum branch and a
businessman in Istanbul, is a second-generation businessman in his family. His family 
had the largest wheat-flour factory of Anatolia in Erzurum. Wheat-flour is the top 
enterprise of Erzurum. Even though his father was the owner of the factory, T.U. had 
worked as an apprentice in a shoemaker’s shop in order to gain business experience 
since his youth. He graduated from the only private high school in Erzurum. He later 
opened a large shopping mall and branches of Burger King in Erzurum. He then 
founded an Islamic fashion retailer in Erzurum. Finally he moved most of his businesses 
to Istanbul and became a partner in large construction and tourism businesses. Coming 
from the economic elites of a big city as a graduate from a private high school, and 
being a franchiser of an American fast food chain puts him in a different place than 
other MÜSİAD members who identify themselves as coming from 
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the economic and social periphery. “I was also the franchiser of the Koç Group (which 
is one of the most prominent entities of secularist business and TÜSİAD), but then I 
withdrew from all of the business that I did with them. I changed my economic life after 
going to Hajj. I will not make any business with Koç or Burger King anymore” (T.U., 
interview). 
E.Ö. entered into business life when he was sixteen years old. A son of two 
government officers, he bought and sold cars and later became a subcontractor to 
provide iron for a friend’s construction company. His most important connection in 
business life is friendship. Now he is the partner of a construction company that builds 
apartment blocks (E.Ö., interview). 
N.L., the President of MÜSİAD Ankara Branch, is a good example of how a 
MÜSİAD member and executive businessman grew into a member of the Islamic 
business elite. He worked as an apprentice in a shop from a young age. He started his 
business life by opening a small shop selling electrical materials in Ankara in 1996. He 
is a graduate of high school and did not attend a university for higher education. After 
growing, he moved his shop to a large building to host the business and started to 
organize subcontracting producers and developing relationships with foreign 
companies. Then he became involved in a partnership deal to construct and to manage a 
large shopping mall with sixteen other MÜSİAD members. 
F.A., the president of MÜSİAD Youth, is a third-generation businessman. His 
family owns a large holding group involved in car retail, construction businesses, and 
building and managing large shopping centres. He is an engineer who completed his 
MSc degree in the UK. The first and second generations of his family started retailing 
cars through interest-free installments for the first time in Turkey. This new retailing 
method helped very many religious people to buy cars from their company. 
H.Ç. is the president of MÜSİAD’s Ankara branch Youth Commission. He was 
born in 1983 in Germany. His parents were workers in Germany. When his parents 
wanted to return home because of their unhappiness, they moved to Ankara. They 
joined their uncle’s business exporting uniforms for certain service jobs. In 2001, 
because of the financial crisis in Turkey, they went bankrupt. Then they opened a 
telephone-retail shop in Keciören, a district of Ankara that is famous for the electoral 
power of its conservative parties. He worked there when he was studying in high school 
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and subsequently worked as a partner for seven years. There he founded an electrical 
maintenance company. 
Not all the business people followed the same social mobility trends. The vice-
president of MÜSİAD’s Ankara branch was a bureaucrat during the years between 2000 
and 2008. He did not use the wealth of his family as capital. “Transforming wealth into 
capital” was not an option for him. R.T., the former president of MÜSİAD, was a 
specialist in the Islamic Development Bank before becoming president. He has a PhD 
and he was an executive committee member of the “Economic Committee of Foreign 
Relations” which is an autonomous government institution. During and after his 
presidency, he has been the general director of the Albayrak Group, which is one of the 
pioneering conservative holding companies in Turkey. 
Another former president, O. Cihat Vardan, was the son of a small-scale 
businessman who had served as a government officer in the past. He graduated as an 
industrial engineer from Istanbul Technical University and then received his MSc from 
Ohio State University in the United States. After returning to Turkey, he took roles in 
some of the Industry of Defence’s projects and then later became the general director of 
his family business, which grew into a large-scale business. After serving on the 
executive committee of MÜSİAD, he was the president from 2008 to 2012. 
The founder President and the most popular figure of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar, is 
the son of a businessman member of TÜSİAD. He graduated from the American Robert 
College, which is the symbolic bastion of Westernization in Turkey. He was not even 
thirty years old when he founded MÜSİAD. He is involved in the construction, car 
importing and retailing, and stationary sectors. His social background is unique in the 
way that he chose to be ‘the other’ while he was in the middle of a Westernist climate 
and a secularist political hegemony. 
In conclusion, the social mobility and transformation of the Islamic 
entrepreneurs provides hints about the transformation of Turkish society from a rural, 
agrarian society to an urban, capitalist, modern society. Beginning in the 1950s and 
accelerating after 1980, the process of urbanization and industrialization transformed 
Turkey from a 20% urban population in 1950 to a 75% urban population in 2014. This 
went hand in hand with urbanization and industrialization growth. In recent decades, 
Islamic Anatolian business has become the engine of this transformation in Anatolia. 
MÜSİAD members tend to talk from a more individualistic perspective when they tell 
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their life stories. Business people who are involved in international businesses such as 
exporting are especially seen as a national success story, for which they feel pride and 
gain prestige. These business people feel as if they are fulfilling their national duty by 
bringing wealth to the country. 
4.4.5. Economic Reasons and Functions of Membership of MÜSİAD 
Membership of MÜSİAD should be considered as meaningful for 
comprehending the nature of Islamic entrepreneurship in Turkey, especially when we 
remember there are other business associations too. First of all, these associations are 
important NGOs in Turkey and are involved in the political and economic activities of 
the country. By being members of MÜSİAD, conservative business people join in with 
public life and make their voices heard. The rise of civil-society culture is important in 
determining whether and how modernity is absorbed by the Islamic sector of society in 
this sense. 
According to most of the interviewees who are members of MÜSİAD, 
membership in MÜSİAD had been disadvantageous until 2002, but they still insisted on 
applying for MÜSİAD membership. “Because of our Muslim identity, we were 
disadvantaged, but we had no other choice” stated a second-generation, young 
MÜSİAD -member businessman. “Being a member of MÜSİAD is not a typical 
capitalist behaviour, and this is a challenge”, said the vice-president of MÜSİAD’s 
Ankara branch. He adds: 
The first generation of MÜSIAD members in the 1990s and their children were the people 
who pioneered the change. Pioneering not only the economic change but also political and 
social change… They paid the price of the change of the country. The name of the 
association is about being independent from fear of laic state intervention. The aim here is 
that willingness to be believers of Allah makes the person really independent from all the 
pressures, impositions and restrictions of this world. MÜSIAD is different from other 
conservative associations. We are independent in this sense too. We are composed of 
independent individuals, independent minds. We can lend our hearts to a sheikh, leader or 
scholar but we cannot lend our minds to anyone else. This is against God’s will. MÜSIAD 
is totally independent of the control of any particular communities or brotherhoods [by 
which he means their difference from TUSKON]. MÜSİAD is a real civil society in this 
sense; individuals can join according to their own wills (I.G. - Vice-President MÜSİAD 
Ankara Branch). 
The president of the MÜSİAD Ankara branch’s Youth Commission was born in 
1983 in Germany. His parents were workers in Germany. When his parents wanted to 
return home because of their unhappiness, they moved to Ankara. They joined their 
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uncle’s business exporting uniforms of certain service jobs. His uncle was a member of 
MÜSİAD and they were Islamists, which was the reason for them to join MÜSİAD. 
The Islamic entrepreneurs describe their business strategy as following the 
Eastern Asian development strategies. Traditional Turkish capitalism follows the 
principles of a formal European market strategy based on collective bargaining, and 
producing primarily for domestic markets. The character of business people in terms of 
being created by the state is similar to Eastern Asian development, especially the way 
that business is created in Korea and Taiwan. Mason emphasized this character as a 
mechanism of market augmentation instead of market repression as occurred in Turkey. 
State intervention in Turkey served to create monopolies and resisted new participant 
entrepreneurs entering business life (Mason, 1980). This kind of state intervention also 
caused a business habitus that can easily be affected by political crises and economic 
uncertainties. Because of this uncertainty, the Turkish capitalist remained dependent on 
the state rather than being independent. As a solution to this uncertainty, Islamic 
entrepreneurs relied on kinship or religious networks (Bugra, 2002, p.523). Instead of 
the capital-intensive development of Europe, Islamic business people of Turkey, who 
were mostly small or middle scale business people, aimed to follow this Eastern Asian 
enterprise, relying on labour-intensive business systems. In addition, these small or 
middle scale entrepreneurs, instead of relying on capital sources in an economy where 
uncertainty is widespread, relied on kinship networks, as is the case for Eastern Asian 
business. Even the title of ‘Anatolian Tigers’ self-given by MÜSİAD refers to the Asian 
tigers defining fast-developing Eastern Asian firms and countries. The Islamic 
entrepreneurs, both in interviews and public speeches, emphasize the modernization of 
Japan and the rapid economic development of Malaysia as role models for themselves. 
This has two reasons: First, Japan is famous for its massive modernization without 
sacrificing cultural traits. Not only Islamic entrepreneurs but also Western scholars 
suggest Japanese modernization as a role model in this aspect: 
The Japanese experience with modernization is another sensible and practical example from 
which Muslim societies can benefit. Japan has exploited its cultural traits and mobilized its 
value system, which is centered on the emperor and the family, to hasten its modernization 
process (Hooker, 2003, p.40). 
Second, Malaysia, as Muslim country, is counted as one of the developing East 
Asian countries that inspire Turkish Islamic entrepreneurs. The reason for finding 
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inspiration  from  these  two  countries  for  Islamic  entrepreneurs  is  mostly  cultural: 
developing while conserving national and traditional values and identity. 
However, this inspiration and role model for Islamic entrepreneurship is 
problematic and contradictory for their discourse of ‘independence’. In the East Asian 
developmental states like Japan, South Korea, Malaysia or Singapore, the state has a 
very important, central and autonomous role, which is defined as state-led macro-
economic planning. 
In states that were late to industrialize, the state itself led the industrialization drive, that is, 
it took on developmental functions. These two differing orientations toward private 
economic activities, the regulatory orientation and the developmental orientation, produced 
two different kinds of business-government relationships. The United States is a good 
example of a state in which the regulatory orientation predominates, whereas Japan is a 
good example of a state in which the developmental orientation predominates (Johnson, 
1982, p.19). 
Similar to the Japanese case, Malaysia is also a clear example of a 
developmental state where government and the bureaucratic elite has an autonomous 
and leading role in the market in terms of subsidizing the entrepreneurial class and 
adapting multinational corporations to the domestic market (Tan, 2009). This type of 
state intervention is clearly against the idea of independence of business people as 
MÜSİAD defended from the beginning. 
In order to become ‘Anatolian Tigers’, one of MÜSİAD’s basic functions is to 
establish networks among different sectors and ranges of businesses. The flow of 
information and business opportunities, subcontracting and outsourcing facilities, 
helping making joint bids, facilitating international business trips, giving help with visa 
applications and organizing business fairs are all direct economic functions of 
MÜSİAD. Additionally, conferences, publications, cultural trips and other social events 
allow business people to gain international experience and opportunities to socialize. 
These are very important, especially for the small and middle-level Anatolian business 
people that have had limited access to higher education or opportunities to develop 
international skills. 
MÜSİAD International Fairs are important gateways for increasing the export 
opportunities of MÜSİAD members. Thousands of business people from all over the 
world meet at these fairs to make business contacts. Also, the business trips organized 
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by MÜSİAD to certain regions or continents serve to further widen the network and the 
visions of the business people. “These were the business people who had never travelled 
abroad or made a flight in their lives before MÜSİAD”, says former president R.T.. 
MÜSİAD helps conservative entrepreneurs who have less international 
experience in terms of international networking and fairs, and also provides some 
consultancy services for visa application processes as well as translation services. Most 
importantly, MÜSİAD broadens the vision of small or middle level entrepreneurs by 
showing them the world. Some of the interviewees declared that MÜSİAD trips or fairs 
provided their first opportunities to travel abroad. Founding president Erol Yarar 
explains this as “breaking the shell of these Anatolian business people and opening their 
visions by providing information about the relationships of other business people as 
well as information about technology and the market” (Ozdemir, 2006, p.171). 
A distinctive feature of the emerging Islamic entrepreneurship is the coincidence 
of its timing with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This helped Islamic entrepreneurs to 
widen their export opportunities to regions that share the same culture, language-group 
and religion – other Turkic countries. Changing policies towards making economic 
agreements with Middle-Eastern and African countries also helped trigger the rise in 
exports as well. 
Some of the interviewees criticized MÜSİAD for not contributing to their 
business scales and relations enough in terms of vision, fairs and international relations. 
E.Ö. stated that “MÜSİAD is too involved in politics; they should focus on developing
our business vision and creating opportunities for new business relations” (E.Ö. 
interview). Ş.Y. has been a member of MÜSİAD from its foundation in 1990. He did 
not see any economic benefit to MÜSİAD membership. He criticized MÜSİAD for 
being beneficial only to industrialists and not to tradesmen. He views MÜSİAD as a 
social, rather than an economic association. 
R.T., former president of MÜSİAD, opposes this idea. He says that MÜSİAD
has organized sixteen international business fairs and eighteen business forums, and 
adds, “if all these events were not successful, can we do the same for all of these 
organizations for years?” (T., interview). 
We made very large business trips and export fairs. MÜSİAD is the first association that 
introduced foreign countries to Anatolian entrepreneurs. These people could not even have 
Page | 106 
imagined staying in five-star hotels, attending large-scale meetings, travelling by air and 
attending fairs in the past. MÜSİAD made it real. MÜSİAD established its first 
international fair in 1993. Also it established the largest business fair of the Islamic world 
(T., interview). 
T.U. suggested the idea that membership of MÜSİAD plays two different 
functions in two different places. In Anatolian cities like Erzurum, membership of 
MÜSİAD serves business people mostly in terms of social solidarity, political 
connections and public visibility, whereas in big cities like Istanbul and Ankara, 
MÜSİAD membership contributes to their economic networking and partnerships to a 
higher extent. The fairs and one-to-one business relations are the main mechanisms for 
this. Also, membership of MÜSİAD brings prestige and reliability, which is important 
for business life (T.U., interview). 
MÜSİAD members stated that membership in this association is not only about 
business; it is also about shared values and beliefs. However, it was seen that after 
becoming members of MÜSİAD the scale of their businesses grew for members. The 
feeling of belongingness to a value system and a collective identity is seen similarly in 
both groups. Mostly ‘being conservative’ or ‘being Muslim’ defines the collective 
identity of MÜSİAD members. The sense of individualism is high in MÜSİAD 
members because they joined the association and more importantly because they act as 
individual agents within MÜSİAD. 
4.4.6. The Attitudes of Islamic Business People from MÜSİAD towards Trade 
Unionism 
Labour relations and the formation of class identity among individual workers 
are important in modern, capitalist, industrial societies. One of the notable signs of the 
level of the formation of social class identities in an industrial society and modern civil 
society organizations is trade unions. Because of the higher level of sub-contracting, 
lack of legal protection for trade unionism, and high rate of unemployment undermining 
the collective bargaining power of workers and contributing to the absence of the 
formation of working-class identity and consciousness, trade unionism in Turkey has 
one of the lowest membership rates in Europe. 
There is a claim that the union membership rates in MÜSİAD-member 
workplaces are even lower than average in Turkey, especially compared to the 
workplaces of TÜSİAD. Trade unionism in Turkey is mostly concentrated in the public 
sector and in large industrial enterprises. A common criticism that is made by the left- 
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wing trade union confederation of Turkey, DISK, is that MÜSİAD is no different from 
TÜSİAD in supporting the anti-unionist, neoliberal policies of the AK Party 
Government (DISK Declaration, 2003). Some left-wing critiques point out that the 
wages and rate of unionization is even lower than in enterprises that are members of 
TÜSİAD (Atasoy, 2009 Hosgor, 2014). In these critiques, MÜSİAD and TUSKON 
members are accused of ignoring the problems of labour and add that the conservative 
trade union, HAK-İŞ, blames Islamic business people for not caring for labour enough. 
For example, the former Hak-İş President and contemporary MP of the AK Party slams 
MÜSİAD members for ignoring the rights of unionization and says “this is also against 
Islam as Islam prioritizes labour rights” (Ozdemir, 2006). Also former TÜSİAD 
President Boyner stated that Turkey should decide whether to be a ‘small China’ or 
‘larger Finland’ in terms of the institutionalization, labour relations and efficiency and 
this statement is perceived as a criticisim to the Islamic business enterprises (Boyner, 
2014). The low level of unionization has several reasons: First, the scope of the 
informal sector and legal restrictions for unionization in small-scale and middle-scale 
enterprises tends to cause structural problems for unionization in Islamic companies. 
The workers have a religious duty to take care to work hard, avoiding laziness, respecting 
the employers and not harming the means of production. In return, the employers have a 
religious duty to be fair to the hard-working employees and to pay the wages to the 
employees before they have even cooled off after getting sweaty” (MÜSİAD 
Publication in Adaş, 2006, p.162). 
The criticism of MÜSİAD members concerning low wages is found unfair, vice 
-president of MÜSİAD Ankara Branch explained:
Because the scales of the companies are smaller, the level of institutionalization is different 
than Turkey’s largest enterprises; we cannot compare MÜSİAD members with them 
(TÜSİAD members) in terms of wage levels. They produce for ten lira and sell for 100 
liras. They have larger profit margins than us. In the first economic crisis, they (members of 
TÜSİAD) campaigned to decrease of the wage of employees by half. 
Second, and more importantly, the approach of Islamic entrepreneurs from 
MÜSİAD is not very positive towards unionism in Turkey. For example, the vice-
president of MÜSİAD’s Ankara Branch validated the criticism towards MÜSİAD 
regarding unionization. 
Turkey does not have a good past with trade unionism. We all remember the example of a 
worker representative in a workplace that demanded a car from his employer just because 
the boss had a car. Trade unions do not follow the cause of workers; instead, they seek the 
interests of union professionals and trade union leaders” (Vice–President of MÜSİAD’s 
Ankara Branch, interview). 
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The left-wing politics harmed unionism a lot. The reason why the unions are backward is 
that they did not consider the workers as the partners of the workplace; instead they 
regarded the employers as the ‘thieves and exploiters’. The trade unionists see employers as 
their enemies. There are some MÜSİAD-member companies that have ‘good trade unions’ 
in workplaces. No need to mention the names of the companies. There are both unions from 
Hak-İş and Türk-İş in these workplaces. They have to understand something; anything that 
will destroy the enterprise will destroy the workers too (T., interview). 
Another notable figure of MÜSİAD declared in an interview that he is against 
the idea of trade unionism. He thinks that trade unionism is a source of alienation in the 
workplace and of over-professionalization. He maintains that they are like a family in 
their workplace, and there should not be a professional relationship within a family 
(H.G, interview). 
Concerning the high rates of informality among Islamic entrepreneurs, E.T., 
another MÜSİAD member, complained about the social security system. He thinks that 
this system works against both the employee and employer. “High rates of premiums: 
salary of 1450 TL, tax of 250 TL and Premium of 250 TL. So at the end the employee 
receives 950tl.” He stated that he had talked to the minister of labour about these 
concerns, but that the minister didn’t understand his points. Tamer says, “This person 
did not even manage a shop, how can he understand me? There are twenty-five-day 
holidays, twenty-four days of permissible absences, and one full month of wage 
compensation” (MUSIAD member, E.T.). 
The employment policies of the Islamic companies are important to aid in 
understanding labour relations and levels of professionalism. In Islamic business, 
having references from a known and trustworthy person plays an important role in being 
employed. Religiosity is also an import factor as expected, but not the only one. 
Recruitment by these companies is believed to sometimes do with the aim of social aid, 
according to MÜSİAD Ankara Branch’s vice-president. “Being recommended by 
someone close and trustworthy is useful because we can match the correct person with 
the correct job position, and most importantly, we can trust a recommended person 
more.” According to the president of the Youth Commission of MÜSİAD Ankara, the 
references of relatives or of MÜSİAD members for employment are important. It is 
both a mechanism of social welfare and a means of matching the positions with 
employees as a human resource service. Also, employers can find easily adaptable and 
trustworthy people for themselves. He adds that, especially for positions in finance, it is 
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better to hire a religious person because religious people have a sense of halal and 
haram (H.Ç. Interview). “If we pay our perquisites to the employees in the feasts, build 
their masjids in the workplace, pay their wages in a satisfactory amount, no one can 
accuse MÜSİAD of being against the workers” (T.U., interview). 
As a result of these views, Islamic business people from the association have a 
negative attitude towards their employees’ membership in unions. They see 
unionization as a threat to their family-like structure and employer-employee relations. 
Whether they use religion as a tool for decreasing and exploiting the rights of 
employees or they sincerely believe that unionization is against their collective 
belongingness and structure, the fact that they are against one of the basic concepts and 
civil society factors of modern society shows that they contradict a remarkable 
institution of the modern society. There is also a semblance of altruistic character and 
lack of individual agency in Islamic business. In other words, the labourers do not have 
the courage or will to demand rights of unionism, both because of the risk of being 
sacked and becoming unemployed, and also because they have kinship, political or 
religious ties with their employers. They do not feel comfortable to make professional 
demands such as unionization, and they feel that it would be ‘unethical’ and ‘a betrayal’ 
of their employer’s who provided ‘help’ in finding a job. In this attitude towards 
unionism, the heritage of Islamism and rural-community relations in contemporary 
Islamic business can be seen. 
4.5. The Socio-cultural Transformation of MÜSIAD members 
4.5.1. Influence of Islamic Business on the Making of New Islamic Elites among 
MÜSİAD members 
The history of modernity in Europe emerged and developed as based on the rise 
of a bourgeoisie. The European bourgeoisie was the pioneering impact that transformed 
Europe culturally, economically and politically. Middle classes should not only be 
evaluated in their economic relations, but also in terms of their cultural relations. In 
Turkey, in the absence of a strong noble class, there was almost no civilian middle class 
independent from state influence until the 1980s. This state influence was composed of 
economic subsidies that were distributed by the state in order to create capitalists, and 
social subsidies and privileges that put bureaucratic and intellectual elites at the top of 
the social and cultural hierarchy. The traditional elites of the republic were mostly 
composed of these bureaucratic, intellectual and economic elites that emerged around 
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the state apparatus and the Etatist culture. The state has a secularist, Westernist elite 
culture as the heritage of its positivist, authoritarian Republic ideology. These elites 
survived and transformed into an elite culture by holding on to the Westernist, secularist 
capitalism of Turkey. 
On the other hand, since the 1980s wave of neoliberalism in Turkey, a new, 
civilian, authentic civil elite started to emerge independently from the state. These 
elites, mostly composed of new-entrepreneurs, started to create their own new culture. 
This new culture was reflected in fashion, consumption culture, lifestyles, music and 
literature. In Ankara, in the districts where this new middle-class mostly settle (e.g., 
Çukurambar), there are luxury cafes and restaurants that organize special social events 
on holy days like Ramadan. Participating in these events and going to these cafes and 
restaurants in expensive jeeps and fashionable clothes became widespread among this 
new class. H.Ç., president of the MÜSİAD Ankara branch’s Young Commission, thinks 
that being a member of MÜSİAD widened his vision. He thinks that his network has 
changed since his membership and that he is now among more ‘elite people’ as his 
consumption behaviours have also changed. “Even the places where I eat dinner are 
different from my old environment in Keçiören; I go to restaurants in Çukurambar 
where my old friends from Keçiören could not imagine eating or spending time” (H.Ç., 
interview). 
The emergence of neighbourhoods of the conservative elites in Ankara is 
reflected in Istanbul as well. In Istanbul, Başakşehir is a similar example that has 
emerged in recent decades. Conservative people mostly populate this residential area, 
and the election results point to the high support for the AK Party in this district. The 
rate of veiled women is higher here than in most of the other districts of Istanbul where 
middle and upper class people settle. The shopping malls that are built by the Fuzul 
group comprise the centre of social and commercial life in Başakşehir. In the shopping 
mall, the shops are carefully selected in terms of Islamic principles. For example, no 
supermarket chain that sells alcohol is permitted to open a shop in the mall (K.L., 
interview). The president of MÜSİAD Youth defends the idea that Muslims can have a 
high-level lifestyle without wasting their wealth, which is not allowed by the religion. 
He criticizes the view that Muslims should not live a ‘bourgeois life’. He says that in 
Turkey there is an unconscious stereotype that sees religious Muslims as the lower 
classes and secularists as the upper classes. The criticisms and resistance against the 
formation of conservative middle classes is the result of this unconscious stereotyping 
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(K.L., interview). The pictures that hang on the walls of the office of the director of the 
shopping mall show Erdogan conducting the official opening of the shopping mall in a 
ceremony. Also, there are other pictures that show the meetings of the MÜSİAD Youth 
Committee with Erdogan and Gul. 
One of the notable features of this new class is the fact of conspicuous 
consumption. Some orthodox Islamists criticize both conservative middle class women 
who wear fashionable, attractive, veiled dresses and also Muslims who waste money on 
jeeps Considering the nature of middle classes and the symbolic role of conspicuous 
consumption, I.G., the vice-president of the MÜSİAD Ankara branch, is against the 
wasting of personal wealth. But he also says that consumer culture pushes people to 
spend more in order to show status and to prove that they are successful business people 
by showing that they own the latest versions of phones and cars, and residences in 
expensive neighbourhoods. The ability to spend more money is perceived by other 
people as indicative that he/she is a successful businessperson. Consumption determines 
the image and gives the impression of the consumer being a successful businessperson, 
which in turn increases perceived trustworthiness and attracts new business 
opportunities. He criticizes some MÜSİAD members for their willingness to enlarge 
their personal wealth instead of contributing to the growth and scale of the company. As 
a prominent figure of Istanbul’s business and politics, T.U., stated: 
My grandmother did not allow anyone to buy a TV for the house, but my wife and my 
daughter are not veiled. The shape is not important; it is the essence and spirit of the faith. 
If I have enough money, I should go to the best hairdresser. Sport is my life too. We formed 
the new board of the National Federation of Skiing with my President Erol Yarar (Founder 
President of MÜSİAD). Those high society people were surprised when they saw us 
leading Turkish skiing because they think that conservatives can never be involved in these 
kinds of sports. We try to transform the people in our environment. We should drive the 
best cars; wear the best clothes they can buy. I am not walking with a stick, shalwar (baggy 
trousers), or a male turban. We have to adapt to our social environment. My wife drives a 
jeep. What is wrong with this? What is wrong with being safer and more comfortable? Why 
should I not go and have breakfast in Huqqa? [Huqqa is a top luxurious café-brasserie in the 
most popular district of Istanbul on the shore of the Bosporus, recently opened by a 
conservative businessman. It serves an alcohol-free menu and also became a chain, opening 
new branches in Ankara (Çukurambar district), London and New York. It is one of the 
symbols of conservative elites.] Why shouldn’t I fly in business class? It is the result of my 
own labour; I gained this money in a halal way. It is my right to spend it in a halal way. I 
went to an American private high school, but at the same time I attended Quran courses. 
Because we are representatives… of a social and political movement... we are not 
extremists; we are conservatives. Conservatism equals balance, a balance between the 
requirements of the modern world and our faith” (T.U., interview). 
Page | 112 
Şennur Özdemir, a researcher on MÜSİAD, describes this change in the attitudes 
toward consumption in research on MÜSİAD that she conducted in 1998 as follows: 
The expression that ‘Muslims have rights to consume the good quality products that 
standards of contemporary work require’ seems to be accepted in the level of commonality 
that encounters no objections…. While I was conducting my research in 1998, the members 
of MÜSİAD seemed very hesitated and uncomfortable. About defending the idea about 
luxurious consumption (Ozdemir, 2014, p. 267). 
The nuance between being extremist Islamist and being conservative is between 
being open to modernity and being oppositional and resistant. Conservatives defend the 
idea of modernization without Westernization. By ‘conservative modernization’, it is 
meant that visibility and representation of Islamic religious and cultural values in the 
public space should exist alongside modern economic and political principles. 
E.T., one of the founders of MÜSİAD Ankara Branch, finds the young
generation of conservative people ‘lazy’ and ‘Westernized’ because of their changing 
culture and lifestyle. On the other hand, he likes the idea that conservative women wear 
more feminine and fashionable clothing. He criticizes the fashion designers of Tekbir 
(the largest veiled women’s fashion company) for not producing more feminine clothes 
for conservative women (E.T., interview). 
“He who sleeps on a full stomach whilst his neighbour goes hungry is not one of 
us.” This Hadith of the Prophet is repeated several times by interviewees to criticize 
luxurious consumption and to remember the traditional principles of social justice in 
Islam. 
Spending money on an unnecessary thing, which is luxurious, is a waste and 
it is a sin in religion. ‘I am paying my zakat, fitra (obligatory distribution of 
one fortieth of income in Islam as alms) and all the money I earned is halal 
so I can do whatever I want and I can spend my money wherever I want.’ 
This is not in Islam! You have to think about social justice and distributing 
more money, or how to use it in a useful way as an investment for the 
people (T., interview). 
These thoughts reflect the post-traumatic stress caused by the process of 
becoming a new class and a changing culture, and also reflect that this process is not 
completed. The classes in a modern sense rise on an ideology and a culture of itself. 
Since the formation of this new middle class is an ongoing process, there can be 
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different views on certain issues and inner contradictions, especially between 
generations. 
There is evidence that cultural capital has increased in inter-generational 
comparisons. H.G’s daughter is completing her BA in England. She is veiled. E.T’s 
daughters are veiled and they go to university even though he is just a secondary school 
graduate. One is going to law school and the other is in an engineering faculty. All of 
the interviewees are more educated than their parents but they are also less educated 
than their children, except for H.G. This increase in cultural capital is evidence of the 
making of a new middle class. They are second-generation rural families who have 
succeeded in becoming urban business people. 
4.5.2. MÜSİAD as the Stage of Conservative Elites and the Establishment of 
Conservative Civil Society 
MÜSİAD, as a social movement, affects its member’s in terms of their social, 
cultural, economic and political behaviours. These effects are more visible in 
consumption culture, leisure, work ethic, communication techniques and artistic and 
literary production. 
The membership admission process into MÜSİAD has been getting harder and 
more expensive every year. MÜSİAD officials declare that the monthly payment for 
membership has increased and that the requirement of providing two MÜSİAD-member 
references is applied strictly. The association has this mechanism for two reasons. First, 
MÜSİAD, in the competition with other associations, wants to spread the perception 
that MÜSİAD is mainly composed of elite members. And secondly, the association 
does not admit any who aim to become members temporarily and without sharing the 
values and principles of MÜSİAD just to gain access to the government and 
bureaucracy by benefiting from the close relationship of MÜSİAD with the ruling party, 
the AK Party. 
MÜSİAD is not only an economic networking association or an ordinary NGO. 
MÜSİAD is also a social space in which newly rising conservative elites go through a 
process of self-realization in sociological terms. 
MÜSİAD also contributes committee members in terms of visibility in the 
media. The President of MÜSİAD Youth, K.L., is twenty-seven years old, and he hosts 
television programmes about MÜSİAD’s activities, its mission and its future 
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vision as well as its views on economic and political developments. Former MÜSİAD 
presidents are also involved in TV programmes and newspaper interviews from time to 
time. MÜSİAD Youth is the branch of MÜSİAD that prepares the younger generation 
of business people, students between eighteen and thirty years old, who are potential 
candidates to become future executives or entrepreneurs. 
Attendance of the receptions, fairs, visits to political parties and politicians, and 
other intellectual and political events provide a public sphere for conservative business 
people and opportunities for personal networking. The business people who themselves 
join these activities also encourage their families, friends and white-collar employees to 
be involved in MÜSİAD events. Not only business life is involved here; this also 
expresses the spirit of the conservative socialization process and political indoctrination. 
O. T., a former president of MÜSİAD who has been part of the association since
1993 and who was placed in the positions of general secretary for seven years, vice-
presidency for four years and presidency for four years, views MÜSİAD as the 
pioneering force of the conservative part of society. He claims that MÜSİAD provided 
impetus for other conservative NGOs, and this is the why, after the foundation of 
MÜSİAD, the number of conservative or Islamic associations increased dramatically 
(interview with T.). 
All the interviewees from MÜSİAD noted the absence of internal competition, 
rivalry, hostility or divisions within the association. “We have a perception of 
brotherhood here. We never imagine a negative feeling or competition between former 
and the successor presidents or executives. No presidents talk or complain in a bad way 
about the former ones. This is against our values. I still do not sit in an informal way 
when I am with Erol Yarar” (T.U., interview). 
MÜSİAD also pioneered the foundation of TGTV (Foundation of Turkish 
Enterprises), which gathered conservative non-governmental social actors to organize 
cultural events, arts and charity organizations. 
4.5.3. Women in MÜSİAD 
It is clear that the influence and visibility of women is rising in MÜSİAD in 
terms of membership, activities and white-collar employees in MÜSİAD-member 
workplaces. However, it is still far from being on the same level as in TÜSİAD. In 
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TÜSİAD, two former presidents in the last ten years were women, whereas there is only 
one woman (for the first time) on the executive committee of MÜSİAD. 
Since the foundation of MÜSİAD, there have always been female members in the 
association. The number of branches has increased from twenty-four to fifty-five across the 
country and there are even some branches abroad now. The influence, participation and 
visibility of women has increased as well. They participate both as employers and as 
executives. At the moment, there are women on the executive committees in MÜSİAD (T., 
interview). 
On the executive committee of the Ankara Branch of MÜSİAD there is a female 
executive committee member, the owner of one of the largest Ankara-based companies. 
N.L., says that before being a MÜSİAD member, she had some prejudices about
MÜSİAD. However, after becoming a member, she adapted very well to MÜSİAD even 
though she does not have a conservative background. 
The patriarchal climate in the conservative part of society is reflected in 
MÜSİAD as well. The business people are mostly men and also the executive directors, 
the CEOs and the high level white-collar employees are mostly men in MÜSİAD-
member workplaces. Women can be seen only in the positions of secretaries and in 
other low-level white or blue-collar positions. 
Women are also objects of control and symbolic oppression in some workplaces 
of Islamic businesses. During my observations and informal conversations with former 
employees of some Islamic enterprises, I heard stories of women being oppressed with 
regard to their outfits or their behaviours. Even if there are many unveiled women 
employees in these enterprises, a few examples reveal that if a veiled employee decided 
to be unveiled or if they hear of any female employee drinking alcohol, then several 
mechanisms of control and oppression occur. First, these women are ‘warned’ and 
reminded about Islamic morality. Next, these warnings become threats. And finally, 
these female employees are sacked. Even though these examples are not witnessed 
generally, if we remember that these incidents are usually hidden, we can guess that 
there must be more. The most important aspect of this story is that if male employees 
commit these ‘immoral’ behaviours, they mostly do not face consequences on this harsh 
level. This is because male employees are not seen as objects to be controlled; instead 
they are seen as subjects. But this is sometimes not the case for female employees of 
Islamic businesses. 
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4.6. MÜSİAD as a Representative Sample of a Transformation of the 
Conservative Political Movement 
4.6.1. The Political Trajectory of MÜSİAD 
The timing of MÜSİAD’s foundation should not be considered a coincidence. 
The implementation of neo-liberal policies meant that the state withdrew its ties from 
the large secularist capitalist group and started to encourage low and middle scale 
entrepreneurship. The opening of new markets for export after the collapse of the USSR 
made the emergence of Islamic capital possible in economic terms. On the other hand 
and in political terms, 1990 signaled two important changes: first, there was a shift from 
a military regime to a relatively more democratic one that the civil, elected government 
had more influence over in the spheres of politics and the economy; and second, the 
ruling party, ANAP, and its leader started to try to form the basis for alternative 
capitalist groups that are conservative and that would increase competition, which was 
part of a plan to demolish the monopoly of the largest Istanbul-based monopolistic 
capital, known as TÜSİAD. 
To this end, as R.T. explained, Prime Minister Özal encouraged some young 
businessmen who are known for being religious, anti-Western and critical of TÜSİAD 
to form a new, alternative business association (T. interview). Contrary to the 
widespread assumption about the ties between MÜSİAD and the Welfare Party, 
MÜSİAD was supported by ANAP during Özal’s leadership. 
When MÜSİAD was founded, the founders were all young business people, the 
founding president Erol Yarar was not even thirty years old, and the average age of 
members of the executive committee was thirty-three years old. These people mostly 
had an Islamist past including involvement in some Islamist youth organizations like 
“Akıncılar” (T., interview). This Islamist activism was an important part in the 
transformation to becoming an actor in modern business life. 
According to the official narrative of MÜSİAD, the reason for the emergence of 
the foundation of MÜSİAD originated from an incident in which MÜSİAD was not 
allowed to join an international business trip of the Foreign Economic Relations Board, 
which is supposed to represent all business people (Bugra, 1998). 
During the first generation of MÜSİAD after its foundation, not all the members 
supported the Welfare Party even though the majority did vote for it. R.T. says 
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that in the first generation there were members who supported centre-right parties like 
the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP), and also the Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP). Also, there were members from different religious groups 
including the Gulenists. The Gulenists left the organization and founded their own 
association in 1993. After the death of Özal and the rise of the Welfare Party in 1994 
municipal elections, support for relations with the Welfare Party increased. The close 
relationship of ANAP with TÜSİAD and DYP with TOBB (Chambers’ Union of 
Turkey) left no choice but for MÜSİAD to make connections with the Welfare Party. 
In the first three years of the association, 1990-1993, Özal as a centre-right 
leader supported MÜSİAD. After the death of Özal, the new leader Yilmaz was chosen 
to make relations with TÜSİAD instead of MÜSİAD. With the rise of the Welfare Party 
in the 1995 general election, the relations with and influence of the Welfare Party 
increased. This continued until the 28
th
 February process in 1997 (T., interview).
MÜSİAD became more visible in the media and in the public sphere after the 
rule of the Welfare Party in 1996 for two reasons: first, the Islamist groups became the 
centre of public attention, and second, MÜSİAD members started to be encouraged and 
supported in terms of becoming more visible. They were praised and permitted to 
compete in public bids by the government and by the municipalities of Istanbul and 
Ankara, which were won by the Welfare Party. 
The military intervention in 1997, known as the 28
th
 February Process, was a
turning point in MÜSİAD’s history. The military and the ‘civilian’ militarist groups 
targeted MÜSİAD as the centre of ‘backwardness’ and ‘anti-secularism’. The 
campaigning against MÜSİAD began with the blacklisting of its members, the 
publication of a list of member companies in newspapers, and the opening of a criminal 
case against the President, Erol Yarar, with accusations of hatred and of criminal 
discrimination. In this ‘state of emergency’, the court of security (which became extinct 
after the process) punished him with two and a half years of imprisonment. 
These people [the MÜSİAD founders] were the people who had a consciousness of an 
ideal. That’s why they formed this kind of movement even if they were already aware that 
this would make them disadvantaged and cause them to struggle. They did not become 
scared or surrendered and they never stopped. 28 February continued for five and a half 
years, the doors of the bureaucracy and government were shut to us, and one-third of all our 
members left the membership, but the main body of members who were conscious of 
struggle was protected (T., interview). 
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“I was a member of MÜSİAD during the 28
th
 February Process” says N.L.,
MÜSİAD Ankara president. He proudly continues: “I know some MÜSİAD members 




 February Process harmed the aim of MÜSİAD to be more independent
from political parties, and MÜSİAD found itself as the natural ally of the Welfare Party 
that was also targeted by the military and secularist civic groups. Also, the economic 
policies that support small and medium-size enterprises helped this relationship to form. 
This trend continued to develop towards the foundation of the AK Party. 
The 28
th
 February Military Intervention had an impact on the outlook of
MÜSİAD towards European Union membership. MÜSİAD had been skeptical about the 
European Union as part of their perspective of the clash of civilizations in previous 
Islamist-culturalist thinking. Similarly, with the Islamist movement in Turkey, 
MÜSİAD began to support European Union membership loudly as a part of the 
elimination of the militarism in Turkey that stood against them. Because of the 
perception of European democracy, MÜSİAD saw the EU as a political opportunity to 
prevail against the militarist forces. 
Not only the foreign policy, but also the discourse of MÜSİAD included 
increasingly high emphasis on democracy, pluralism, rights and modernization. This 
went hand in hand with the division of reformists–traditionalists within the Islamist 
political party, the Virtue Party. This kind of division overlapped with another division 
within MÜSİAD. Since the foundation of MÜSİAD, it had been no secret that 
MÜSİAD emphasized liberal democracy, open market relations and moderateness more 
than the Islamists represented by the Welfare Party and its leader Erbakan. Even in the 
official publication of MÜSİAD, Homo Islamicus, Hayekian quotations were frequently 
used to underline the importance of free market relations without state intervention. In 
1998, a group of business people closely connected to the traditionalist group 
supporting Erbakan quit MÜSİAD and founded ASKON, The Confederation of 
Anatolian Lions. But most of the MÜSİAD members and the executive committee 
remained in MÜSİAD and supported the reformists led by Erdogan and Gul. This 
continued through the stage of the foundation the AK Party as well, which gained the 
support of most MÜSİAD members. 
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4.6.2. MÜSİAD’s Relationship with Politics and the AK Party since the 
Foundation of the AK Party in 2001 
The NGOs in Turkey started to play an increasingly important role in political 
and economic life. The rise of the concept of civil society and the liberal trends that 
limit governmental power led political parties and governments to develop close 
relations with NGOs. In the debates of the media and academia, MÜSİAD, as an NGO, 
is widely seen as the social and economic “backyard” of the conservative party, the AK 
Party. There are strong arguments to support this close relationship. For example, the 
importance of MÜSİAD, more than other socio-economic factors, can be seen as 
starting from the foundation of the AK Party, of which ten MÜSİAD members were 
among the founders. There were twenty-one elected MÜSİAD members, whereas there 
were only two trade unionists in parliament for the AK Party in the 2002 elections 
(Yildirim, 2010). In the interviews, I observed that most of the MÜSİAD member 
interviewees seemed to support the AK Party. However, some of the MÜSİAD 
members were critical of some of the AK Party’s governing policies, even if they 
ultimately voted for the AK Party. This shows that there is some evidence for 
homogeneity amongst the majority of the members in the association concerning 
electoral decisions. One member critical of the AK Party government was the vice-
president of MÜSİAD Ankara branch, who declares in an interview: 
We accept 80% of the ideas and policies of the AK Party but the other parties have strong, 
cruel opposition that is 100% against us. We hide our criticisms for the part that we don’t 
like in AK Party policies which is almost 20% of them. We have to do this, because the AK 
Party is best among the rest. There is a strong, secularist power group that wants to destroy 
the AK Party and MÜSİAD totally. We are silent about our criticisms of the government 
because we do not want to help this group collapse or weaken the government. We did not 
forget 28
th
 February! (Mmeber of the MÜSİAD Ankara Branch).
There are also members who joined MÜSİAD to benefit from the political 
connections and favouritism towards MÜSİAD-connected businesses from the 
government or local municipalities. 
Being a member of MÜSİAD mostly means being supportive of the AK Party, and 
supporting the AK Party is now quite fashionable. I first considered registering for the 
MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), but I saw future projection in the AK Party while at 
the same time I saw nepotism and favouritism in the AK Party. I registered both for the AK 
Party and for MÜSİAD. My first political identity is nationalism, and my second one is 
conservatism (young MÜSİAD member, E.Ö., interview). 
Page | 120 
At the same time, a member of the Ankara Branch opposes the idea that 
MÜSİAD members are favoured and economically supported by the AK Party 
government directly: 
I have to say something. I do not know how outsiders view it. MÜSİAD members are still 
subordinate even in the period of the AK Party. Most of the firms making the largest 
business deals with the state are again TÜSİAD members. Not us. They were benefiting 
from the wealth of Turkey and they are still doing this. We are seen as the “backyard” of 
the AK Party. This perception is something we are not comfortable with. We also have 
members who support different views and who sometimes institutionally criticize the AK 
Party (N.L., interview). 
From his youth, T.U., one of the founders of MÜSİAD’s Erzurum branch, joined 
the activities of the National Salvation Party (the forerunner of the Welfare Party), 
which supports Islamist ideals. He was one of the founders of the AK Party. He is also 
involved in politics and the economy at the same time. He is a member of the Istanbul 
Local Parliament as an AK Party member. 
“It is not true that MÜSİAD cannot criticize the policies of the AK Party 
Government. We can. But in a kind and constructive way, not just to harm the 
government. And we mostly do it in our private meetings, not in public conferences for 
the press” (T.U., interview). The degree of the influence of Erdogan and the AK Party 
on MÜSİAD is always argued in the media and academia: “I guess the opinions of 
President Erdogan are asked about: whether he thinks of the future board and president 
of MÜSİAD in a positive or negative way. I do not think he will interfere in the 
association directly and determine the president and the committee. I am not sure about 
this part” (T.U., interview). 
The storylines of MÜSİAD and the AK Party run in parallel. They have both 
been transformed from orthodox (to differing degrees) Islamist points of view to more 
moderate, pluralistic, modern-conservative positions. Instead of transforming the 
society, they chose to adapt to the liberal, secular world system by bringing their own 
Islamic and traditional values into the public sphere. 
4.6.3. Defining the Self-Identity and the Other 
The discourse of MÜSİAD members points to a large struggle and a utopian 
longing. The struggle for them is not only religious; it is civilizational, cultural and 
national. “They see us as their rival, that’s why they try to stop us, to ban us, and to 
damage our image. They do not see us only as an economic rival, but as a social and a 
political rival as well” (T.U., interview). “This is a struggle that requires 
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commitment, loyalty, patience and faith. MÜSİAD is now twenty-five years old. If it 
was not brave, fearless, resolute, solid, and if it had not had a mission, MÜSİAD could 
not have survived over this period of time” (T., interview). 
Almost all the interviewees stated or implied that they are practicing Muslims. 
This seemed an important means of self-representation. If we focus on the terminology 
and examples of social differentiation and struggle, we will see that it is mostly cultural 
and political rather than economic. 
Why should we not take up skiing, play golf or go to Huqqa [the most famous café owned 
and visited by conservatives] for breakfast? When my veiled sister goes to Reina [the most 
famous night club of Istanbul], they look at her as if they’ve seen a ghost! We know what 
happened on 28
th
 February. Then we became the ruling power but we never did the same
thing to them. This is our difference. We are not the losers of the society any more. We are 
successful, powerful and proud. This is what hurts the secularists! (T.U., interview). 
The uniqueness of the case of MÜSİAD is that it is the carrier engine of this 
struggle, not only in the economic but also in the social and political spheres. This 
economic struggle overlaps with political and cultural struggles as well. 
We have to have the best education, make the largest business, live the best but sinless life 
and then we can compete in a most powerful condition and beat the secularists. We both ski 
and pray in the mosque in the last ten days of Ramadan without doing any other activity. If 
we do not interfere with their tuxedos, they do not interfere with our outfits (T.U., 
interview). 
Ş.Y emphasizes the differences between Turkish Muslims and Westerners: 
They always make plans to devastate and invade us, divide us, but Erdogan is the hope and 
leader of all Muslims. They will never accept us as a European Union member even if we 
are much better than Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Cyprus, Poland or the other new 
members. They do not want us because we are Turkish and Muslims (Ş.Y., interview). 
4.6.4. MÜSİAD as the Centre of Political Indoctrination 
The important feature of an interest group is not only being an organization of 
shared common interests; it is also being a centre that constructs common interests for 
this group of people. This construction will lead to the cohesiveness and solidarity of 
the group, inventing and attaining the resources to defend the interests of a group in the 
public space by putting financial, political and social sources together (Grossman, 
2006). This is the reason why MÜSİAD is a social and a political formation. 
The policy-reports periodical Çerçeve (meaning frame) has been published by 
MÜSİAD to frame their ideological positions. These publications make policy 
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suggestions to the conservative parties and indoctrinate members into a new 
conservative democratic ideology. O. T., former president, complains that the Welfare 
Party did not pay attention or listen to the reports and thoughts of MÜSİAD, while on 
the contrary the AK Party always cares, listens and appreciates MÜSİAD’s reports, 
suggestions and opinions. This might be important evidence to show the harmony 
between MÜSİAD and the AK Party as opposed to with the Welfare Party. The AK 
Party’s conservative-democrat character is more adaptable than the Islamist character of 
the Welfare Party. 
O. T. states that some of the AK Party governmental policies were first proposed 
by MÜSİAD: 
Removal of six digits from Turkish lira, re-organization of the State Institution of 
Supporting Small and Middle Scale Entrepreneurship, Solution Process for Kurdish 
Question, Social Security Reform, decrease of interest rates, taxation reform are the policies 
that the AK Party borrowed from MÜSİAD and then implemented. MÜSİAD worked as an 
intellectual source for the AK Party government”, states Mr. T., like a think tank (T., 
Interview). 
Working as a think-tank, providing indoctrination for politics, carrying religious 
connotations, and making political connections all underline the uniqueness of 
MÜSİAD as a business people’s association. 
4.6.5. The Formation of the Political Identities of MÜSİAD members and 
Relations with the AK Party 
MÜSİAD members are individuals or families or business partners who 
prioritize religious and traditional values and mostly support the conservative AK Party 
government. This group of entrepreneurs refers to Islam as an identity and a label, 
firstly by connotation of the word ‘Muslim’ in the name of the association by starting its 
abbreviation with the letters “MÜS”. This abbreviation also forms a kind of duality with 
the largest, oldest business association, TÜSİAD, whose name is the abbreviation of 
The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen. Also, the name of the 
association includes the Turkish word ‘müstakil’ (meaning independent) and 
emphasizes independence from state support and ideology. 
This political and ideological consciousness was formed in individual or family-
based MÜSİAD members whose sense of religious belongingness lies with other 
members or associations as individuals. In general, the social background to the change 
in conservative politics can be traced to this new entrepreneurial class as a part of the 
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demand, bottom-up, from society, rather than seeing this change only at the level of top 
politicians. Even if the MÜSIAD members define themselves as Muslim and have more 
or less political links with the AK Party government, among their intellectuals, the mass 
media and politicians, a difference in the discourse can be seen. 
One of the new Islamic entrepreneurs’ distinctive features is their support for the 
Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the framework of financing the party, 
being the founders and MPs of the party and also emphasizing the label of ‘Muslim’ 
which differentiates them from the traditional, secularist, Westernized and monopolistic 
business group. In the relationship between the AK Party and this business class, for 
instance, ten members of MÜSİAD were among the founders of the AK Party, and 
twenty-three members were elected as AK Party parliamentarians in the 2002 elections 
(Jang, 2005, pp.214-217). In the 2007 election, thirty MÜSİAD members were elected 
as AK Party MPs, and in the election in 2011, twenty-three MÜSİAD members were 
elected as MPs of the AK Party. Also, three members of MÜSİAD were elected in the 
MHP (Nationalist Movement Party, the Nationalist Right-Wing Party) as MPs 
(Yankaya, 2014). 
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CHAPTER 5 - ANALYSIS OF THE 
BUSINESS PEOPLE OF TUSKON 
 In this chapter, one of the most important and largest segments of 
Islamic business in Turkey –TUSKON – will be analysed on the basis of 
their relations with religious values and politics, their approach to modern business 
life, secularization, capitalism and modern Turkish political life, and also their 
socio-cultural strategies to become the new business class. Firstly, in order to 
understand Gulenist business people and TUSKON as an affiliated association, the 
leader of the movement, Fethullah Gulen, and the story of the movement will be 
discussed. Second, the institutional background and economic development 
of TUSKON and TUSKON members will be examined. Third, the traces of 
changes in the social life and in the cultural dynamics of Gulenist business people 
will be explored. And lastly, Gulenist political perspectives and their relations 
with the contemporary political establishment will be evaluated, especially in 
terms of the turning points of the political positions of the Gulen movement 
and the political attitudes of Gulenist business people. 
The basis of the analysis of TUSKON will be the data extracted from interviews 
done during the fieldwork for this research in combination with historical analysis of the 
Gulen Movement. Four TUSKON members were interviewed during the research, and 
one non-official Gulenist businessman, who participated in some TUSKON events but 
who choose to remain a non-official member for self-protection, was also included. 
A movement called the Gulen Movement (or the Service as they define 
themselves, also known as “The Gulen Community” as it is publicly known in Turkey) 
has become the centre of attention recently in the national and international media, 
politics and academia. The business people of the Gulen Movement that are 
organized in the business people’s association called TUSKON have  features in the 
way they combine their so-called Islamic values and modern capitalist business 
relations, and have become a wide-spread, strong business network on an international 
level. 
As a movement founded and led by a retired imam, Fethullah Gulen, 
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they established worldwide schools, private courses and media channels, and also tried 
to gain political power by benefiting from relations with political parties. From the 
beginning of the Gulen Movement, Gulenists have tried to find positions in high levels 
of bureaucracy. After the alleged investigation on 17th December concerning four 
Ministers of the Turkish Government started by Gulenist prosecutors and policemen that 
were trying to overthrow the Government, the organization gained national and 
international attention. The Government, composed of the AK Party and President 
Erdogan, accused the Gulen Community of forming a “parallel state” within the Turkish 
State to act as an organized group following the orders of Fethullah Gulen and to carry 
out espionage for foreign states. By ‘foreign states’, both Israel and  the USA are 
implied. After this incident, war broke out between the government and the 
Gulenist Community, especially among media channels, intellectuals and 
politicians. Also in 2014, The Turkish National Security Council recognized the 
Gulenist network as a terrorist organization called Fetullahist Terrorist 
Organization (FETÖ). However, Erdogan emphasized that the Gulenist elite is the 
terrorist, but added that the lower social levels as ‘deceived by the terrorist elite’ and 
this study is mostly about the business aspect of Gulenists, not the criminal aspect 
“The Gulen Movement does not easily fit into existing categories of religious 
organizations in the Muslim world” (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010, 
p.18). Setting up of alleged secular institutions such as secular schools, media 
and business institutions, and political debating platforms, are the main 
distinguishing features of the Gulenists (Turam, 2007). Because the Gulenists present 
themselves as serving the Community as so-called service for Turkey and Muslims, the 
interests of the Community are one of their main priorities. Baskan states that the 
Community is now the richest and most powerful religious 
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network in Turkey (Baskan, 2004, p.223). 
The most remarkable difference between the other Islamic movements in Turkey 
and Gulen’s movement is Gulen’s approach to Christians and Jews on the basis of inter-
faith dialogue. 
The members of his community have built over one thousand schools around the 
world, which have high standards of expensive modern facilities and English teaching 
from the first year. 
Even if Gulen’s movement emerged as a civic and non-governmental 
organization, afterwards Gulen openly preached to the members to organize and to gain 
the control of the important positions in the state structure. He explained “how blessed 
are the ‘believers’ who hide their identities and their faith in order to reach the highest 
positions in state”. Some Gulenists stated in the interviews that Gulen suggests to his 
followers “even if you feel that you have to drink alcohol to hide yourselves, you may 
drink it for the ‘holy ideals’. 
As a global movement, the Gulenist Community is highly focused on Turkey’s 
foreign policy. The movement supported Turkey’s European Union membership with 
all its segments, and placed Turkey’s ideal foreign policy position within a USA-Europe 
alliance. In 2009, an aid flotilla, Mavi Marmara going to Gazza (Palestine), which was 
under the isolation of Israel, was attacked by the Israeli army in international seas, and 
Erdogan and the AK Party government reacted harshly against Israel by cutting off all 
diplomatic relations with Israel, and openly defined Israel as a “terrorist state”. All of 
the Islamic groups and conservative social bases of the AK Party started to take action 
against Israel collectively in terms of protesting the Israeli state, with the exception of 
Gulen’s movement. Gulen blamed the NGO that organized the aid flotilla for not being 
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“respectful to Israeli authority”. This statement was criticized by the other Islamic 
groups and by the AK Party government. This was the beginning of the tension between 
the AK Party and Gulen’s movement. 
The second incident that caused tension between the AK Party and other 
conservative social groups and the Gulenists happened in 2012. Attorneys who were 
Gulenists prepared a case against the Chairman of the National Intelligence Service 
(MIT) and an important member in Prime Minister Erdogan’s team. Prime Minister 
Erdogan accused these attorneys of committing treason and of being a part of foreign 
intelligence services (CIA and MOSSAD were implied). Thirdly, the government’s plan 
for closing private courses designed to prepare young people for university entry exams 
was declared, and since the Gulen movement has many private educational institutions, 
the Gulen movement reacted and rigorously opposed this plan. 
Finally, the turning point in the breakdown of the relations between the AK 
Party and the Gulen movement was the preparation of corruption cases against four 
ministers in the cabinet on 17th December 2013. These cases were prepared by Gulenist 
prosecutors and were taken to the courts by Gulenist judges. Since the end of 2013, 
there has been a cold war between the AK Party (with the support of the rest of the 
religious brotherhoods and conservative groups) and the Gulen movement. The AK 
Party government has initiated a detection and stigmatization programme with the aim 
of eliminating Gulenist government officers and removing them from important 
government positions since 2013. 
The global attention on the Gulen movement increased dramatically, 
especially after the conflict with the AK Party government in 2013, and BBC News 
described Gulen and his influence on business people as follows: 
Turkish businessmen are attracted by what they see as Mr. Gulen’s international outlook 
and pragmatic approach to issues like using credit. The mix of philanthropy and 
business appears to have been powerful, with Gulen-inspired schools supporting and 
smoothing the way for Turkish businessmen in emerging markets like Africa and Central 
Asia... In this sense the Gulen movement has much in common with Puritanism. There are 
said to be millions of Hizmet followers in Turkey, where they are believed to hold 
influential positions in institutions from the police and secret services to the judiciary 
and the AK Party itself (BBC, 2013). 
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Even though the Gulen movement had been assumed to have millions of 
followers, this assumption needs to be questioned, especially after the results of the 
general and presidential elections in 2014 and 2015. The Gulen movement had 
supported and campaigned in favour of the AK Party since its foundation in 2002. In 
2011, the last general election in which the Gulenists declared that they supported the 
AK Party, the AK Party gained about 50% of votes. After the conflict between the 
AK Party and Gulenists started, the Gulen movement started to campaign against the 
AK Party with all its power; however, this did not affect the results of the elections. 
In the 2014 Presidential Elections, Erdogan gained 52% of votes and in the general 
election of 2015 the AK Party gained 49% of votes and the independent candidates of 
Gulenists gained around %2 in big cities (No Gulenists even could manage to attend the 
elections as independent candidates in other cities). This leads to two possibilities: 
Either the number of Gulenists are not as high as previously assumed or the Gulen 
movement is not powerful enough to change the direction of its followers or most 
of Gulenists quitted the movements and chose to support Ak Party. In any 
possibility, it is validated that the electoral and demographic power of 
Gulenists had been exaggerated by Gulenists and mass media. 
5.1. The Institutional Background of TUSKON 
TUSKON is well organized and composes an important faction of Islamic 
business in Turkey. Gulenist entrepreneurs founded the Confederation of Businessmen 
and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) in 1993. To understand the significance of 
TUSKON, we can check the “Turkey’s Largest 500 Industrial Firms List” (2009) which 
presents forty-five TUSKON member firms that succeeded in being included on the list 
(ISO, 2009). For Islamic entrepreneurship in general, Gulenist entrepreneurs 
in particular emerged in Turkey as a new phenomenon after 1980, triggered by the 
arrival of neoliberal policies that cut the state’s organic relationship with the 
large-scale Istanbul capitalism and that freed Turkish businesses and markets from 
interventions by the state. The power of the Gulen network is also another 
reason for the rise of TUSKON-member firms. 
Business associations like TUSKON are very important in terms of making 
business networking and collective identity possible. TUSKON has about fifty-five 
thousand members (TUSKON, 2016). 
Members of the Gülen movement are known for their business solidarity and 
intense global networking in every region of the world in terms of establishing private 
schools, universities and charity organizations as a part of the missionary goal to spread 
the alleged principles of the Gulen community. 
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TUSKON should be considered in the context of the Gulen movement since it is 
totally organized within the structure and hierarchy of the movement. Other than the so-
called liberal discourse of the Gulen Movement in terms of inter-religious dialogue and 
its European Union membership emphasis, supporting the improvement of minority 
rights can be regarded with skepticism by other conservative groups like MÜSİAD and 
regarded as degenerative and anti-national. The main difference here is the formation of 
political views in the structure of a religious sect that has a certain leader and principles. 
Even if both the Gulenists and other Islamic groups define themselves as Muslim, and 
have more or less political links with the AK Party government, among their 
representatives, mass media and politicians, a difference in the discourse can be seen. 
The differentiation within the Islamic people, especially between the Gulen 
community and the other Islamic movements, started to grow, specifically in that the 
Gulen community, for the first time, started to criticize the AK Party government in 
their mass media channels. This triggered even more dichotomy between the 
businessmen groups and, as claimed before, there are key differences in terms of 
religion and political emphases between these two groups. These kinds of division 
within Islamic groups were identified, and the mechanisms of business, religion and 
politics were unpacked during the field study. 
Five members of TUSKON were interviewed in the part of this research on 
TUSKON. All of their businesses are based in Ankara, and each of them has different 
scales of businesses.  
TUSKON is the association of business people who are mostly members of the 
Gulen movement. The Gulen movement is a social and religious Islamic movement that 
is also quite involved in politics, business and education. The Gulen movement (or 
“Hizmet” as they define themselves, and which means “Service”) strongly encourages 
its members to be involved in business and educational activities. 
The timing of the fieldwork was remarkable. After years of strong support for 
the AK Party government, Gulen and the TUSKON (as a social group) started to 
withdraw their support from the government and to strongly oppose the AK Party, 
especially regarding foreign policy and ‘democratization’ within the country. The 
intellectuals of the movement and its mass media channels announced this opposition 
starting from the end of 2012. This affected the field study and the interviews as well. 
The interviewees’ responses reflected the tension between TUSKON and the AK Party 
government in their criticisms. 
One of the most significant common features of the members of TUSKON is the 
higher homogeneity among profiles of members. This is expectable in the structure of 
TUSKON since it is the association of a particular community. The structure of 
TUSKON is that of a confederation composed of several federations of business people 
across Turkey. The name of the federation in Ankara is HÜRSİAD (“Free Industrialists 
and Businessmen’s Association”). The member of the HÜRSİAD branch of TUSKON, 
F.I., opposed the idea of homogeneity within TUSKON and stated that there is a
heterogeneous profile, especially in the Ankara branch, and said that their association 
and members’ businesses existed even before the Gulen movement. Business life is 
separate from spiritual life, but they have respect for the principles of the movement. On 
the other hand, one of the primary figures of TUSKON in Ankara N.Y., underlined the 
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importance of the motives of Gulen’s teachings for most of the members and for his 
own business many times. 
TUSKON is mostly involved in international business fairs and in international 
links with Central Asia and Africa. Most of the members had visited several central 
Asian and African countries in order to make business connections. However, this does 
not mean that TUSKON totally excludes politics from its activities. In the 2010 
referendum about democratization and juridical law, TUSKON published documents 
openly supportive of the government and emphasizing the importance of voting ‘yes’ in 
the referendum. However, in the African Business Congress organized by TUSKON in 
Istanbul in 2014, the chairman of TUSKON openly declared their political opposition 
and even threats to AK Party and Prime Minister Erdogan. 
TUSKON is a confederative association. TUSKON is composed of seven 
regional federations and hundreds of sub-regional associations. ANFED is the 
federation of the Central Anatolian business associations. The hierarchy from bottom to 
top is HÜRSİAD (Ankara) – ANFED (Central Anatolia Region) - TUSKON (Turkey). 
5.2. Economic Empowerment of TUSKON 
5.2.1. Why do people become members of TUSKON? 
There are fifty-five thousand individual members of TUSKON. The interviews 
were conducted in the Ankara branch, which is called HÜRSİAD. According to F.I., the 
member of HÜRSİAD, there is a heterogeneous membership profile in TUSKON. 
There are even Kemalists and liberals among them, he claims. He says there is plurality 
in the organization, as it is not only comprised of Gulen movement members. In 
TUSKON, he says there is a hierarchy from the board of TUSKON to the federations 
and member associations, but he adds that they respect autonomy in TUSKON. 
However, all of the other interviewees stated that a large majority of TUSKON 
members are Gulenists. 
The members of TUSKON stated that membership of the association is not only 
about business; it is also about Gulen movement’s aims. However, it was seen that, after 
becoming a member of the association, the scale of their businesses grew for this group. 
The feeling of belongingness to a collective identity is 
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seen. 
Most of the interviewees stated that the being a member of the Gulen movement 
is not profitable, and it even has negative effects because of the restrictions that 
the movement imposes upon its members, and also because of increasing exclusion 
from the rest of society. By saying this, they do not mean that TUSKON does not 
contribute to their professional business lives, but that they evaluate their 
belonging to the movement in terms of every aspect of the effects that membership has 
on their lives. 
In most cases, membership of TUSKON means membership of the Community 
(the common name given by the society to the Gulenists) for business people and vice-
versa. This also means that each of the members are evaluated as representatives of the 
Community and represent the image of TUSKON and the community since it is a 
closed, strongly tied social movement.  
The power and influence of TUSKON in the business world is mostly about the 
solidarity and collaborative bonds of the Gulen network on both national and 
international levels. We can find the narratives of small-merchants’ success stories, of 
starting in exporting and becoming international scale businessmen, on Gulenist 
television channels (Buğra, & Savaskan, 2014, p.202). These narratives are also spread 
by Gulenists to motivate its members and to attract more non-members. 
Membership of TUSKON started increasingly to be understood as membership 
of the Gulen movement. 
I became a member of TUSKON because I am a member of the community. I have been a 
member of the community since 1991. I think membership of TUSKON and the community 
affects business life positively because your network grows by getting to know more people 
from different sectors and fields during the circle meetings, especially of the community 
that we attend after working hours in the evenings (N.M., interview). 
Especially after the conflict between the AK Party Government and the 
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Gulen movement at the end of 2013, business people who were in a loose circle of 
members of TUSKON began to cancel their memberships and the association started 
struggling to recruit more members even within the movement. “I saw that some people 
had joined the community thinking that it would increase their business income; 
however, they left the community after the last conflict with the AK Party. About 40% 
of the people left the community. The weak links in the chain broke and left, and the 
true, strong ones stayed” (R.Z., Interview). The exact data about the change in the 
numbers of members is not shared by TUSKON, but many members and non-member 
business people told me this in the interviews and in informal conversations. 
In some cases, non-membership as well as membership of an association can 
mean a lot because of the common negative image of the Gulen movement recently, and 
some business people decided not to become official members even though they are 
Gulenists and had attended some events of TUSKON. R.Z. is one of them. He pointed 
out that he is quite a cautious person all the time and he aimed to protect his business, 
first from the previous militarist pressure, and now from the tension between the 
government and its supporters and the Gulen movement. He also added how much he 
benefited from being so cautious. R.Z. says, “I am a member of TUSKON by heart, not 
by signing papers”. 
5.2.2. The  Attitudes  of  TUSKON  members  towards  Capitalism  and  Islamic 
Business 
There is a consensus among TUSKON members that business is for gaining 
wealth, for creating new jobs, employing more people, and finally for helping the 
development of the country to be more powerful. R.Z. makes a distinction between the 
wealth of the Gulf States and Islamic business people like himself: “We do not need to 
have wealth for waste as in Dubai; we need economic wealth to be an economic power 
as a country. Muslims have to be wealthy, industrialized and powerful. But at the same 
time we should be careful to have halal income and social justice” (R.Z., interview). 
Gulen considers the relationship between Islam and capitalist market relations as 
compatible, and that the latter should therefore benefit Muslims. Sevindi says that 
Gulen believes in free markets and free enterprise (Sevindi, 2008). Yavuz also states 
that Gulen preaches that believers must be wealthy and expand their businesses as much 
as possible in order to be more wealthy and powerful and to contribute to the collective 
wealth and that the strategy to obtain 
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wealth and power is through the establishment of free market relations and through 
being an important factor in this market (Yavuz, 2003). 
According to N.Y., Gulen preaches to the business people of the movement not 
to do business with the state because such business can degenerate the values of the 
movement and cause problems such as corruption. However, other Gulenist 
businessmen openly said that they do business with the state. R.Z. said in the interview 
that they import medical devices and sell them to the public hospitals: 
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5.2.3. The Importance of Trust Networking and the Moral Economy of Kinship 
for TUSKON Members 
As do other factions of Islamic entrepreneurship in Turkey, and perhaps even 
more, Gulenists rely on the moral economy of kinship. Kinship relationships are 
functional in terms of providing capital, labour resources and partnerships. The different 
aspect of Gulenism is the centrally organized, hierarchical structure of the community 
that has led the members to internalize a sense of brotherhood that is similar to kinship. 
The community organizes for the unmarried members to live together like family 
members, and also arranges marriages by finding ‘perfect’ matches for its single 
members. These two mechanisms of the Gulen movement help to build kinship-like ties 
among members and business people. In this mechanism, the kinship network intersects 
with the Gulenist religious network to construct a reciprocal regime within the moral 
economy of kinship. 
The trust network of the business people of the Gulen movement works in a 
unique way because of the special restrictions held by the preaching of Gulen. Gulen 
does not force the members of the movement to form partnerships among the Gulenists; 
instead he encourages supporters to make business and form partnerships with 
‘outsiders’. There are three reasons for this: 
First, Gulen does not want any internal tensions or problems arising from 
partnerships between members within the community or any favouring in employment 
of people just from the community, because the atmosphere within the community 
could be damaged if there are any materialistic problems. 
Second, the Community sees partnership and employment relationships as 
strategies of growth and enlargement, by forming relationships with new people from 
‘outside’ and recruiting them to the movement. In this strategy, members are advised to 
introduce the wider community to Gulen’s principles by using their business 
relationships. “Other religious communities are protective and closed to outsiders, and 
exist as ghettos in the society; however, our community is open to everyone, even to 
non-Muslims. For example, I saw that members of The Community were serving free 
ashura (a traditional desert served in religious feasts) in front of a cathedral in Hungary 
to find ways to dialogue with the people there” (R.Z. interview). 
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A member of TUSKON’s Ankara branch thinks that there is no cultural and 
social background for good partnerships in Turkey. They once made a partnership for 
hotel ownership and patrol facility services, but then it did not work out because of the 
lack of institutionalization. He says the most important problem in new Turkish 
entrepreneurship is its lack of institutionalization. By remembering the rural and 
uneducated origins of these entrepreneurs and that they used to mostly own small and 
middle-scale businesses, we can understand this issue. In this case, religious and moral 
trust networking compensates for lack of institutionalization. This fact evidences that 
TUSKON does not encourage forming partnerships to avoid problems away from the 
community. 
As an alternative to issues about social justice rising from capitalism, the Gulen 
movement has a distinctive inner mechanism of aid (himmet) and solidarity. Fethullah 
Gulen preaches that the members of the movement should give a significant percentage 
of their incomes to the movement for financing charities, media, education and other 
organizations of Gulenists. The dormitories, preparatory courses and schools around the 
world are financed through this money given by the supporters of the movement. The 
business people of the Gulen movement finance the largest part of this expenditure. 
Gulen encouraged this new business class to sponsor the activities of the 
movement, including dormitories, colleges, preparatory courses and universities 
(Ebaugh, 2008, p.37).  
Apart from motivating people to donate money, Gulen remained distanced from the financial 
management of all institutions related to the movement. Instead, he encouraged the sponsors of 
these institutions to actively oversee the use of their monies. (Woodhall, 2005, in Ebaugh, 
2008, p.37). 
Gulen tells us to give money as much as you can. Even so much that you cannot sleep at 
night. I know some people who give more than half of their yearly income without expecting 
anything in return. I know some business people who give so much money that they must 
drive very cheap and low-standard cars because they have given away all their money for 
buying a new, better car. I cannot say that all the people give the same percentage of money – 
it depends how big their heart is (N.Y. interview). 
Such stories of ‘giving’ are spread by Gulenists in order to increase the rate 
of donations to the Community: 
After seeing that people are giving 25% of their yearly income or even half of 
all their income, you get surprised but then you see how much people are 
sacrificing. They do not waste their money on luxury or joy. They do it for an 
ideal. Instead of driving two Mercedes cars, he drives an ordinary Renault. 
Do you know how many orphans are being taken care of with this money? Or 
how many students are educated? (N. M., interview). 
These quotes are examples of a Gulenist propaganda good example of the inner 
mechanisms of donations in the Gulen movement is the foundation of Fatih University, 
as Ebaugh explored in her research: "One wealthy businessman from Istanbul donated the scenic property on which the 
university is located, appraised at the time at approximately 5 million dollars. Today the 
property is worth about 100 million dollars. Once the land was donated, other 
businessmen contributed to constructing the buildings and the initial opening of the 
university (Ebaugh, 2008, p.90). 
However, there is also criticism towards the movement by a Gulenist 
businessman concerning the rates of giving: 
…but the Service [Hizmet, the name given to the movement by its supporters] is excessive 
in the rates of money they ask us to give. They ask for so much money, I cannot give that 
much. But if there is a very important, urgent situation I would give, but there is not at the 
moment. For example I went and invested money when the government tried to bankrupt 
Bank Asya (Islamic Bank of the Gulenists). Not only me, everyone I know from the 
Gulenists did the same (R.Z., interview). 
Ebaugh observed during her research that the size of donations typically varied 
between 5% and 20% of a person’s yearly income. A small number of business people 
give even more according to her: “In Bursa, a businessman gives approximately 3.5 
million dollars per year which is one third of his income. Another businessman gives 3– 
4 million dollars per year to eleven schools in Albania. A third man gives money to 
schools in ten countries and said that he now has brothers in all of these countries not 
just locally in Turkey” (Ebaugh, 2008, p.55). Mahcupyan, an author who worked for 
many long years for the Community’s daily newspaper Zaman said that there is a 
widespread consensus that giving money equivalent to 10% of yearly income is a 
donation to the movement. This applies for the blue-collar workers as well (Mahcupyan, 
informal conversation). 
When asked why they give 1 million dollars or more each year to movement projects, the 
group of businessmen in Istanbul gave the following reasons: to make better human beings 
as Gulen encourages; to educate our youth; to please God; to earn a reward in the next life; 
to be part of a bigger movement to better the world; to provide hope to our people in 
Turkey and around the world” (Ebaugh, 2008, p.59). 
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5.2.4. The Attitudes of the Members of TUSKON towards Islamic Finance 
In the Community, the use of Islamic finance is encouraged, but not strictly 
enforced. Self-resources are also advised to use as an alternative. The Gulen movement 
owns its own Islamic financing bank, Bank Asya, which became the focus of debates 
after the government recognized as a financial source of organized crime of Gulenists.
Bank Asya opened in 1996 when three hundred and forty-six business people 
throughout Turkey bought shares in the bank and obtained a license from the Turkish 
Treasury Department to open an interest-free bank. Gulen attended the 
opening ceremony of the bank. Most of the Gulen-inspired schools, hospitals and 
companies use Bank Asya for their banking needs. 
In terms of the attitudes of TUSKON and its members, the perspective 
on Islamic finance is positive; however it is not seen to be satisfactorily profitable by 
the members. TUSKON member, N.Y., says in the interview: 
Until three or four years ago, I avoided bank credit. But now in our scale of business, we 
have no other choice than running the business with bank credit. We cannot borrow this 
amount of money. Movement does not put anything against bank credit. I work both with 
Islamic finance and capitalist banks, but the interest rates are higher than the benefits of 
Islamic banks, so I do not know if the Islamic finance system is really halal. We don’t live 
in Canada, the economy here is not stable, and we have to rely on bank guarantee. We have 
to have competitiveness with foreign companies and we have to have large investments. We 
can do it only by bank credit” (N.Y., interview). 
N.M., like all of the other interviewees, thinks that there is still confusion about
Islamic finance in Turkey: 
What is interest [riba], is it the interest rate above the inflation rate or is it all counted as 
interest? We need to clarify everything about interest and Islamic finance. This restricts us a 
lot. There are cases in which we need urgent money for our payments but Bank Asya is not 
helpful in these situations: they only offer to buy the machines in the beginning and become 
partners. They do not lend money in the process when we need cash. But other banks give 
the money as soon as we need it. The economists and Islamic scholars should gather and 
solve these issues. I do not want to have haram [religiously unacceptable] money, but if 
there is a rate of inflation, there should be a solution for this (N.M., interview). 
TUSKON’s Ankara branch member said that he thinks the separation of 
modern banks and Islamic finance institutions is not important. Most of the TUSKON 
members use bank credit, according to him. He states that he used bank credits before 
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(Y.S., interview). However, another young TUSKON member said in the interview that 
he had never used bank credit in his life and he is against this for religious reasons 
(G.A., interview). 
TUSKON members say that the Community does not impose or enforce 
anything against usage of bank interest: this is their own choice. This is one of the most 
remarkable outcomes of the analysis of the data. 
I am very positive towards Islamic finance; however, the system is still not well organized 
and profitable for business people like us. I have to take bank credit and use leasing because 
I have to pay the wages of my workers, but if I have money enough, buying machinery with 
cash is always my first choice (R.Z., mid-level entrepreneur in Ankara, interview). 
5.2.5. The Attitudes of Islamic Business People from TUSKON towards Trade 
Unionism 
The workers in workplaces of Gulenists have some features. First, the local 
circles of the movement and the solidarity within the Gulenist community decrease the 
extent of formation of a working-class identity and a sense of class differentiation. Even 
the Gulenist workers are part of the share system of sponsoring the movement. 
“Because they are not as wealthy as the businessmen, they cannot support an entire 
school or ten scholarships as some businessmen do, but perhaps three of them will 
support one scholarship. Also, some of them make donations without giving money but 
by serving voluntarily for the movement by giving their time and effort” (Ebaugh, 2008, 
p.49).
TUSKON’s primary figure, N.Y., opposed the concept of unionism: “We think 
of trade unions as an aristocratic institution rather than one that seeks to serve the 
interests of the workers. I discussed with a business partner a hotel construction 
partnership in the USA, and they warned me that the trade union there has the power to 
block all your profits and efficiency. In Turkey, trade unions can be an obstacle to 
financial success. We don’t need a trade union because The Community itself is a civil 
society, and it is a bridge between employers, employees and all of the other partners” 
Page | 139 
TUSKON member). G.A. thinks that, in terms of employment policies, references are 
very useful and important. The references of Gulenists are most important, but also 
there can be other references that he can rely upon as well. 
The business people of the movement seem to benefit from the negative image 
of unionists in Turkey, and do not feel comfortable about their workers and unions if the 
workers become unionized in the workplaces: 
I do not approach trade unions positively, even if we are not in a large-scale workplace, I do 
not. We already give the wages that workers deserve. Also, trade unions are not clean. I do 
not think we have fair, clean, systematized trade unions in Turkey as in Europe. And bare in 
mind that there is hypocrisy, non-sensitivity, selfishness and fraud in Turkish people’s 
minds: that is the reason that the trade unions are not working properly (R.Z., interview). 
However, not all the TUSKON members are against the idea of trade unionism: 
“The Community does not discuss it enough, but I think there should be trade unionism 
in TUSKON workplaces. The rights of the workers should be protected and defended. 
That is what the Prophet suggests” (N.M., interview). 
But overall, Islamic business people from TUSKON have a negative attitude 
towards their employees’ membership in unions. They see unionization as a threat to 
their ‘family-like structure’ and to their employer-employee relations. Whether they use 
religion as a tool for decreasing the rights of employees or they sincerely believe that 
unionization is against their collective belongingness and structure, the fact is that they 
are against one of the basic concepts of modern civil rights as actors of modern society, 
and that they conflict with a remarkable institution of the modern society, even though 
they define themselves as modernists. There is also a semblance of altruistic 
character and a lack of individual agency in Gulenist movement. In other words, the 
labourer does not have the courage or the will to demand the rights of unionism, both 
because of the risk of being sacked and becoming unemployed, and because 
they have personal, political or religious connections with their employers. They 
do not feel comfortable to make professional demands like unionization and they 
feel it would be ‘unethical’ and a ‘betrayal’ of their employers’ ‘help’ in finding a 
job. In relation to unionism, the heritage rural-community relations in contemporary 
Islamic business can be seen. 
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5.3. The Socio-cultural Background and Transformation of
TUSKON-member 
Business People 
5.3.1. Commonalities and Differences of Social Background and Mobility of 
TUSKON Members 
The Gulen network helps the new Gulenist entrepreneurs to grow in business, 
even if some of the business people interviewed do not agree with the idea that this is 
beneficial. One of the largest oil producers in Turkey, T.Y., said that they increased the 
number of countries to which they export to eighty, due to the schools of the 
Community in these countries. “There are schools of the Service in one-hundred and 
twenty countries. The people who go and work in these schools are respected and 
prestigious people. We benefit from those schools in our export networks. The suppliers 
from these countries even started to prefer Turkey for imports. The ones that buy oil 
from me even started to buy tomato paste and pasta from another Turkish company 
that I introduced to them” (Zaman, 29 June 2010). 
G.A., started as an apprentice in the jewellery shop of his uncle. In a few years’ 
time, he opened his own jewellery shop in Ankara. He ran his shop until 1996. He 
entered into a small-scale construction business later. In 2010 he started to own the 
franchising rights to a Turkish café-restaurant chain, and then opened a luxurious cafe 
in a high-class shopping mall in Ankara. He will open his second cafe at the end of 
2013 in another shopping mall. 
Not all business people share the same social mobility. The company of Y.S., is 
sixty-two years old and he is of the third generation in the family to lead the company. 
The company was founded in 1951. Having the heritage of a family business, and 
working, as an institutionalized company is not common among TUSKON members. 
This institutionalization and running of businesses in different sectors, and also being 
well-known in the business life of Ankara and possessing good relations with the 
different parts of society even though he is from a peasant family living in a village near 
Ankara. 
R.Z. is a partner of an industrial producer, based in Ankara’s Ostim Industrial 
Zone. He is a partner with his brother who is a mechanical engineer. They produce 
industrial parts for Boeing and Airbus planes and also for the Tractor Company of Koç. 
Page | 141 
He is fifty-three years old, and a graduate of the Faculty of Agriculture in the University 
of Ankara. After graduation he moved to Edinburgh, Scotland where his sister lived, but 
then decided that he could not live anywhere except in Turkey. They then founded their 
business by borrowing money from relatives and further improved their business. 
N.M., an important figure of TUSKON and the business community in Ankara,
has a distinctive feature in that he is both an entrepreneur and a politician. He is fifty-
one years old and was born in Kayseri, which is famous for its successful tradesmen. He 
graduated from the University of Uludag in Bursa and became a government officer for 
two years, and then left his job to enter into business life. 
The future vision of being a government officer was too limited for me. Trade is more free, 
flexible, the sense of personal success much higher. Being a government officer is mostly 
about personal or political connections whereas business life is about personal success. As 
conservative businessmen, we believe in destiny. Allah says: I will give the knowledge to 
that which demands it, will give the wealth to which I want. Trading requires talent and 
skills; it is not about education. I did commerce of electronic appliances in Kayseri until 
1996. During my military service, thanks to the people I met in the house belonging to the 
community (Gulen movement), I started doing this business concerning heating systems. 
Anyone can do small-scale marketing and commerce but what we are doing requires 
technical knowledge and specialization. We are the official distributors for four large, 
world-famous German energy companies in Turkey. It is not easy to get the rights to sell 
these products; there are legal and technical requirements (N.M., interview). 
His company is involved in the importing of heating and air conditioning 
devices from Germany and in distributing, repairing and installing the devices in homes 
and in office buildings. Later in his political life, N.M. became an important figure of 
the AK Party’s Ankara branch. 
In conclusion, the social mobility and transformation of Islamic entrepreneurs 
gives hints about the transformation of Turkish society from a rural, agrarian to an 
urban, capitalist, modern society. Starting in the 1950s and accelerating after 1980, this 
urbanization and industrialization process transformed Turkey from a 20% urban 
population in 1950 to a 75% urban population in 2014. This went hand in hand with 
urbanization and industrial growth. In recent decades, Islamic business became the 
engine of this transformation in Turkey. Both groups of business people have similar 
trends in their life stories in terms of their upward social mobility. The only difference 
can be said to be that because of their tight solidarity in their community, 
TUSKON members feel that they owe their success stories to their membership in the 
Gulen movement. 
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5.3.2. The Making of New Islamic Elites in TUSKON 
The Gulenist interviewees that are members to TUSKON seemed careful not to 
present themselves as being interested in conspicuous consumption. Each of the 
Gulenists, whether business people or others, consider themselves as representatives of 
the movement and therefore pay special attention to their own images. 
R.Z., a middle-scale businessperson in Ankara, explains that he is careful not to
buy luxurious cars or houses for his personal life, but he also adds that he has to have 
high-quality cars to impress his clients or network to show that they are a trustworthy 
company that has a good income. 
…but the Muslims have no right to accumulate wealth for themselves. I have thought about 
the hungry, poor people suffering in cold weather when I put my head on the pillow in bed 
at night. I would like to buy a jeep to provide safety for her in the traffic but it has to be an 
old, non-expensive one. Otherwise, buying an expensive one is not going to suit us where 
the minimum wage is about 1000 TL. The Muslims would not think badly about us when 
we drive a Şahin car [Old cheap Fiat brand produced in Turkey] (R.Z., interview). 
Consumption is about the representation of social status in Turkey: that is why we need to 
show our social status and consume. I had my summer holiday in Angel’s Peninsula [7-Star 
Top-Class Holiday Resort owned by a large Gulenist businessman and famous for its high 
luxury and extreme prices] last summer. It is a summer holiday in the end, a place and time 
for relaxing. But when we go to the dinner in the dining hall of the hotel, women become 
different, they show-off their expensive dresses and stare at each other in an analysing and a 
despising way. It is unbelievable: it was a dinner at a holiday resort, and it was a 
competition of status, money and consumption of luxuries (N.M., interview). 
Not only business people, but also the environment of conspicuous consumption 
affects the professionals of enterprises. “I let my engineers drive the cars of the 
company whenever they want, but still they want to own their own cars and to pay that 
money. Consumption is the focus of everyone, all the time, especially since we as 
conservatives all have an inferiority complex towards the secularists: we would all like 
to reach their social status by conspicuous consumption to satisfy our inferiority 
complex” (N.M., interview). Turkish sociologist Kasaba described Gulen network as 
follows: 
Today the Gulen network represents a massive accumulation of resources or ‘capital’, such 
as economic and cultural (educational and media-related) capital. However, regarding 
symbolic capital, that is capital providing prestige and status, and hence legitimacy, the 
situation is different. Indeed, there is an obvious deficiency in this regard, which the leaders 
try to compensate for in various ways, for example, by adding – and emphasizing – an 
academic profile (universities, scholarly journals and other publications) to otherwise 
mainly secondary education and business-oriented efforts. Thus, on one hand, the 
leaders/members want to keep a low, reserved profile, but on the other they also want their 
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efforts to be visible and stand out as praiseworthy and prestigious achievements in the 
public sphere (Kasaba, 2014, p.628). 
The participation in sports organizations and executive committees of sports 
associations is a mechanism of self-realization among the upper classes in Turkey. 
N.M., first generation businessman, developed his social network by becoming a
member of the federations of sports branches. 
5.3.3. TUSKON as a Socialization and Solidarity Mechanism 
TUSKON in specific and the Gulen Movement in general both play important 
roles in helping the socialization process of people who are mostly rural-based and who 
come from poor uneducated conservative families, and who also support Gulen and his 
movement. There are Quran-reading circles; exhibitions are organized; 
preparatory courses to universities or schools; and there is provision of new business 
and networking opportunities for various scales of entrepreneurs. 
Attending the circles can take a lot of time for the members: 
I do not go to the reading and discussion circles (sohbet) because it is a waste of time after a 
long, exhausting day at work. I just support the movement by giving money (R.Z., 
interview). 
I am confident about the money I am giving to the community. The money is in safe hands. 
I know it goes to the construction of schools in Papua New Guinea or Tanzania, or going 
into the pocket of the teacher working in America or in a part of Asia or to the students who 
need this money. I went to eight countries in Africa and Asia, we went to Turkish Schools 
of the community and I am more motived to give money each time I saw these places. 
(R.Z., interview). 
The international links and branches of the Gulen Movement and TUSKON 
in particular are run by the Gulenists who voluntarily go and work as missionaries in 
different parts of the world. These voluntary Gulenists make connections with the 
local social and political elites to build economic and political relations for the business 
activities of TUSKON and for the local educational institutions of the Gulen Movement. 
Not only as a solidarity mechanism, but also as a way of increasing the inner 
motivation in the Community and in marketing to gain public support, the Turkish 
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Language Olympiads are important. The Turkish Language Olympiad is one of the most 
popular public scenes and marketing mechanisms of Gulen movement, showing 
how ‘the Community works for the good of Turkey’. The Turkish Language 
Olympiad is the Turkish version of Eurovision. It is a Turkish language skills 
competition for singing and poetry in Turkish among the students from the 
Gulenist schools from all over the world. 
The second most popular social events of the Community are the meetings of the 
Abant Platform. These are a series of panel meetings of liberal intellectuals and host 
discussions about democratization, the Kurdish question, potential constitutional 
reforms and political parties. 
5.3.4. Approaches of Islamic Business People in Ankara towards the Role of 
Values in Islamic Business 
One of the keystones in the debates about Islam and capitalism concerns 
rationality. Weber argued that capitalism is not compatible with Islam since Islam is not 
suitable for the development of economic rationality and capital accumulation. Among 
interviewees, there were varying kinds of manifestation of rational economic behaviour. 
The basic reason for the contradiction between Islamic and secularist 
entrepreneurs is their different identities. Yet it is seen that business people from both 
sides can have good business relations. “If I see the supplier of the goods I am buying 
drunk, and if I had an alternative, I would buy from someone else. But I would 
never talk behind them and gossip and I do not see them as an enemy” (R.Z., interview). 
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TUSKON, as part of the Gulenist strategy in all spheres of life, strategically 
plays a flexible role in terms of attracting new members. In Kayseri, a 
conservative Central Anatolian city, TUSKON members oppose the idea of serving 
alcohol in the city, whereas in a city like Izmir which is well-known for its 
secularist-Westernized social atmosphere, TUSKON members’ attitudes are more 
moderate with regard to alcohol consumption and service (Ayata, 2014, p.239). 
Self-interpretations of Gulenists concerning the place of Islamic values in 
modern business life are sometimes contradictory. They seem to prioritize 
Islamic values in some regards whereas in other regards they seem to choose rational 
business principles without taking Islamic or communitarian principles into account. 
N.Y. became a member of TUSKON eight years ago when he went to 
Turkmenistan in 1994 with entrepreneurial aims. It is not common to hear this 
much sensitivity or emphasis from a TUSIAD member about the organizational 
structure of Gulenists.
We, as TUSKON, have an economic growth record; God is rewarding our service with his 
bereket (efficient outcome given by God). We find subcontractors by ourselves. We, as a 
movement, carry out trade reasonably and rationally. After receiving proposals, only in 
similar conditions can we consider choosing Hizmet movement’s members. Also this can 
avoid the chance of unrest in the Gulenist community. We prefer personal skills first, and 
then religiosity. We don’t want radicals, marginal people to employ. They can harm our 
peace, solidarity and teamwork (N.Y., interview). 
5.3.5. Women in TUSKON 
Not only in TUSKON but also in almost all Gulenist activities, especially in 
those of local circles and exhibitions, preparatory courses are gender-segregated. Both 
men and women in the movement explain this situation by maintaining “they all feel 
more comfortable in gender-segregated places”. The movement is sometimes criticized 
for discouraging women from engaging in public leadership and in social interaction 
with men, and for encouraging women to play their given roles as ‘housewives’ 
(Ebaugh, 2008, p.50). These discussions about social values, socially accepted and non-
accepted behaviours, sometimes tend to define women by using examples about women 
provided for by businessmen. ‘The women driving jeeps’, ‘the women wearing 
headscarves but putting too much make-up on’, ‘the women wearing tight clothes’, etc., 
are the most common negative examples to show the level of degeneration in the 
society. “The woman who drives a jeep with too much make-up like a painted clown is 
never suited to Islam and the image of the Community [the Gulen movement]” (R.Z., 
interview). 
Y.S. from HÜRSİAD, says that there is a women’s commission in HÜRSİAD, 
and that it is the most active women’s branch among TUSKON branches. And they are 
not wives of businessmen either; they are businesswomen involved in business. 
There are female members in TUSKON and there is a Women’s Branch but generally there 
are no women executive committee members. But this is not the case only for TUSKON; in 
ATO (Chambers’ Union of Ankara) there are one hundred and eighty-eight members in 
total, but there is only one businesswoman in total (N.M., interview). 
During the 1990s, where the laic, political and militarist oppressions were 
strongly felt by conservative, religious people, Islamic companies preferred not to 
employ veiled women because they did not want to be stigmatized. After 2002, this fear 
tended to be lower; however, it still exists: 
Let us be honest, I prefer not to employ veiled women because they [the secularists] 
stigmatize straightaway. We cannot be sure about the aims of people coming here. We are 
still afraid. We want to be sympathetic to everyone. 
R.Z. was clearly trying to convince the interviewer and himself by emphasizing moral 
values as follows: 
Check this girl out [indicating a woman employee working in the workplace]. She is not 
veiled, her nails are polished: what is wrong with this? But if she wears some immoral 
outfit: I would warn her (R.Z., interview). 
5.4. TUSKON’s Relationship Politics and the AK Party Government 
TUSKON is a hierarchically structured community. In order to perceive the 
political tendencies of TUSKON members, we have to analyse the Community. The 
Community is the Turkish name of what is commonly known as the Gulen movement.  
The sharing and cooperation system in the Gulen community works in a way in 
which there is a central hierarchy: N.Y. belongs to the Çankaya district of the 
Ankara region of the share system of Community, and Ankara belongs to the 
Central Anatolia branch. N.Y. recently supported the construction of eight floors 
of student dormitories,  
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some construction work for students belonging to the Gulen movement and trained in 
the movement’s educational institutions. Also, the Çankaya district gives money to 
Southeast Anatolia and to central Asia and Africa for aid and the opening of new 
Gulenist schools and dorms. “Most rich people have no satisfaction, but we do! I
know a person who gave five-million dollars to aid the system (Hizmet’s share
system], and then he had no money left to exchange his old car” (N.Y., interview). 
“In five years, TUSKON will grow dramatically. The education and the vision 
are combining here. The fairs and the push of entrepreneurs into Africa and Asian 
markets will contribute and transform this country” (Y.S., interview). Y.S. went to 
Russia, Senegal, Nigeria and Azerbaijan as part of the TUSKON fairs and investments. 
Y.S. says that, like many other TUSKON members, he is involved in the construction 
businesses in these countries. 
After the 17
th
 December process in 2013, Erdogan and the AK Party first tried to
make a separation between the leading elite of the Gulen movement and the ‘ordinary’ 
supporters of the movement in the base. The AK Party described these supporters of the 
social base of the Community as being “deceived, innocent people who believed that Gulen 
and the elites had good, religious intentions and gave their money and time to these liars 
who they thought to serve to the enemies of Turkey and Islam” (N.M., Interview). 
N.M., one of the primary figures of Gulenist business people and TUSKON
members in Ankara, was also an important figure in the political life of Ankara. He was 
Vice-President of the AK Party’s Ankara branch between 2010 and 2014. He was a part  
of the cadre of Abdullah Gul in the AK Party. After the conflict between the 
Community and the AK Party that started with the 17
th
 December Coup, he was
eliminated from the AK Party. N. M. emphasizes his efforts to make a division between 
his economic and political lives. “My business was not affected directly by my political 
career but it is possible that my political title provided some trustworthiness in me. But I 
was never unethical to use my political power in favour of my business” (N. M., 
interview). 
As an important segment of the Gulen movement, TUSKON was involved in all of 
these political incidents, problems and conflicts. The media released the secret tapes of 
a conversation between Fethullah Gulen, the leader of the Service movement, and the 
General Secretary of TUSKON. In the tapes, Gulen was giving orders and listening to 
the report of the latest business deals of TUSKON firms at the business fair, especially 
about how they were preparing a struggle with the government by excluding untrusted 
outsider business people, and how they founded business connections with African 
countries’ presidents. 
TUSKON members are strictly obedient to the directorate of the Gulen 
movement concerning political, economic and religious principles. The Gulen 
movement, including TUSKON, supports Turkey’s European Union membership at all 
costs, and also supports the USA-Israel axis in the Middle Eastern foreign policy in 
opposition to AK Party Government’s recent anti-American, anti-Israeli 
position in foreign policy. In fact, this can be considered as the validation of the claims 
of AK Party about the Gulenist movement. 
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CHAPTER 6 - COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF ISLAMIC BUSINESS 
GROUPS AND THEIR SELF-
INTERPRETATION OF THEIR 
DIFFERENCES FROM SECULARIST 
BUSINESSES 
As a result of the rapid development in democratic consciousness, urbanization, 
education levels, and also rise of new urban, educated middle classes, the importance of 
NGOs raised in recent decades in Turkey. The social status achievements of people had 
depended on the links with the state for long time in terms of economic subsidy or rent 
distribution, and an authoritarian–militaristic political atmosphere was dominant. 
However, recently, NGOs have been becoming significant actors in all spheres. As the 
representatives of the economic elites, these business people associations have entered 
the arenas of social life and political struggle. 
The new rising economic elites of Islamic entrepreneurs increasingly became the 
centre of attention from the late 1990s, and emerged as a power, especially with the 
beginning of AK Party rule in 2002. It would be fair to say that these new Islamic elites 
are mostly composed of relatively newly-urban social groups that have stronger 
religious and traditional tendencies and benefit more from religious and kinship 
networks than the earlier typical Turkish secular elites. 
In this chapter, the ways in which Islamic business people might be 
differentiated from secularist business people and the similarities and differences 
(according to their self-interpretations) between the two largest Islamic business 
organizations – MÜSİAD and TUSKON – will be discussed. 
The major sociological difference between MÜSİAD members and TUSKON 
members concerns being an individual actor or a member of a strictly hierarchical  
movement, the Gulen Movement. As Tönnies describes, the modernization of societies 
is a transition from communities (gemenschaft) to societies (gesellschaft), and MÜSİAD 
members tend to give more evidence that they are at a different stage of becoming the 
modern middle class because of their higher level of development of ‘self’ and free 
individual agency (Tönnies, 1887). 
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One of the main approaches to describing the emergence and rapid growth of 
Islamic business is to regard the Islamic business as resulting from the conservative 
governments of Turkey. This approach is a good example of thinking of Islamic 
business as an external factor without taking any sociological changes into account. 
First of all, there is a chronological mistake in this proposition. Islamic businesses 
founded associations like MÜSİAD (1990) and TUSKON (1993), and then started to 
grow dramatically long before the governance of the Welfare Party (RP), which began 
in 1995 and ended in 1997, or the governance of the AK Party, which started in 2002. 
Also, without taking the sociological backdrop into consideration, the explanation of the 
development of Islamic business as resulting from conservative party governments is 
misleading. This kind of explanation does not adequately explain the economic, social 
and media support behind these parties (RP in 1995 and AK Party in 2002) that led 
them to electoral successes. In addition, even were it definitely fair to say that the rate 
of growth and economic power accelerated with AK Party rule after 2002, the rate of 
growth of Islamic business was already on an upward trajectory before the AK Party 
came into government. 
Over-simplifications regarding Islamic business concern not only its emergence 
and relation with AK Party, but also its class character. Some Turkish Marxian 
researchers approach Islamic business by considering it as the exploitation of labour by 
benefiting from Islamic bonds, networks of Islamic communities or brotherhoods, and 
kinship relations that are partially based on an informal economy. This kind of analysis 
of Islamic business can only over-simplify, focusing on the small tip of an iceberg by 
only analysing the aspect of labour relations in Islamic business. It would be very unfair 
to conclude that the rate of exploitation is very low in secularist business and very high 
in Islamic business. This is not true, and the comparison itself is not fair in that it 
compares institutionalized, older enterprises with newly emerging ones that have 
smaller business scales. 
Another view on the rise of Islamic people in politics and the economy defines 
this transformation as “passive revolution” in Gramscian terms (Tuğal, 2009). 
According to this theory, the Islamist people, who were subaltern and remained on the 
economic and political periphery throughout the earlier history of the Republic, came to 
hold power not through revolution but through a transformation. And in this 
transformation, these people who, it had been argued, were anti-capitalist were then 
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suddenly absorbed by global capitalism and became politically moderate and 
compatible with the global Western capitalist dominance. 
These assumptions are quite misleading. First, in the recent past, conservative 
people and the conservative party (AK Party) have turned to a more Anti-Western 
(Anti-American, Anti-EU) political position from a previously more pro-EU and pro-
American political position, as can be seen in many examples as discussed by both 
Western and non-Western media and academics from 2009 onwards. Second, the 
assumption that Islamic people were anti-capitalist before is simply not true. There were 
a couple of radical Islamist groups with very limited memberships that defined 
themselves as anti-capitalists before; however, this cannot be generalized to all 
conservative people in Turkey. Anti-capitalism is not a primary trait of this movement; 
it is perhaps anti-Westernist instead. And third, seeing this group of conservative, 
Islamic people (which make up the majority in Turkey) as objects that can be absorbed 
by someone or something else is epistemologically, sociologically and ethically wrong. 
Such a stance goes against current practice in explaining social change in the social 
sciences, for it has been repeatedly shown that we cannot explain human behaviour in 
ways that assume that individuals can be easily deceived or manipulated. A social 
researcher cannot put him/herself in a higher position to judge other people’s 
intelligence or logic. We can only try to understand pieces of evidence as to the reasons 
for their decisions and attitudes, by discussing the effects of these decisions and also by 
comparing a particular phenomenon from time to time or from case to case. People have 
their own wills, struggles, decisions and strategies to follow rather than simply being 
‘fooled’ by social or political agents. 
According to the views of those scholars who classify themselves as Marxists, 
focusing on the conflict between the secularist and Islamic business fractions 
undermines the ‘real’ class conflict in the society by leading to the ignoring of class 
conflict. However, another Marxian scholar, Savran, opposes this Marxist simplification 
and says that coming to this kind of conclusion intentionally or unintentionally ignores 
the importance of different factions of the bourgeoisie, and has ultimately led such 
Marxists to support one or other of these factions (Savran, 2015 p.110). Further, in the 
main these Marxist analysts tend to be closer to the secularist faction’s political and 
social position since they share the ‘common enemies’ of religion, tradition and 
nationalism that constitute an obstacle to being a Westernized society with class 
consciousness and readiness for class struggle. In the 28 February 1997 military 
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intervention, the two largest trade union confederations supported the military 
intervention against the Welfare Party. The Turkish Marxists’ tradition is well known to 
be anti-religionist because of the Soviet and Chinese experiences and the misconception 
of the quote from Marx about religion: “Religion is the opium of the masses” (Marx, 
2001). 
6.1. Economic Empowerment of Islamic Business People: The 
Commonalities  and  Differences  in  Becoming  Members  of  Islamic 
Business Associations 
The business people who are members of Islamic business associations were 
mostly small scale and middle scale entrepreneurs who had remained on the economic 
and social periphery for a long time and who registered for MÜSİAD or TUSKON after 
their foundations in early 1990s. The economic elites that are the largest Turkish 
capitalists were members of TÜSİAD, and they never accepted the idea of their 
membership including small and mid-scale entrepreneurs. In addition, TÜSİAD and its 
members (except for a few exceptional members) were cultural Westernists, politically 
strictly secularist and in alliance with the State bureaucracy and military. This historical 
power led to the small and middle scale entrepreneurs that only have stronger traditional 
and religious aspects, founding MÜSİAD in 1990 and TUSKON in 1993. 
However, the differences between the profiles of the MÜSİAD members and 
TUSKON members are almost completely missing in the literature on Islamic 
businesses in Turkey. The MÜSİAD members are Islamic business people who base 
their activities mostly on kinship – neighbourhood relationships that benefit from the 
sharing of common religious and traditional values. Even if the MÜSİAD members 
share similar conservative values and political values, MÜSİAD does not allow any 
religious movement or community to be organized or to form a power base in the 
association (N.K., interview). Both this policy and the social background of members 
led to the formation of a more individual-based business people that can compose a new 
middle class. 
The major difference of TUSKON is that it is the association of the Gulen 
movement that is hierarchically controlled from the top down by the movement. Even 
though Y.S. said that there were also members from 
Page | 152 
different backgrounds in the summer of 2013, the 17
th
 December Judicial Coup that 
caused a conflict with the government and the isolation of the Gulen movement led 
TUSKON to lose a significant number of members, especially those that had no, or only 
loose connections with the Gulen movement, as explained by an important Gulenist 
businessman in Ankara, N.M. (N.M., interview). 
Significant information was not found during the research on people who were 
members of both Islamic business associations, MÜSİAD and TUSKON. Some 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON members said that there were some business people who were 
members of both associations, but most of them had left TUSKON after the conflict 
between the government and the Gulenists in 2013. 
The rivalry and occasional hostility between these social and political groups 
reflect the attitudes of business associations as well. For a long time, there had been a 
rivalry (or even hostility) between MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD. (TUSKON had never 
expressed this kind of hostility towards TÜSİAD, a typical moderate and strategically 
ambiguous characteristic of Gulenists). MÜSİAD, since its foundation, has blamed 
TÜSİAD for being the monopoly in the country and for not contributing to Turkey’s 
development. In a public congress of TÜSİAD, former president Koç   said: 
We need to hit the table if we need to. We needed to support the Dogan Media Group [a 
secularist media group that is strictly criticized by Erdogan and that had received a huge 
amount of fines from the Ministry of Finance] when they were under attack. We started to 
be perceived as weaker than MÜSİAD. They are now taken more seriously in public than 
us (Milliyet, 2 October 2009). 
In this rivalry between Islamic business and secularist business, TÜSİAD has 
many advantages. First, TÜSİAD is much more institutionalized because it was 
established much earlier than the Islamic enterprises, thanks to republican statist 
policies and huge state support. Second, TÜSİAD had a chance to form monopolies in 
many sectors and to undermine the chances of their competitors. Third, TÜSİAD has 
strong economic and cultural relations with large Western companies and became a part 
of their global chain as their local agents. Fourth, TÜSİAD has a symbolic and cultural 
power that attracts companies, partners and employees more than Islamic business. 
After the massive improvements of MÜSİAD and TUSKON, TÜSİAD founded 
an association for small and mid-scale entrepreneurs, TÜRKONFED, under its own 
control. This rivalry is seen in the business statistics of Turkey. In 2009, the percentage 
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rate of TÜSİAD members in the national income was 40%, whereas the percentage rate 
of MÜSİAD was only about 15%. TÜSİAD member companies employ 626,000 
employees, its TÜRKONFED branch members employ 1 million, and MÜSİAD 
members employ 1.2 million. But TÜRKONFED is not a popular association in the 
public media or academia, since it is considered to be an agent of TÜSİAD to stop the 
growth of MÜSİAD and TUSKON. 
After the 17
th
 December Process, a similar kind of hostility to that between
TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD began between MÜSİAD and TUSKON as well. In almost all 
of the interviews after this process, the interviewees blamed the other group: TUSKON 
members blamed MÜSİAD of being controlled and supported by the AK Party 
government by implying that they are economically assisted by the government in an 
illegitimate way. On the other hand, MÜSİAD members accused the Gulen movement 
in general and TUSKON members specifically of being agents of the West (mainly the 
USA) and Israel, and of having no individual will against the orders of Fethullah Gulen 
and his A-team. In addition, MÜSİAD members reply to the accusations of TUSKON 
by saying that TUSKON was previously protected and helped by the government as 
well, especially in its organizations of international business and the trade fairs that 
brought important international political and economic figures to the country. 
According to this view, TUSKON members do not have the right to complain about 
something that they themselves did previously. 
6.1.1. Comparison of Islamic Business Factions in Capitalism and Islamic 
Businesses 
Until recent decades, in the literature of social sciences and media, religion had 
been seen as something that is not a public dynamic that affects economy and politics 
anymore. The heritage of the Enlightenment affected many scholars and they started to 
ignore the role of religion in business life and in the formation of political identities. 
However, this seems to have changed in recent decades, and now religion has once 
again started to be seen as an important dynamic in the economy and politics. As 
Habermas states: “religious traditions and communities of faith have gained a new, 
hitherto unexpected political importance since the epoch-making change of 1989-90” 
(Habermas, 2006, p.1). 
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The increasing importance of religion became more visible after the 1990s in 
Turkey as well. The governments of conservative parties have engaged in strong Islamic 
discourse (the Welfare Party 1995-1997, the AK Party 2002-present) in political life and 
in the rise of Islamic business people, and their associations (MÜSİAD 1990-present) 
(TUSKON 1993-present) brought Islam back into the centre of political and economic 
struggle after long decades of strong, authoritarian laic, Westernist political and 
economic elites’ domination in the country. 
With regard to the life of The Prophet, Islamic business associations refer mostly 
to the fact that he was a merchant and that being involved in trade is totally compatible 
with Islam when expressing themselves in their publications or daily informal 
conversations. They use religious symbols and Islamic history like the Medina Market 
during The Prophet’s life to justify their views and business lives. This emphasis is very 
high among MÜSİAD members and in MÜSİAD publications. 
This emphasis is less in TUSKON than MÜSİAD even though the former was 
created within the Gulen Movement. This may be a result of “a strategic ambiguity” of 
the Gulenists, which Hendrick describes as meaning the movement tries to show itself 
as moderate and sympathetic with every pole (within Turkish society and globally)
without claiming sharp and strong opinions (Hendrick, 2015). While Islamic business 
associations, especially MÜSİAD, emphasize the differences of their ideal capitalism 
from contemporary Western capitalism, TÜSİAD always refers to ‘Western values’ and 
the importance of the relationship with Western institutions like the EU and IMF. Umit 
Boyner, former president (2010-2013) of TÜSİAD, explains these different approaches 
thus: “we have to decide between being ‘the little China’  or ‘larger Finland’”. For sure, 
this difference does not imply only differences of economic or social policies; this 
phrase also has cultural and political implications. 
These different approaches towards West and East are reflected in their different 
business strategies as well. TÜSİAD members are organized mostly on Western types 
of larger company structures and professional business relationships. However, Islamic 
business people, as a rival strategy, chose the Eastern Asian type of organization of 
work based on primary social relations and networks of small and middle scale 
enterprises. Also, while TÜSİAD member companies have business relationships with 
Western companies in terms of exporting and importing, Islamic enterprises depend on 
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exporting to, and networking with those Middle Eastern, Central Asian and African 
countries that tend to share certain cultural and religious similarities. 
Members of both factions of Islamic business in Turkey, MÜSİAD and 
TUSKON, think that wealth is a tool for the development of the nation and for Muslims 
to become stronger by increasing the welfare and employment of more people. 
Capitalism is thus seen as a tool for the rise of the nation, for Turkey to become more 
developed, wealthy and free. By saying this, they are trying to express the idea that they 
are seeking a personal wealth or pleasure in this world. 
At the same time, Islamic business people and their associations prefer to make a 
clear distinction between development and Westernization. They defend the idea that 
development is possible without giving up on Islam and Turkish culture. This emphasis 
is stronger among MÜSİAD members than among TUSKON members. At the same 
time, the emphasis on social justice is common among the members of both 
associations. The Hadiths concerning social justice were repeated during the interviews 
many times to prove that they support the idea of social justice. For this reason, they 
talked about how they give importance to charity events, helping the poor, employing 
desperate people as a form of charity, and taking care of the rights and the interests of 
their employees. 
Throughout the interviews with TUSKON members, stress was given to the 
amount of money given by Gulenist business people to the Gulen movement for the 
expense of building and running dormitories, schools around the world, and many other 
services of the Gulen movement (which is called himmet). These aid payments are 
based on a centrally and hierarchically organized mechanism for determining the rate of 
money based on yearly income, the manner of collecting it, and the spending for each 
particular service of the Gulen community.  
6.1.2. Comparison of Trust Networks and the Moral Economy of Kinship for 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON Members 
The trust network is one of the most significant advantages for Islamic business 
people, making the forming of partnerships, supplying of machinary, borrowing of 
resources, and employment easier than for the typical capitalist enterprise. These trust  
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networks lead to decreased risk in investing and developing their businesses. However, 
this trust system works differently for MÜSİAD members than for TUSKON members. 
MÜSİAD members benefit primarily from kinship relationships as the capital of 
the network. An important part of the capital is that owners have partnership 
relationships with their family members, and also employ relatives because they find 
them to be trustworthier. Also, they especially prefer to employ relatives and family 
members for positions that require trust relationships, such as accounting. Political 
belongingness and religiosity are the second most important dynamic for this trust and 
safety network. This network is not only about partnerships or employment; it is also 
about subcontracting, outsourcing, purchasing the means of production and chain 
production, which can be seen as commercialization in industrial zones. 
Kinship plays an important role for TUSKON member entrepreneurs as well. As 
much as kinship, membership of the Gulen movement is also an important resource and 
social network that opens ways to gain more business opportunities within the circle of 
the Gulen movement and its international connections. However, as most of the 
Gulenist business people stated in their interviews, Gulenist business people do not 
prioritize partnerships within the Gulen community because of the preaching of Gulen, 
who suggested that making partnerships with outsiders would help to gain more 
members and to avoid the inner conflicts that can arise from partnerships. 
This is also the case with employment, as Gulenists are not always favoured 
during the recruitment process. This is the major difference from MÜSİAD members, 
because religious and political commonalities play a more important role for MÜSİAD 
members than for TUSKON members in terms of partnership, subcontracting and 
employment relations. 
Stronger rural and traditional kinship bonds, and the more important role of 
religious bonds – including the network capital of membership to a movements like the 
Gulen movement – make partnership, subcontracting, outsourcing and resource-finding 
networks lead Islamic business people to an advantageous position compared to a 
significant part of the secularist business sphere in which TÜSİAD members operate. 
With their more urban and Western social backgrounds, and relatively weaker kinship 
relations than those of the traditional, rural social habitats, and lacking the bonds of 
religious communities or movements, secularist business people seem to have less 
advantages than their Islamic counterparts. 
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6.1.3. The Attitudes of the Members of Islamic Business Associations towards 
Islamic Finance 
One of the main points of the debates about the relationship between Islam and 
the Quran is riba, which means usury: additional charges added onto the total amount 
owed in bank interest or any kind of interest on debt money or any other asset. 
Rodinson claims that what is meant by forbidding riba is not clear in today’s Muslim 
world, a world in which Islamic banking foundations have excluded the practice of 
interest. “It does not appear to signify mere ‘interest’, in the sense in which we use this 
word, but rather, the doubling of a sum owed (capital and interest, in money or in any 
kind) when the debtor cannot pay it back at the moment when it falls due” (Rodinson, 
p.14).
The history of Islamic banks is shorter than that of the secular banks in Turkey. 
They were founded after the 1980s, and aimed to attract money from religious people 
who do not want to invest their money in an interest banking system since Islam forbids 
it. 
All of the Islamic business people interviewed in this research stated that they 
could not benefit enough from Islamic banks because of their mechanisms. In Turkey, 
the Islamic banks work on the principle of murabaha (partnerships during the purchase 
of commodities). But most business people could not predict when they will have 
problems with the payment of wages or loan installments, and at this stage they cannot 
benefit from Islamic banks because their applications are rejected. 
There is great heterogeneity among MÜSİAD members and TUSKON members 
concerning the use of Islamic finance banks. Most of the interviewees from both 
associations openly said that they use bank interest credit in order to survive in the 
market, and that Islamic finance institutions are not much help for that goal. Some 
Islamic business people said that bank interest credit is the last choice for them, and that 
they prefer to use either Islamic finance or self-resources. 
The TUSKON-member business people give the impression that Gulen does not 
emphasize Islamic finance as much as other Islamic scholars and movements do. 
However, because Islamic banking is also unsatisfactory for meeting the needs of 
MÜSİAD-member business people, there is not a meaningful difference among 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON members in terms of the attitude towards Islamic finance. 
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6.1.4. The Attitudes of Islamic Business People towards Trade Unionism 
One of the major differences between Islamic business and secularist business 
(TÜSİAD) is that TÜSİAD member-companies have much higher rates and experiences 
of trade unionism. There are several reasons for this. First, informality is more common 
among Islamic business people, and this undermines the effect of legal enforcements. 
Second, most Islamic business people have smaller scales of businesses in less 
professional, newly emerging enterprises. Both of these factors affect the rates of 
unionization in these enterprises in negative ways, for Islamic business people from 
both associations, MÜSİAD and TUSKON. Most of the interviewees indicate the 
informality and smaller scales as reasons for underdeveloped trade unionism in Islamic 
businesses. 
However, apart from these two facts, in almost all the interviews with business 
people from both associations, the perception of trade unionism seems quite negative, 
and some bad memories regarding labour activism and professional trade unions were 
frequently repeated. The idea of anti-unionism can be named as one of the main features 
of the character of an Islamic businessperson, whichever association – MÜSİAD or 
TUSKON – they belong to. 
The interviewees tried to justify their point of view by referring to some Hadiths 
that strongly suggest the importance of respecting rights of labour. Nevertheless, it is 
not well understood that trade unions and collectivity are basic rights of the labourers as 
well. One of the main reasons for opposing the idea of trade unions might be that trade 
unions are perceived as representing a professionalization of the labour relations within 
the workplace whereas Islamic business people and their employees share common 
religious views, kinship or neighbourhood relations, or membership to a religious 
community or a political party, and this professionalization could disrupt this family-
like atmosphere by creating a source of alienation. Of course, this cannot be a 
convincing excuse for stopping or opposing a basic, universal right of workers. 
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6.2. Socio-cultural Background and the Transformation of
TUSKON Members 
6.2.1. Commonalities  and  Differences  of  Social  Background  and  Mobility  of 
Islamic Entrepreneurs 
Turkish society has recently and rapidly become an urban society. In less than 
sixty-five years, Turkey’s urban population has increased from 25% to 77%, according 
to the latest population census. Most of the Islamic entrepreneurs’ social backgrounds 
reflect an important part of this newly urbanized social group. Mostly they are first-
generation entrepreneurs who moved from the rural peripheries to big cities in order to 
establish their businesses, to gain a political identity and to form families in the big city. 
Only two of the interviewees were born in big cities, and these were the younger, 
second or third generation business people and their families. There is no meaningful 
difference between MÜSİAD and TUSKON members in terms of their social 
backgrounds; but there is a significant difference amongst TÜSİAD members from 
Islamic business people because they are mostly composed of members who have 
urban, highly-educated, Westernized family backgrounds. 
Adapting to the new urban, modern lifestyle did not go the same way for all 
Islamic business people. In Turkey, the urbanizing people become involved in kinship 
networks and hometown networks (hemşerilik) primarily to find shelter and jobs. In 
their second stage of assimilation, they tried to enter business life as labourers or as 
small-entrepreneurs by using their primary networks, but in this stage political and 
religious networks became important only if the primary network was not satisfactory 
for the development of business opportunities. 
This stage is where the difference between MÜSİAD members and TUSKON 
members emerges. A significant portion of MÜSİAD members are not members of any 
religious movement or community, but almost all the TUSKON members are also 
members of the Gulen community, and this Gulenist network forms the network capital 
which affects their social mobility. But for MÜSİAD members, both religious networks 
and political networks are important at this stage of development. 
6.2.2. The Making of the New Islamic Elites 
Bringing the rural-traditional background where Turkish local culture and 
Islamic religion still dominate, and merging it with modern education, a partially 
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Westernized urban middle class culture and global business networks, Turkish Islamic 
entrepreneurs elevated in society as the new elite of business, which also pioneer the 
formation of the new cultural, intellectual, political and economic elite. 
The conservative part of the society went through a significant social 
transformation, especially by gaining increased access to higher education, 
urbanization, and economic empowerment processes that led them in the formation of a 
new conservative elite class. By elites, not only economic elites are connoted: 
conservatives also started to form an intellectual elite that is involved in academia, 
journals of literature and philosophy, charity organizations, feminist NGOs, hobby and 
lifestyle clubs and gatherings, and mass media organizations like newspapers and 
television channels. Debates are continued on such issues as the consumerist culture of 
Islamic people, the position of women in the conservative people, the democratization 
of Turkey, the relationships of modernity, capitalism and Islam, the future of Turkish 
poetry, the lack of production in cinema and theatre by conservatives, and the 
differences between rural Islamic life and urban Islamic life under global popular 
culture’s influences. This intellectual wealth started to develop significantly after the 
1990s. 
Another important influence on their lifestyles and social behaviours is that their 
export relationships affect and develop their social skills and lead them to import some 
foreign cultural values and aesthetic choices. 
Luxurious cafes in Istanbul and Ankara that serve authentic Turkish, European 
and Asian cuisine and beverages at the highest prices in the city began to emerge. 
Expensive cars, especially Jeeps, became widespread among this new elite. New 
neighbourhoods emerged, and these new high-class neighbourhoods are composed of 
luxurious flats that are purchased by conservative elites. New seven-star hotels have 
opened on the coast that are among the most expensive in Europe, and these hotels cater 
mostly to the new Turkish conservative elites and especially to Islamic business people. 
The uniqueness of these hotels is found in their sexually segregated beaches and non-
alcoholic beverage service. Islamic fashion companies have been founded and are 
starting to design new Islamic fashions for the conservative, veiled women of the 
Islamic elites. These fashion companies open new shops in new shopping malls owned 
by Islamic business people. 
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This kind of new consumption culture of Islamic elites has caused hot debates 
among conservative intellectuals. Some Islamist intellectuals began to criticize 
conspicuous consumption and to accuse these conservative people of wasting money, 
which is religiously forbidden (haram), and of showing off their pride, which is also 
forbidden. These criticisms continue, with further accusations of degeneration, of 
Westernization and of imitating the secularists who have had this kind of consumption 
culture for a much longer time, because of an inferiority complex. Another group 
(which includes some of the Islamic business people themselves) oppose these 
criticisms by saying that this is their halal (religiously deserved) money, and it is also 
their right to have a good quality of life. 
The making of these elites is an on-going process in Turkey. This causes plural 
tendencies among Islamic business people concerning the attitudes and choices towards 
Islamic business ethics, conspicuous consumption, usage of media and participation in 
popular culture and leisure activities. This on-going process is of a rural-based, newly-
rising economic elite’s transformation into a new elite culture. 
6.2.3. The Islamic Business Groups as a Socialization and Solidarity Mechanism 
Not only through being members of the same business people’s associations, but 
also through sharing similar cultural codes, religious backgrounds and political and 
moral views, Islamic business people benefit from the safety, solidarity and the 
comforts of this Islamic business network. TUSKON members in particular – who are 
part of the Gulenist network, a closed, tightly knit community – benefit from this 
solidarity network. It is not only in business life that they are aided: participation in the 
events of the Gulen movement helps every Gulenist businessperson to socialize and 
adapt to the new business environment in big cities without feeling lonely. These events 
include charity events, Turkish Language Olympiads, Quran readings and discussion 
circles that take place at least once a week. These activities serve to strengthen the ties 
among Gulenist business people. 
MÜSİAD members have relatively flexible and weak ties because they are not 
part of a top-down organization or of a hierarchical religious or social movement. 
MÜSİAD’s events mostly involve charity events and political discussion meetings. In 
MÜSİAD, the political characters are more important than TUSKON, and this more 
political character is manifest in support for the AK Party and Erdogan by almost all of 
the members. The major difference between the two groups is reflected in MÜSİAD’s 
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individual, kinship and politically based membership profiles, which have led MÜSİAD 
members to have weaker solidarity ties than TUSKON members, who are part of the 
Gulen movement. 
6.2.4. Attitudes of Islamic Business People in Ankara towards the Role of Values 
in Islamic Businesses 
The reason these business people are called ‘Islamic’ is not mainly because they 
practice religion by praying or fasting, etc.; rather, it is because they claim their identity 
through their business ethics and networks, as well as through their moral and political 
attitudes in the public sphere. 
The most important difference between Islamic enterprises and secularist 
workplaces is the masjids. The masjids are the most important distinguishing feature 
that is visible in the public space. The secular workplaces mostly do not have masjids. 
Another visible difference in the public space is in the pictures with which walls are 
decorated. On the walls of the workplaces of Islamic enterprises, Ayahs from the Quran, 
Hadiths of the Prophet, portraits of Ottoman Sultans and quotes from Rumi or Yunus 
Emre are widespread, whereas in the workplaces of secular enterprises, the most visible 
objects are portraits of Kemal Ataturk and pictures painted by Western artists. Another 
important difference is the existence of veiled women in Islamic enterprises, which will 
be discussed in the next section. 
Keynes said that “capitalism has no religion” (Keynes, 1963, p.306), but it does. 
It can operate and function in different societies, religions and cultures in different 
shapes, in different formations. The struggles of two capitalist classes and two different 
capitalist projects indicate a very considerable difference: the secularist-Westernist 
faction versus Islamic businesses. Also, the manner and mechanism of emergence and 
development of each group is a contradictory story, as discussed in previous chapters. 
Barriers against bank interest, different approaches towards business development 
strategies, and different benefits from different cultural networks have led to the 
emergence of two different types of businesses. 
Within the Islamic faction, it is possible to say that there is heterogeneity among 
Islamic business people regardless of the associations to which they belong. The 
importance placed on the religiosity of their business partners and employees, the usage 
of bank interest, and the approach to trading with ‘the others’ are all major areas that 
revealed a variety of attitudes during the field work. This heterogeneity has several Page 
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reasons. First, Islamic entrepreneurs are a new phenomenon that needs to complete its 
economic and cultural transformation process within the axis of interaction with modern 
capitalism to achieve an identity. Second, as a part of the strategic ambiguity of the 
Gulenists, some of the TUSKON members tend to present themselves as more moderate 
and liberal, even to the extent that they do not employ women veiled such that their 
identities are hidden, despite the fact that they support the idea that Muslim women 
should be veiled. This means that, in some cases, Islamic business people, especially the 
Gulenists, can choose to be ‘rational’ by giving up on their ideals. But on the other 
hand, a large number of MÜSİAD members became members whilst the association 
was stigmatized and blacklisted by the military, but they did not give up by choosing 
‘the rational choice’. These kinds of contradictions cause this variety among Islamic 
business people. 
6.2.5. The Difference of the Position of Women in Islamic Business Factions 
In terms of the differences in the positions of women in Islamic business 
people’s associations, there is much that lags behind the secularist business association, 
TÜSİAD. TÜSİAD has had three female presidents in the last ten years. However, there 
has not been a single female president or vice-president in the entire histories of both 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON. There has not even been one single female president of any of 
the branches in the cities. This is due to several reasons. 
First, coming from the rural culture, which is a strictly patriarchal structure, 
women have been seen as housewives and are therefore much less visible in the public 
sphere. But in secularist businesses where urban, educated upper classes with a longer 
history in which to have absorbed and to have established an elite class, women are 
more active, visible and powerful. This has nothing to do with the religion itself as some 
orientalists argue, but because the urbanization and upper social mobility of the 
conservative part of the society started much later than the urban, secularist part, and it 
takes time to reach that level in terms of gender roles. We have already started to see 
very high rates of higher education among conservative women and also to see more 
veiled female intellectuals, authors, politicians and poets in the public sphere. It is 
therefore fair to expect to see more conservative businesswomen in Islamic businesses. 
To expand, while the absence of women in Islamic business is not related to religion, it 
is related with politics and the cultural background of the families of the business 
people. First, until 2011, veiled female students had not been allowed to enter 
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universities as either students or as academics. The oppressive secularist-militarist 
regime did not allow religious veiled women to become educated. Thus, taking a 
position in top-level business life was highly unlikely for women who had no higher-
education experience. It was hard to talk about equality of opportunities in this sense. 
Second, and maybe more crucially, unlike the intellectual or political elites, business 
people have more rural cultural backgrounds than the other conservative groups, and the 
older and middle-age generations of women tend to remain housewives in keeping with 
the norms of a strongly patriarchal rural culture. However, the second-generation 
women in these families, thanks to higher education and the influence of being born into 
an urban culture, started to have more important roles in family business enterprises, 
and this trend is ongoing. I have seen examples of these young professional women 
filling important positions in these Islamic enterprises during my fieldwork. Not only 
can it be seen that the absence of women in Islamic business associations is related to 
previous political barriers and rural patriarchal backgrounds, but further, as observed 
during the field work, there is no evidence that the level of religiosity decreases in the 
new generation of women who have started to reach top-level positions in business life. 
The situation of women in the families of Islamic business people represents 
many of the same features as that of women of Muslim minorities involved in the moral 
economy of kinship in Western Europe. The case in West Yorkshire among Pakistani 
women where the ethnic difference is influential could be a case among the wives of 
Islamic business people in Turkey: 
It is the contention of this paper that in the unquestioning commitment of Muslim women to 
the paramount duty of motherhood and their willingness to submit to unremunerated work 
within the family, there is an important element of ideology and ethnicity which makes 
well-educated highly-qualified middle class women into unpaid labourers, who work well 
below their own class potential and do so for little or no pay. In this respect, ethnicity does 
play a central part in creating identity (Afshar, 1989, p.223). 
So why might Muslim women also perceive themselves to be in a minority in a 
pre-dominantly Muslim country? The authoritarian secularism of didactic 
Westernization led conservative religious women to assume a secondary position. This 
secondary position also benefitted the rural patriarch who gained from the ban on veiled 
women’s education rights that effectively forced women to stay in domestic labour, 
away from working life. The wives of businessmen are predominantly housewives and 
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are involved in domestic labour within the terms of the moral economy of kinship, or 
else in less prestigious working positions like cleaning, secretarial jobs and catering. 
However, this situation seems to be changing with the access of conservative, 
young religious women to higher education after the ban on headscarves in places of 
education was removed in 2010, and these educated women are now being recruited 
into higher, white-collar, management positions in the workplace. This change has 
created a situation in which the wives of the businessmen are limited to domestic labour 
and some voluntary activities where ‘family representation’ is necessary, while the 
daughters of these same families become actively involved in business life. 
Even though the existence of women as business owners in the Islamic business 
world is very limited, both TUSKON and MÜSİAD have women’s sections that 
organize some events, and the number of women in the management departments of 
these companies is increasing. In both the Islamic business world and in the secularist 
business world, women are the pioneering figures of social events such as charity 
organizations and art exhibitions. It is mostly women who are responsible for 
organizing these events and for gathering people to make donations. In the case of 
Islamic business, these events include charity organizations to provide aid to the poor 
and to people suffering from the conflicts in Muslim countries like Somalia, Sudan and 
Syria. Amongst TÜSİAD members, the organizations and foundations for the 
educational institutions in Turkey and scholarships are the focus of women’s attention. 
6.3. Political Relations and Attitudes regarding Islamic Business People’s 
Associations’ Relationships with Politics and the AK Party 
Government 
The proposition that Islamic business people grew with the power and economic 
favouritism of the AK Party government is quite common in media debates and 
amongst some academics. However, this explanation of the rise of Islamic businesses is 
not quite accurate: Firstly, Islamic business was already in a trend of growth in the 
1990s, and secondly, the reason for this growth is mostly due to Turkey’s changing 
economic policy towards exporting and towards the creation of a new Turkish economic 
hinterland in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. In addition, the direct state 
protection over, and support of secularist businesses (represented by TÜSİAD) was 
withdrawn after 1980, and a new economic policy began to be implemented to assist the 
rise of small and middle scale entrepreneurship. This helped Islamic business to grow. 
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It is important to note that even if neo-liberalization took place in Turkey after 
the 1980s, through privatizations and the decreased role of the state in the creation of a 
capitalist class, the state, as a phenomenon, is still an important factor in the Turkish 
economy. There is no doubt that some of the business people who possessed good 
relationships with the various governments found more chances to grow rapidly than 
others. Especially after the 1980s, the government started to give incentives to small and 
mid-scale producers, and these incentives increased during the AK Party’s period. The 
conservative government supported the small and middle scale entrepreneurs for two 
reasons: first, they believe that the future of the growth of the Turkish economy can be 
made possible through the competitiveness of the new industrial entrepreneurs by 
demolishing the monopoly of larger capitalists who do not contribute enough to the 
development of country; and second, the larger capitalists are segments of the Kemalist 
power bloc with its Western influence, unlike small-to-mid-scale entrepreneurs. 
In contrast to Islamic business associations, TÜSİAD had serious conflicts with 
the AK Party government. In the 2010 Referendum, Erdogan openly criticized TÜSİAD 
for being against the democratization of the country and for not supporting the 
government in demolishing the influence of militarism in the country. Afterwards, 
similar conflicts occurred, and TÜSİAD and the AK Party openly blamed each other for 
different reasons. TÜSİAD’s concerns were mostly about Turkey’s relationship with the 
Western European Union membership and its agreements with the IMF. TÜSİAD has 
been critical of the AK Party for not making enough effort in the reformations for 
European Union membership, whereas the AK Party stated that the European Union 
does not appreciate the efforts of Turkey and implied that the EU will never accept 
Turkey as a full-member, no matter how much Turkey deserves to be a full member. 
Also, TÜSİAD repeatedly declared that the government should sign an agreement with 
the IMF to show the world that the Turkish economy is stable, whereas the AK Party 
openly opposed this idea by saying that the economy is already growing and stable and 
they do not want any foreign intervention in the country, which would be against the 
nation’s economic principles and independence. 
MÜSİAD supports more nationalist and independent foreign policies that are 
free from the influence of Europe, the USA and Israel. This does not mean the cutting 
off of all relations with these entities; however, according to MÜSİAD, these 
relationships should be on the basis of equal partnerships and collaboration. But for 
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MÜSİAD, the network corporation with Islamic countries is more important and more 
advantageous, since these countries are markets for the Turkish industry. 
Most of the primary business people among TÜSİAD members openly 
supported the Gezi Park Protests in 2013 against the AK Party Government. The largest 
business group and founder of TÜSİAD, Koç, wanted his hotel (Divan) to open the 
doors for the protestors in Taksim Square in Istanbul. Especially during the presidential 
elections in 2014 when Erdogan was elected as President, the municipal elections in 
2014, and the general parliamentarian elections in 2015, almost all of the mainstream 
media channels and newspapers owned by TÜSİAD members openly supported the 
opposition parties against the AK Party. The subsequent tax penalties against some of 
these companies by the Ministry of Finance are argued to be the result of this opposition 
campaign. 
TUSKON members, after the conflict began following Gulenist prosecutors’ 
opening of an alleged corruption investigation case against the government in the 17
th 
December Process, started to support opposition parties openly against the AK Party. 
The Gulenist media channels and newspapers that are owned by TUSKON members 
started a war against the AK Party that was even harsher than that of the TÜSİAD 
media groups. This conflict also led to some investigation by the Ministry of Finance 
into the largest TUSKON member: Ipek Group. Also, the only bank of the movement, 
Bank Asya, faced the risk of bankruptcy because of the campaigns by the government. 
Knowing that they had supported the AK Party  for thirteen years, TUSKON’s 
newfound political position on the same front as TÜSİAD seems to contradict its  
background, which shares more in common with MÜSİAD. MÜSİAD, it seems at the 
moment, both on the institutional level and on the level of the large majority of its 
members, is the only important supporter of the AK Party government in terms of 
financing, participating as politicians within the AK Party, and establishing media 
channels to help the party to have a strong public voice. 
6.3.1. ‘Us’ versus ‘Others,’ or Islamic Business versus Secularist Business 
The most important aspect of the dichotomy between Islamic business and 
secularist business is that this conflict perfectly overlaps with political and cultural 
conflicts. Secularist business people are the organic segments of the authoritarian 
Kemalist state tradition, through their integration into the anti-democratic militarist 
Page | 171 
regime, and also since they were created by this structure through the foundation of the 
Republic on the principles of secularism and Westernism. Gellner defines this as 
“didactic secularism” and “authoritarian secularization” (Gellner, 1983). In addition, 
since they are part of this Westernist tradition, they oppose any Islamic or nationalist 
ideals that contradict this cultural Westernization and its accompanying political and 
economic dependency on the West. Former President of TÜSİAD and owner of 
Turkey’s largest and wealthiest holding company, Mustafa Koç, emphasized this 
dependency in the middle of a harsh speech in which he was criticizing the AK Party 
government for turning Turkey’s face to the East instead of towards the West: 
“Turkey’s dependency on the West is our non-negotiable red line” (Savran, 2007, p.9). 
On the contrary, Islamic business is part of the conservative political movement 
in Turkey that demolished the Kemalist/Militarist power bloc, which had organic 
relations with the large capitalists. Also, the conservative people’s emphasis on Islam, 
traditions and national history is totally against the cultural Westernization of Turkey. 
They see Islam as an important part of their identity and present this in the public 
sphere, not only in their private lives. 
According to the TUSKON- member Gulenist business people, ‘the others’ were 
just the secularists until 2013. Then the AK Party government and its supporters became 
‘the new other’. This is a contradictory and confusing situation for the movement. The 
level of exclusion of the community from broader society increased because the 
movement was excluded from the huge socially and politically conservative part of 
Turkey in addition to its existing exclusion from the Westernized, secularist part of the 
society. 
I do not have a problem with secularism, but if they do not respect my right to practice the 
religion and try to force our daughters and sisters to take off their veils as they did during 
the 90s, then I have a problem. But now, the AK Party is more hostile to the community 
than the military was in the process of 28th February, 1997: they are trying to destroy the 
community. Did you see how Oktay Ekşi [primary secularist columnist and MP of the 
People’s Republican Party (CHP)] came and supported our authors of the Newspaper 
Zaman [The most popular newspaper of the Gulen movement] when the police of the 
government picked them to interrogate because of the case against them? We did not show 
the same support for the secularists when they faced similar cases (R.Z., interview). 
An important TUSKON figure in Ankara, N.M., continues: 
There is a lack of self-confidence in TUSKON. They almost beg people to register as 
members. On the contrary, it should be totally the opposite; people should beg TUSKON to 
be members. But the AK Party government does not support TUSKON as they support 
MÜSİAD, so people hesitate to become members. Especially since the 2013 conflict with 
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the AK Party, many people have stopped being members, but the people who stayed 
consolidated their loyalty to the Community and even started to make more donations to the 
movement (N.M., interview). 
The frustration with, and opposition to TUSKON and the Gulen Movement 
increased among MÜSİAD members after the conflict between the Gulenists and the 
AK Party began. MÜSİAD tried to inspect the Gulenists to discover if any had been in 
their association’s committees previously. The membership process then became stricter 
to protect itself. This is because, to some extent, Gulenists are perceived as the spies of 
foreigners by some MÜSİAD members and by the government. While talking about 
their perspectives on TUSKON and the Gulen Movement in general, some MÜSİAD-
member interviewees were proud to say that “they understood what the Gulenists really 
were and what they stood for” long before the AK Party did. Also, in the local and 
national elections of the chambers’ unions, MÜSİAD and TUSKON have been in 
competition for a long time, even before the conflict between the Gulenists and the AK 
Party. 
In terms of this cultural division, in most of their interviews Islamic business 
people defined the TÜSİAD members and secularist/Westernist people in general with 
denigrating phrases such as ‘drinkers’, ‘they do not care about religion’, ‘they are not 
nationalistic or patriotic’, ‘degenerate people’, and ‘their women are too open’. “I do 
not think that this part of the society cares about ‘self-pride and honour’ [in Turkish: 
namus]” (R.Z., interview). By this he definitely means the secularists. 
On the other hand, there are similar stereotypes about Islamic business people, 
as the media argues. Frequently, in daily life and in mass media channels, religious, 
conservative people in general and Islamic business people in particular were described 
with demeaning phrases such as ‘backward’, ‘they want us to become like Iran or Saudi 
Arabia’, ‘they only benefit from the AK Party government’s influence’, ‘green capital’ 
(referring to the common assumption that green is the colour of Islam), ‘uneducated 
people’, ‘villagers’, and ‘ignorant people’. This binary opposition determines the 
cultural and political struggle in Turkey, which dominates the recent history of the 
country. 
In terms of attitudes towards the social and political differences in Turkey, 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON underline the importance of social and political pluralism and 
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strengthening democratization and human rights. Both of these associations declared 
their support for joining the EU while meeting the criteria regarding the problems of 
democratization, rights of the non-Muslim minority in the constitution.  
6.3.2. Comparison of Islamic Business Associations in Terms of their Interactions 
with Modern Capitalism 
Contrasting with both the Kemalist modernization project, which tried to import 
and adopt another culture, and the anti-reactionary Islamist fundamentalism against this 
modernization, the case of Islamic entrepreneurs gives evidence of being both Muslim 
and modern-capitalist in a unique way. Benefiting from the trust networks formed by 
Islamic collective identity and religious motives that contribute to their businesses in 
terms of networking, partnerships, business ambition, labour relations, political 
connections and commercial reliability, Islamic business is an example of a new 
synthesis of modernity and Islam. Beside religion, this synthesis also merges local 
cultures and traditions with modernity, as the multiple modernities approach presents. 
As a new modern example, Islamic businesses possess internal contradictions as 
well. Their contradictory opinions and behaviours regarding the use of bank interest 
form a primary example of these contradictions. The ways in which using (or not using) 
bank interests are justified demonstrates the fact that Islamic business values are not 
determined and agreed upon by all factions, and this is an on-going process. Second, the 
free will of individuals can sometimes be dominated by an altruistic type of behaviour 
for the sake of ‘all’, as we see in the behaviours and attitudes of Islamic business people 
concerning trade unionism, consumption behaviours and political trends. As in all on-
going processes, the contradictions co-exist within a synthesis. As a part of its nature, a 
synthesis does not necessarily have to be the combination of two equal halves; instead, 
in every synthesis, there can be dominant segments, and all syntheses are by nature 
incomplete processes. Since Islamic business is a new phenomenon, the cultural traits of 
the entrepreneurs are transforming into a more urban, middle class culture by 
confronting the Western culture that is the heritage of the official ideology. 
Islamic business is not only an example of the synthesis of Islam and modernity, 
but also an example of an alternative, authentic, civilian modernization case against a 
top-down, statist, and authoritarian, Euro-centric modernization project. This is a sign of 
the flourishing of the civil society against the state, which society was created and 
emerged by its own cultural and historical conditions. Secondly, in economic terms, in 
contrast to the monopoly of the statist capitalists, Islamic entrepreneurs increase the 
competitiveness of the Turkish industry, services and market, triggering innovation and 
progress as well as playing an important role in employment in the country. Thirdly, 
this is a case of the cross-fertilization of the social and rural periphery with modernity 
and capitalist business. 
The two large factions of Islamic business have commonalities as well as 
differences. The major commonality is their sociological backgrounds in terms of being 
recently urbanized and in their social mobility trends. The most important difference 
between the two of them is that since TUSKON is an association of the Gulen 
movement, it has a hierarchy within itself, which excludes non-Gulenists. This affects 
the level of formation of individual and class identities, which are basic institutions in 
modern societies. In this sense, MÜSİAD is more transparent, pluralistic and 
democratic as a non-governmental organization that is at the core of civil society. 
. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION 
7.1. Summary of the Study 
In this study, a new social, economic and political phenomenon of Islamic 
entrepreneurship in Turkey is investigated within the context of Turkish modernization. 
In this investigation, the historical roots of state-business relations in Turkey, Islamic 
conservatism in culture and politics, and the social/political divisions raised by Turkish 
modernization are taken into account. 
This research is based on a triangulation of historical and theoretical discussions 
and an analysis of fieldwork. The trajectory of the relationships between politics and 
business, and the rise of conservative politics and business people within the analysis of 
the data extracted from interviews with Islamic business people will be traced by 
questioning the interaction of new Islamic business people with Turkish modernization. 
This study located itself on the meeting point of a few specific dichotomies that 
have been debated in the literature of Turkish modernity: First, the study began with 
discussions of modernizations of non-Western countries within the context of Turkish 
modernization by questioning the development of a group of business people that 
flourished and grew to be an important economic, social and political elite, defining 
themselves as a group that is non-Western and that does not sacrifice deeply-held 
religious, national and traditional values. 
This study began with introductory information and a discussion of the context 
of the participants’ experiences of the modernization of non-Western countries. The 
case of Turkish modernization was examined in this context by benefiting from the 
‘multiple modernities approach’. This approach basically suggests two premises: First, 
that the ways of modernization are multifaceted, and are not necessarily brought about 
through Westernization even though the West is the first hegemonic reference point 
because of its historical precedence and political power. According to this approach, 
secularization is not a requirement for being modernized, contrary to the arguments of 
many scholars (e.g., Lerner, 1964), and it is argued that there are examples of non-
secular modernities in non-European regions (Eisenstadt, 2000; Fourie, 2012). For this 
research, the multiple modernities approach opens the door to understanding the 
processes of modernization in non-Western societies without cultural Westernization. 
The multiple modernities approach is functional for understanding the rise of the  
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Islamic elites in Turkey. 
Second, and to some extent related to the first theoretical argument, the relations 
between the Turkish state, its role in the modernization process, and its power in social 
and economic life form the basis that this research is built upon. According to 
mainstream Marxian and some liberal analyses which are prevalent in the analysis of 
the state in general and the Turkish state specifically, the state has no autonomy in terms 
of managing the economy and of influencing social change, and is regarded as an 
‘apparatus of the bourgeoisie’. As discussed in the historical background chapter, the 
Turkish state – with its rich Ottoman heritage – is the source of political, social and 
economic power, rather than this source stemming from the actions of any specific 
social class. 
In its early stages of development as a rural society, where no feudal or capitalist 
classes existed, the state was the only hegemonic power in history. Starting from the 
Tanzimat (Re-organization) period and continuing through the period of the Republic, 
the state had two primary objectives: Creating a national bourgeoisie and modernizing 
the country through the transformation of traditional Islamic society into a Western 
society by accepting the cultural programme of Westernist modernization. This aim led 
to the creation of a capitalist group with an organic relationship with the civic and 
militaristic bureaucracy that controlled the state power. 
As discussed by some non-Marxian scholars in their conceptualizations of a 
‘strong state tradition’ and a ‘centre-periphery duality’ in Turkish studies, this alliance 
between the bureaucracies, capitalists, military and organic intellectuals of this structure 
contradicted the traditional Islamic and rural majority of a society that had no previous 
economic, political or social power (Heper, 1985; Mardin, 1973). This formation had 
continued until recently with the help of a single-party regime, military coups, and the 
privileging of a praetorian social structure over elected governments. This political 
structure created a hegemonic and monopolistic business elite that was formed and 
shaped by the official ideology of the state. In these conditions, even though this 
business elite had been hegemonic throughout Turkish modern history, the emergence 
and rise of a new, Islamic business group led this research to analyse and to understand 
the dichotomy between two distinct groups of modern Turkish business elites. 
Third, the debates on the civic Islamic movements or social background of 
conservative politics in Turkey and its duality with liberalism, secularism and 
Page | 176 
democracy forms the meeting point upon which this research is built. The literature on 
the concepts of Islamism, political Islam, Islamic movements, Islamic radicalism and 
Islamic finance has increased significantly, especially after each of the incidents of the 
Cold War, the rise of the thesis of ‘clash of civilizations’, the 9/11 attacks, the Arab 
Spring, and the terrorism of Al-Qaida and ISIS all over the world. In the case of Turkey, 
radical Islamist movements were never a real threat because of Turkish Islam’s 
moderate culture based on Sufi traditions, including the heritage of moderation of its 
Central Asian background, the pluralities of the Ottoman Empire, the strict secularist 
policies and cultural transformation programmes that have been implemented by the 
Republic. 
However, the rise of the Welfare Party had remarkable connotations for political 
Islam in 1994, 28 February 1997, the process of military intervention, and the rule of 
the AK Party starting from 2002 onwards, and caused great national and international 
academic interest in Islamism, Islamic movements in general, and in Turkish 
conservatism in particular. In these debates, significant numbers of works tend to ignore 
the authenticity of Turkey’s Islamic economic, social and political movements due to 
their Euro-centric outlook. These debates also tend to perceive these movements as 
transforming from a radical position to a liberal one; from previously radical Islamism 
that directs the top-down Islamization of society and the collapse of secular-democratic 
political and legal systems by bringing a despotic regime and caliphate through an 
Islamist revolution, towards a liberal, democratic, Islamic way of thinking which is 
defined as ‘absorption’ by capitalism (e.g., Tugal, 2009). However, this Euro-centric, 
reductionist perspective has failed to explain the nature of Islamism in Turkish society 
and politics, and describes these key factors as if they are homogenous in their pasts and 
presents. 
In order to comprehend and grasp the secularists’ understanding of the AK 
Party, we must make a distinction between the oppressive form of secularism that forces 
religion to be limited to the private, individual space, and the ‘passive secularism’ that 
allows the neutrality of the state towards religion and that also permits the visibility of 
religion in the public space (Hale & Ozbudun, 2010). These debates and claims led to 
misleading conclusions concerning the rise of Islamic entrepreneurs in Turkey who are 
an influential band that affect social, political and economic developments in the 
country. 
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In order to eliminate the misconceptions of the secularists, this study examines 
the new Islamic entrepreneurship in Turkey in terms of the interactions between the 
conservative, Islamic business people and Turkish modernization, which are 
investigated in three spheres: economic development and structural changes in relations 
between business and politics; the making of a new conservative, Islamic social elite 
class that came from the social periphery into the centre; and the rise of conservative 
politics and the interdependent nature of relationships amongst Islamic businesses. 
This research attempts to construct a theoretical analysis for perceiving Islamic 
entrepreneurs in Turkey through an examination of the empirical, qualitative data 
obtained from the life-stories and the self-interpretations of the business people that 
were revealed in the case-study interviews. The emergence, rise, change, evolution, 
interactions and relations of Islamic entrepreneurs and their inner differences and 
factions are also explored in this study. This research focuses on two pioneering groups 
of the Islamic business people in Turkey: MÜSİAD and TUSKON. These are the two 
largest Turkish Islamic business associations in terms of the numbers of their members, 
their influence and power in politics and the economy, and their symbolic importance 
for the country. 
These two cases are articulated and analysed by merging the two different lines 
through historical analysis of empirical data. First, MÜSİAD and TUSKON are both 
associations and their members are participants in a social movement. This study 
explores the trajectory of these entrepreneurial associations and their perspectives on 
Islamic finance, labour relations and unionism, partnerships and the moral economy of 
kinship, the importance of their values in business life, the pathway to the social 
mobility of the entrepreneurs, their consumer cultures, ways of spending their leisure 
time, their views on ‘the other’, the position and influence of women in the associations 
and Islamic businesses, their relationships to politics, their self-interpretations of their 
political identities, and the influence of their members within these business 
associations. 
Finally, after analysing theoretical and empirical data on MÜSİAD and 
TUSKON, a comparative analysis of these two factions of the Islamic business world is 
conducted. The similarities and the differences in these two associations in terms of 
their emergence, development, rise and evolution are also explored. 
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7.2. Summary of the Findings 
The empirical and theoretical analysis of this study demonstrates that the over-
generalizing reductions of Euro-centric and orientalist perspectives on Islamic business 
people are incorrect to a significant extent. 
First, the personal histories and narratives of almost all of the interviewees from 
both factions are not related to radical Islamist groups that are against capitalism, 
democracy and relations with the West categorically. Instead, they had different 
political pasts, which involved membership in right wing, conservative political 
movements such as the Welfare Party, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and/or 
centre-right parties like the ANAP or the DYP. This falsifies the proposition that all 
Islamic business people had radical Islamist ties and became liberal-conservatives 
afterwards. This means this change is not a rupture; instead it is continuation, as Islamic 
Turkish entrepreneurs adapted new political demands for themselves while evolving 
from a traditional Turkish conservative political stance into a more liberal and 
democratic form of conservatism. 
Second, it would be accurate to say that – especially one faction of Islamic 
entrepreneurship, MÜSİAD, not as an association but in terms of the political choices of 
its members – is seen as the ‘back yard’ of the AK Party, and during the field study a 
majority of the observations, interviews and data about the MPs of the AK Party that 
come from a MÜSİAD background validated this assumption. But it is important to 
remember that conservative politics in contemporary Turkey is under the definite 
hegemony of the AK Party, which does not provide any other feasible choices for 
conservative business people. At the same time, the emergence and development of the 
AK Party has an interdependent relationship with Islamic business people by becoming 
a culturally conservative, politically democratic, economically liberal, and 
diplomatically proactive party that could take the country to become a leading power in 
the region and in the Islamic world, but that could also form strong relationships with 
the EU and the USA on equal terms. The AK Party, with its conservative democratic 
political programme, provided a significant means to satisfy this demand. 
Thus, the proposition that Islamic business people’s rise is a direct result of the 
AK Party’s political rule is a reductionist, misleading proposition. Even if the AK Party 
’s rule influenced Islamic business people in quite a positive way, the opposite could 
also be easily claimed. MÜSİAD’s executives and its official declarations, and also both 
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MÜSİAD’s and TUSKON’S members’ involvement in the foundation and development 
process of the AK Party, show that this process is an interdependent process. This 
interdependent process both gives Islamic business people access to government bids 
and lends credibility to the support of the government, and at the same time allows the 
AK Party to be supported by the new elites in the society in terms of voting, media 
channels and sponsorship. 
Third, Islamic business people have different tendencies towards political 
identification, perspectives on Islamic finance and unionism, have different attitudes 
towards consumer culture, and have a variety of diverse attitudes concerning the role of 
Islamic values, communitarian relationships, ways of spending leisure-time, and 
attitudes towards labour and partnership networks. These tendencies demonstrate a 
simple and important fact: Islamic business people in Turkey are not homogenous as 
previous arguments claimed. Rather, there exist different groups, factions and 
individuals that all have various differences and similarities. However, in terms of the 
differences within factions, while MÜSİAD has more inner plurality among its 
members, because TUSKON is an association of a certain Islamic social group, the 
Gulen movement, its members tend to be more homogenous. 
Fourth, there is a high sensitivity concerning the role of Islamic values in terms 
of the functions of Islamic finance, labour relations, conspicuous consumption, 
lifestyles and the political influence of the Gulen movement. However, sensitivity about 
this topic does not necessarily lead Turkish business people to behave or act according 
to their beliefs. In some cases (such as usage of bank interest), it might be seen that 
beliefs and Islamic rules may contradict the business activities of some business people. 
These contradictions can even be seen with the same businessman within the same 
interview. Numerous examples occurred in the interviews of such contradictions, such 
as the businessman who criticizes the conscious consumption of other conservative 
people but at the same time defends the idea that his wife has to drive a luxurious jeep 
because of safety reasons, or another businessman accusing other Islamic business 
people of being ‘fake’ for using bank credit, but at the same time confessing that he 
himself uses public bank credit even if there is interest involved in the process, 
justifying himself by saying that these are not private banks, they are public banks that 
are beneficial to the state and society. This could be related not only to the level of 
sincerity of certain business people, it is also related to the emergence of a new social 
group without becoming institutionalized or establishing a new Islamic business 
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paradigm, where such contradictions can occur in the early stages. In fact, such 
contradictions are often and generally seen during large social changes of social groups 
in transition or empowerment. 
Fifth, the differences between the two factions of Islamic business people are 
undeniably important. The competition, rivalry, and sometimes hostility among Islamic 
movements have always existed as a kind of rumour within Turkish conservative 
political circles until recently. Some incidents in the elections of the local or national 
Chambers of Commerce were the tiny tip of an iceberg. Nevertheless, after the process 
of 17th December 2013, which caused a war between the AK Party and the Gulen 
Movement due to the alleged corruption investigation brought against the AK Party 
government by Gulenist prosecutors, the social and religious groups supporting the AK 
Party openly declared their hostilities against Gulenists. 
Even if there had already been important differences in the approaches towards 
religion (e.g., the Gulenist approach of inter-faith dialogue, tolerance, and occasional 
support for American or Israeli foreign politics, etc.), the conflict of Gulen Movement 
with the AK Party and AK Party-led majority of conservative Islamic religious and 
social groups. Almost all of the interviewees, business people and employees from both 
sides (MÜSİAD and TUSKON) that I interviewed for the field study spoke about each 
other as ‘other’ in a paradigm of binary opposition. The political choices, identities, 
religious approaches in terms of Islamic values, their relationships with non-Muslims 
and secularists, and the hierarchy and organization of the community and business 
structures all tend to become increasingly differentiated among these two factions. 
Thus, without seeing and analysing this inner duality within Islamic business, any 
explanation or assumption about Islamic business people in Turkey could be 
misleading. 
Sixth, the assumption that the majority of Islamic business people who joined 
these factions because of short-term interests such as gaining the political support of the 
government is not valid, generally speaking. This is because most of these business 
people existed well before the foundation of the AK Party, and also before they became 
members of these associations during the strict secularist oppression periods like the 
28th February military intervention process when they were severely disadvantaged and 
isolated. 
Seventh, the observations derived from these interviews explore important facts 
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about TUSKON and the Gulen Movement in general. Previously, there was a general 
idea that TUSKON members belonged to the movement on various levels. However, 
after the conflict with the AK Party Government and its isolation policies towards the 
Gulenists, a large number of members who previously belonged to TUSKON left the 
association and even left the Gulen Movement itself as a reaction to the attitudes of the 
Gulen movement. These facts demonstrate both the importance of political changes 
in business life in Turkey and also that the Gulenist business people with close 
ties to the movements stayed on as members, while other members who opted out of 
this circle did not want to stay and to be stigmatized. Furthermore, the strict 
centrally formed hierarchy of the Gulen movement demands a certain rate of 
annual income from its members, which caused these business people to be less 
flexible and which led to struggles within the association. 
Last but not least, Turkish Islamic business people’s manner of interacting with 
Turkish modernization is a unique phenomenon. They emerged as a reaction both to the 
cultural Westernization of Turkish modernization and to the monopolistic hegemony of 
large Turkish capitalists which can be described as secular and Westernized that were 
created and supported as a part of the Westernist/secularist modernization process of the 
Turkish Republic. Even the name of the first and largest Islamic business association, 
MÜSİAD, is a reaction to both of these issues. Because the name MÜSİAD is the 
initials of the ‘The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’, it is an 
opposition to the state-supported monopoly of large capitalists, and also its first three 
initials, ‘MÜS’, signal a reaction to the cultural Westernist and authoritarian secularism 
by connoting Muslim identity. 
The interaction of Westernist Turkish modernization and Islamic business 
people varies concerning social backgrounds, education levels and factions. Some 
business people oppose any cultural symbols, such as the symbols of fashion, 
leisure and social networks, just because they come from the West. However, it 
would be difficult to claim that most of these critics could ever manage to be 
completely free from all of these Western influences, especially in the age of 
globalization. But there also exist cultural symbols that are perceived as being 
symbolic of a break from their own identity and as signs of becoming ‘culturally 
degenerated’. 
These  symbols  of  ‘cultural  degeneration’,  in  the  understanding  of  Islamic 
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business people, include drinking alcohol, wearing tuxedos for men and revealing 
dresses for women, spending too much money on luxuries like expensive cars or living 
in high-class neighbourhoods in expensive houses, not being loyal to the words, 
community and faith of the family network, having a ‘typical Western businessman 
character’ (which has negative connotations), and involvement in illicit relationships, 
which are all seen as symbols of degenerative Westernization and are openly criticized 
during the interviews. Also, the symbols of the strict Westernized cultural policies of 
the Republic, such as the imposition of Western classical music and opera, being against 
Ottoman history, or banning religious symbols like wearing headscarves, caused a 
strong reaction. Most Islamic business people attempt to show by several daily practices 
that they are against these policies in public spaces by having religious Sufi music 
played at their wedding ceremonies, by hanging Ottoman flags or signs on the walls of 
their workplaces, and by employing female employees who wear headscarves. 
As stated above, all social groups in the stage of emergence have similar 
contradictions, and their responses and reactions to Westernization included many of 
them. However, it is important to emphasize the fact that the basic, guiding principle of 
all Islamic business people is to be conservative in their religious, national, historical, 
traditional and cultural symbols. But unlike radical Islamist groups, they do not oppose 
the idea of any social, political or economic relationship with Western firms or 
societies, and they are open to exchange and transfer of Western values as long as they 
are not perceived as threats to their identities. 
Despite the inner contradictions, varieties of inner-differences and the factions, 
Islamic business people in Turkey might be argued to be an example of an alternative, 
non-Western development model, which is an opposite model to the Westernization 
ideal of the Turkish Republic. Co-existence of religiosity and modern capitalist 
entrepreneurial spirit could be proven to those holding the old-fashioned Euro-centric 
views against Islamic business. The type or level of co-existence could be argued to be 
controversial; however, starting from a very disadvantaged position, the success story of 
rural based, Islamic people becoming significant economic actors by dealing with 
industry needs to be appreciated. 
The emergence and rise of Islamic business falsifies another Euro-centric view 
about the compatibility of Islam and capitalism, at least in the contemporary Turkish 
case. This Euro-centric view advocates that Islam is incompatible with capitalism by 
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nature (Weber, 1978, p.625; Lerner, 1958, p.405). However, Rodinson opposes this idea 
by saying that there is no correlation between Islam and any particular economic 
system. Whilst it has been held that Islam did not create any commercial activity, or 
even opposed it, in reality the leaders of the Islamic expansion were traders, and the 
spread of Islam into three continents happened mostly via trade (Rodinson, p.186). The 
type of industrial entrepreneurialism Islamic business people has shown, and the level 
and the way they grew is a very good example of this compatibility in the modern 
capitalist business world. 
In the literature on Islamic business people in Turkey, there is a terminological 
confusion. First, the confusion is about the terms ‘Islamic’, ‘Muslim,’ ‘Islamist’ and 
‘conservative’. As discussed in the introduction, in this study the terms ‘Islamic’ or 
‘conservative’ are used to define these business people, while Islamism refers to an 
extreme political movement and ‘Muslim’ is not descriptive in a country where a large 
majority of people define themselves as Muslims. Instead, ‘Islamic’ or ‘conservative’ 
refer to the religious identity, serial values, lifestyle or political conservatism without 
any radical or extremist political connotations. 
Similarly, there is another confusion on the sociological definition of this 
Islamic entrepreneurial group. Yankaya (2014) defines this group as the ‘new Islamic 
bourgeoisie’ by discussing the social and cultural change and the mobility of this group. 
On the other hand, Buğra &Savaskan (2014) argues this group is a ‘new, different 
Islamic capitalist class’, and Savran (2015) views this group as ‘a fraction of capitalist 
class’. In this study, to describe this Islamic entrepreneurial group, the terms of ‘class’, 
‘movement’ and ‘interest group’ are used depending on the context. It is argued in this 
study that Islamic business people constitute a faction within Turkish capitalists and 
have features of a ‘capitalist class’ in terms of the context of labour relations. It is also 
considered in this research that this group has features of an ‘interest group’ because 
these Islamic businesses share common interests beyond being members of the same 
association. In fact, the people sharing common interests might be banded together 
through the pioneering and persuasive figures that can theorize and legitimize these 
common interests in the public sphere, not only in economic but also in cultural and 
political terms (Grossman, 2006, p.14). In this sense, as a result of the research, 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON are more than typical interest groups because they represent 
not only the interests of the business people but also the common political, traditional 
and religious principles of certain social backgrounds. For this reason, these 
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associations and the Islamic elite that these associations represent, independent from 
any particular context, could be best defined as a ‘movement’, which has economic, 
political and social aspects. In addition to the representation of the interests of an 
economic group, these two factions of Islamic business people (MÜSİAD and 
TUSKON) attempt to highlight and represent some political and social principles, 
values and ideals. This is the reason that Islamic entrepreneurs are held as an important 
actor in the rise and rule of the AK Party and also in building a new, alternative cultural 
elite by spreading an idea of a different, conservative way of life, consumption and 
cultural identity. 
7.3. Contribution to Literature 
This study focuses on a social, economic and political group that emerged in the 
1990s and started to become an important factor in Turkey during the 2000s. As a new 
phenomenon, the literature that specializes on Turkish Islamic entrepreneurs is not wide 
and well developed. Also, the literature on these factors in Turkey’s development has 
some serious flaws, and so one contribution of this study is to review the existing 
literature and to critically expose these flawed misinterpretations. 
First, while most studies about the new Islamic business elites in Turkey 
connect the rise of Islamic business to the influence of the conservative AK Party 
Government, this study proposes that the surge in both Islamic businesses and in 
conservative politics (AK Party) is based on an interdependent relationship in which 
both support and assist each other’s growth. 
Second, the majority of studies on the Islamic business class in Turkey adopt a 
Marxian approach by focusing solely on the justification of false assumptions that these 
entrepreneurs are successful because of the exploitation of labour through religious 
coercion. Such studies seek to justify the view that this faction of Turkish capitalism is 
essentially no different from any other except in their public presentations of their 
religious identities in public spaces. This reductionist perspective is questioned in this 
study, which analyses this social group not only in the aspect of their way of presenting 
their religious identities in public space or their labour relations, but also in many other 
and more complex aspects. 
Third, this is the only research that adopts the perspective of analysing the 
emergence and rise of this social group as an alternative manifestation of Turkish 
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modernization into a republican-Westernist modernization, and on the basis of the 
‘multiple modernities approach’. Without seeing culture or religion as the reasons for 
backwardness and underdevelopment, and in opposition to the idea of transferring or 
importing a culture, the rise and development of Islamic business people as 
industrialists, tradesmen and manufacturers into an important social, economic, and 
political actor is discussed in this study as an example of a conservative development 
strategy that affords economical growth, technological renovation, increase in the rates 
of employment and wages, reaching high rates of exports and contribution to the 
country as a result without sacrificing the traditional, religious or cultural traits and 
identity towards cultural Westernization. 
Fourth, this study is not the only study that attempts to combine theoretical 
approaches with field study to analyse Islamic business people (Ozdemir, 2006; Durak, 
2011; Yankaya, 2014). However, this research comprises the only study to analyse both 
Islamic business factions (MÜSİAD and TUSKON) in order to make a comparative 
analysis of them as two cases. Previously, most studies of Islamic businesses were 
conducted on MÜSİAD alone and almost no other research has been conducted to 
examine TUSKON as such. As MÜSİAD and TUSKON are the two largest factions of 
Islamic entrepreneurship in Turkey, any analysis that does not cover both is misleading. 
Fifth, the timing of this research distinguishes this research from others because 
of the high degree of fragmentation among Islamic business factions that occurred at the 
end of 2013. The timeliness of this study provides a unique opportunity to observe and 
to include recent incidents that have influenced the fortunes of Islamic business people. 
Moreover, the pronounced polarization between the secularists and the 
conservatives raised with widespread Gezi Park anti-government protests gave this 
study an opportunity to observe and to interpret the consequences of this social 
polarization on Islamic business people, a polarization that strengthened their identities. 
7.4. Suggestions for Further Research 
It is important to remember that this research is based solely upon the small 
sample of Islamic business people who I managed to interview, and makes no claims to 
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represent all of the Islamic business people in Turkey. However, this study combines a 
historical analysis of the emergence and rise of Islamic business people with the data 
extracted from the interviews in order to make some further assumptions. 
Second, as happens with all social research, this research is specific to a certain 
time and place, and thus this is a limited snapshot of more global perceptions and 
attitudes. The perceptions and attitudes expressed by interview subjects in this study 
could differ dramatically in another time and place. 
These two main limitations of this research also open new doors for further 
research in the future. First, further research on Islamic business people should include a 
wider sample composed of a larger number of interviewees and of Islamic business 
people from different regions of Turkey. Second, further research should be repeated 
with the same sample of Islamic business people at different temporal intervals in order 
to follow and analyse their change. Additionally, further research should be conducted 
to examine family members and to analyze their changing social dynamics. 
Furthermore, this study focused on the two largest and most influential Islamic 
business associations: MÜSİAD and TUSKON. However, there are numerous other, 
smaller associations in terms of size and power. Further research could be done to 
include these smaller factions to provide a more developed and broader analysis of 
Islamic business people in Turkey. 
Lastly, the emergence and rise of new Islamic entrepreneurship could be 
investigated in other Islamic societies or in other societies where Muslim communities 
are involved in order to provide a more holistic comparative analysis. 
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APPENDIX – LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Name Association Place 
O. T. MÜSİAD Istanbul 
N.L. MÜSİAD Ankara 
E.O. MÜSİAD Ankara 
N.I. MÜSİAD Ankara 
E.T.. MÜSİAD Ankara 
K.L., F. MÜSİAD Istanbul 
H.C. MÜSİAD Ankara 
T.U., F. MÜSİAD Istanbul 
H.G. MÜSİAD Ankara 
S.Y. MÜSİAD Ankara 
N, Y. TUSKON Ankara 
R.Z. TUSKON Ankara 
N.M. TUSKON Ankara 
G.A. TUSKON Ankara 
Y.S. TUSKON Ankara 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
AK Party : Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) 
CHP : People’s Republican Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) 
MHP : Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi) 
MÜSİAD : The Association of Independent Industrialist and Businessmen (Mustakil 
Sanayici ve Isadamlari Dernegi) 
TUSKON : The Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (Turkiye 
Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu) 
TÜSİAD : Turkiye Sanayici ve Isadamlari Dernegi 
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